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The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel Faced
with Client Misconduct: Disclosure of Client
Confidences or Constructive Discharge
H. LOWELL BROWNt
INTRODUCTION
Recent cases upholding in-house counsel's rights to sue for-
mer clients for wrongful discharge and other similar causes of
action have once again brought into focus the troubling issue of
whether, or under what circumstances, corporate counsel, par-
ticularly in-house counsel, are ethically obligated to "blow the
whistle" on their corporate client's misconduct. Where, in the
past, a lawyer's obligation to speak out in the face of client mis-
conduct was typically viewed as one of ethics and professional
conduct alone, increasingly, a lawyer's failure to disclose client
wrongdoing to the government or to third parties is also being
viewed as a basis of personal criminal and civil liability.
In view of the possibility of personal civil and criminal lia-
bility if counsel does not "blow the whistle" on the client's un-
lawful conduct, are there circumstances under which counsel
must either breach a client's confidences or resign? And if so,
would in-house counsel's resignation under those circumstances
constitute an actionable constructive discharge?
Courts are divided on these issues although a growing body
of case law suggests that an in-house counsel who must resign
for ethical reasons has recourse against the employer/client. In
any event, finding the point at which the lawyer's professional
responsibility is completely at odds with the lawyer's responsi-
bility to the client requires following a tortured path through
the applicable standards of ethics and decisional rules. This arti-
cle is an attempt to navigate the thicket.'
t (c) 1995 H. Lowell Brown Assistant General Counsel, Northrop Grumman Corpo-
ration; BA- Syracuse University; J.D. Antioch Law School. The author wishes to express
his appreciation to Richard R. Molleur, Corporate Vice President and General Counsel of
Northrop Grumman Corporation, for his assistance in the formulation and refinement of
this article. The article's faults are the responsibility of the author as are the opinions
expressed, which do not necessarily reflect the views of Mr. Molleur or the Northrop
Grumman Corporation.
1. Although the ethical standards provide basic guidance for corporate lawyers con-
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Part I of the article analyzes the basic framework of who is
the client and what confidences are protected, in the context of
the representation of a corporation. Part II discusses the alter-
natives open to corporate counsel who discover corporate mis-
conduct. Part III considers the possible consequences for corpo-
rate counsel if counsel remains silent in the face of client
illegality. And finally, Part IV presents possible remedies both
for the corporate counsel who must disassociate from the client's
illegality, and who for that reason, is terminated, either actually
or constructively, as well as for the corporate client facing dis-
closure of its confidences by the corporation's former counsel.
fronting corporate misconduct, both the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct have been criticized for failing to adequately re-
spond to the unique circumstances of a lawyer whose client is an entity rather than an
individual. See Jonathan J. Lerner, Traversing the Legal Ethics Minefield of the 1990's:
When Does the Corporate Counsel become a Cop? in THE ATroNENY-CmENT RELATIONSHIP
AFTER KAYS, SCHOLER, at 9, 17 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
779, 1992). As Lerner observes:
The difficulties presented to counsel faced with this situation are exacer-
bated by ethical rules that are not definitive. Neither the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct adopted in 1983 .... or, its predecessor, the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility adopted in 1969 .... and still in force in some
states, provide bright-line guidance as to the parameters of a lawyer's obliga-
tion when confronted with a client's misconduct.
Id. at 17; George D. Reycraft, Conflicts of Interest and Effective Representation: The Di-
lemma of Corporate Counsel, 39 HASTGS L.J. 605, 609 (1988). Reycraft notes that:
Problems for the corporate and securities lawyer arise because at various times
.... the interests of the organizational client's constituents diverge. The corpo-
rate counsel is then placed in the position of determining who commands his
primary loyalty and how he can adequately fulfill his duties and responsibili-
ties to each constituent in the face of their conflicting interests. Because the
Model Code and the Model Rules fail to explain how a corporate lawyer can de-
termine the 'entity's' interest in such situations, the lawyer must confront com-
peting loyalties and duties of confidences to the various groups with little or no
guidance as to how he might resolve the conflicts.
Id. at 609; Maureen H. Burke, The Duty of Confidentiality and Disclosing Corporate
Misconduct, 36 Bus. LAw. 239, 253 (1981). Burke states that:
Corporate counsel face unique problems. Their clients are abstract legal enti-
ties, heavily regulated by the government, and often wield enormous social and
economic power. The public increasingly looks to corporate lawyers as guardi-
ans of the corporate conscience. Unfortunately, the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility offers even less guidance to corporate lawyers faced with determin-
ing the scope of the duty to disclose client misconduct than it does to lawyers
with other types of clients.
Id. at 253.
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I. WHO IS THE CLIENT AND WHAT CONFIDENCES ARE PROTECTED?
A. Who Is The Client?
Every lawyer for a business entity, whether a member of an
in-house legal department or an attorney in an outside firm,
must be aware of and resolve the issue of who it is that the law-
yer represents. Both the Code of Professional Responsibility (the
"Code") and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the
"Model Rules") provide the facile answer that the client is the
entity and not the individuals who comprise it. For example,
under Canon 5 of the Code, Ethical Consideration 5-18 provides
the instruction that:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes
his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, em-
ployee, representative, or other person connected with the entity. In ad-
vising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interests and his
professional judgment should not be influenced by the personal desires of
any person or organization.
2
That the lawyer for the corporation represents the corpora-
tion and no one else is a truism bordering on tautology. Worse,
because the corporation has no will of its own or capacity to act
except through its human constituents: directors, officers, em-
ployees and stockholders, corporate counsel's relationship with
those who act on behalf of the corporation is fraught with ambi-
guity.3 On the one hand, corporate counsel must extract informa-
tion, often of a highly confidential nature, from the individuals
associated with the corporation with whom the lawyer regularly
deals, while at the same time the lawyer must segregate the in-
terests of those individuals as manifestations of the corporate
client (which must be protected) and the individual interests of
those same individuals (which the lawyer has no obligation to
protect).
4
2. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REspoNsIBLry EC 5-18 (1980).
3. This ambiguity led Louis Brandeis to remark, when asked whom he represented
in the face of numerous conflicting interests in United Shoe Machine Trust, "I represent
the situation." Brian D. Forrow, The Corporate Law Department Lawyer: Counsel to the
Entity, 34 Bus. LAw. 1797, 1800 (1979). Brandeis was roundly criticized for this charac-
terization of his role, see John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Represen-
tation of Multiple Clients in the Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 741, 742-43 (1992),
but nevertheless, the description is an apt one for corporate counsel. Forrow, supra, at
742-43.
4. The Code does not appear to have fully contemplated such a schizoid relation-
ship. See Forrow, supra note 3, at 1799. As Forrow notes:
The code is keyed to the relationship between a lawyer and a client, but a cor-
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An attempt at clarity was made with the adoption of the
Model Rules, which are now the prevailing standards of conduct
in the majority of states.5 Thus, Model Rule 1.13 provides, in
part, that "[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents." 6 And the comment following Model Rule 1.13
explains:
When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates
with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity,
the communication is protected .... This does not mean, however, that
constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The
lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the
representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by
the organizational client in order to carry out the representation ....
The distinction between the entity, a legal fiction, and those
empowered to act on behalf of the entity remains blurred, how-
ever. And as one commentator has observed, the situation is a
"perverse" one in which the lawyer is engaged by, advises, and
porate lawyer must deal not with an entity as a client in an abstraction but
with individuals having authority to act on behalf of the entity-employees,
managers and officers, members of the board of directors and, in some cases,
controlling shareholders.
Id.
5. The Model Rules have been adopted by 35 states and the District of Columbia
(Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming). Four states continue to fol-
low the Code, albeit with modifications (Massachusetts, Oregon, Virginia and New York).
See Note, Inside Fraud, Outside Negligence and the Savings and Loan Crises: When Does
Management Wrongdoing Excuse Professional Malpractice?, 26 Loy. L-A L. Rzv. 1165,
1209 nn.332, 333 (1993).
6. See Robert J. Kutak, Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 36 Bus. LAW.
573, 578-79 (1981). Kutak stated that:
As you know, Rule 1.13 ["organization as client"] proceeds from the traditional
premise that the lawyer for the corporation represents the corporation as op-
posed to any of its many constituencies. In other words, our point of departure
was the Code's Ethical Consideration 5-18; but we could not stop there because
that general premise provides no meaningful guidance to corporate counsel
called upon to make a specific decision under particular circumstances. If a
code of professional duty is to provide meaningful guidance to those who con-
suit it, the implications of that general premise must be fully explored and
clearly stated in the rules.
Id. at 578-79. Robert J. Kutak was the Chairman of the ABA Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards which proposed the Model Rules.
7. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFEssIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.13 cmt. (1995).
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can be discharged by, persons who are not the lawyer's clients
while the shareholders (the closest human manifestation of the
"client") are largely uninvolved and uninformed of the lawyer's
representation.
8
Nevertheless, while the entity-client theory has led to vex-
ing issues in litigation concerning multiple representation9 and
has been criticized by commentators, 0 the identification of the
entity as the client continues to serve as lodestar for the ethics
of corporate counsel."
8. See Ralph Jonas, Who is the Client?: The Corporate Lawyers Dilemma, 39 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 617 (1988). Jonas goes on to state:
[W]e have the perverse situation in which the lawyer who represents a publicly
held corporation is selected and retained by, and reports to and may be fired
by, the principal officers and directors of the corporation-who are not his cli-
ents. Moreover, the shareholders of a corporation, who, collectively, are the
owners of the mythical beast, typically do not participate in the process by
which the lawyer is selected, retained, or fired.
Id.
9. See, eg., Wylie v. Marley Co., 891 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1989) (exclusion of commu-
nications between a corporate employee and the general counsel on the grounds that the
employee reasonably believed he was seeking legal advice); Evans v. Artek, 715 F.2d 788
(2d Cir. 1983) (remanded in order to determine whether law firm would be disqualified
from representing individual parties in suit with acquiring corporation where the issue
was whether counsel, who had also served as counsel to the acquired entity, had con-
suited with plaintiff individually or as president of the entity); FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636
F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (corporate counsel prohibited from acting as counsel to a
wholly-owned subsidiary that was possibly subject to divestiture). As Professor Geoffrey
C. Hazard has pointed out, the creation of an attorney-client relationship with an em-
ployee of the corporation may result in counsel's inability to represent the corporation:
When the corporate officer begins talking, the lawyer must be mindful that a
lawyer-client relationship is in the making. At this point, if the lawyer treats
the corporate officer as the client, and if he learns things that may subject the
officer to criminal or civil liability, the lawyer is bound by the rule of confiden-
tiality not to disclose these matters to others, for example to the board of direc-
tors. But the lawyer's general retainer, if we may call it that, is to the corpora-
tion. The board will consider that it "is" the corporate client, and expect the
lawyer eventually to advise the board what to do, including advice about the
possibility of proceeding against the executive. The lawyer may find himself
unable to do that without violating his professional duty to the executive. The
board will then feel at least disappointed and very likely betrayed.
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETIucs IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 50 (1978).
10. See, ag., Roberta S. Karmel, Duty to the Target: Is an Attorney's Duty to the Cor-
poration a Paradigm for Directors?, 39 HAsTiNGs L.J. 677, 681 (1988); Jonas, supra note
8, at 622; Reycraft, supra note 1, at 610-11; Thomas B. Leary, Is there a Conflict in Rep-
resenting a Corporation and its Individual Employees?, 36 Bus. LAw. 591, 592 (1981).
11. Thus, as Robert Kutak observed, "[nlo matter which way we approach it I think
all recognize that an attorney's duty runs to the corporation and this will require that
the attorney act to protect the interest of the corporate client apart from the interests of
its many constituents! Kutak, supra note 6, at 577.
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B. What Confidences Are Protected?
The privilege from disclosure to third parties of a client's
communication with an attorney is a fundamental tenet of the
attorney-client relationship. It is the oldest of the common-law
privileges 2 and has as its purpose the encouragement of "full
and frank communications between attorneys and their clients.
.13 The privilege arises when one communicates with a lawyer
in the course of an attorney-client relationship, 14 and protects
not only the professional advice that is provided but also the
giving of information to the lawyer by the client, upon which the
advice is based.
15
In the corporate setting, the United States Supreme Court
has made it clear that communications from all levels of the cor-
poration, not solely those who would be considered the "control
group," are subject to the privilege. 16 Accordingly, the attorney
12. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("The attorney-client privi-
lege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common
law."). Indeed, the attorney-client privilege has its origins in Roman law and was incor-
porated in early English law. See Burke, supra note 1, at 242; Junius Hoffman, On
Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud--the Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAw.
1389, 1396 (1978).
13. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389. As one commentator has suggested, the attorney-
client privilege creates a "safe house" of non-disclosure. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1395-
96. As Hoffman elaborates:
A logical way to insure that [the lawyer's duty to the client] will be done is to
constitute the lawyer a safe house of non-disclosure for confidential informa-
tion received from his client. And of course the particular foundation upon
which such safe house has been built is the attorney-client privilege.
Id.
14. Thus, it is said that the privilege applies if.
(1) [The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is act-
ing as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney
was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the
purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services
or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of com-
mitting a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege.has been (a) claimed and (b) not
waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
15. Upjohn Co., 449 US. at 390 ("[T]he privilege exists to protect not only the giving
of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the
lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice.").
16. As the Court stated in Upjohn Co.:
In the case of the individual client the provider of information and the person
who acts on the lawyer's advice are one and the same. In the corporate context,
however, it will frequently be employees beyond the control group as defined
by the court below--"officers and agents ... responsible for directing [the com-
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client privilege will attach if: (1) the communications were made
to corporate counsel, acting as such 17; (2) the communications
were made at the direction of management in order to secure le-
gal advice from counsel; (3) the communications concerned mat-
ters within the scope of the employees' corporate duties; and (4)
at the time the communications were made, the employees were
aware that they were being questioned in order that the corpo-
ration could obtain legal advice.'
8
Although both the attorney-client privilege and the lawyer's
ethical obligation to preserve client confidences serve the same
end of encouraging communication between lawyer and client,
the two are not coextensive. Indeed, the ethical obligation is sig-
nificantly broader than the privilege. The attorney-client privi-
lege is an evidentiary privilege that prohibits compelled disclo-
sure to third parties of client confidential communications. 19
Thus, the privilege only arises in the context of litigation. Fur-
ther, because the privilege is a rule of exclusion, the privilege is
construed narrowly2
0
pany's] actions in response to legal advice"-who will possess the information
needed by the corporation's lawyers. Middle-level-and indeed lower-level-em-
ployees can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the cor-
poration in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employ-
ees would have the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is
adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential
difficulties.
449 U.S. at 391.
17. The applicability of the privilege to communications with corporate counsel is
sometimes difficult to sustain because corporate counsel from time-to-time function as
both legal and business advisors. Thus, the privilege has not been recognized when it
has been found that corporate counsel's activities were not primarily those of a lawyer,
as for example, where counsel served as a business advisor, see, ag., United States v.
Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044 (5th Cir. 1981) (receipt and disbursement of funds); United
States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630, 640 (9th Cir. 1980) (sale of equipment); SEC v. Gulf &
Western Industries, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 683 (D.D.C. 1981) (acting as a corporate di-
rector, member of pension fund investment committee and investment advisor); negotia-
tor, see, e.g., Attorney General v. Covington & Burling, 430 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (D.D.C.
1977) (contract negotiations); or lobbyist, see, e.g., North Carolina Elec. Membership
Corp. v. Carolina Power and Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 517 (M.D.N.C. 1986).
18. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 394.
19. See, eg., Doe v. A Corporation, 709 F.2d 1043, 1046 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The attor-
ney-client privilege is evidentiary. A client may invoke it to prevent his lawyer from re-
vealing communications made in confidence to the lawyer while acting in the capacity of
professional legal advisor for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.").
20. See, eg., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d
1414, 1423 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Because the attorney-client privilege obstructs the truth-
finding process, it is construed narrowly"); Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572
F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1978) ("While the privilege, where it exists, is absolute, the ad-
verse effect of its application on the disclosure of truth may be such that the privilege is
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In contrast, a lawyer's ethical obligation of confidentiality is
not limited to judicial proceedings, but instead relates to all of
the lawyer's activities on behalf of the client.21 Unlike the attor-
ney-client privilege that prohibits only disclosure of confidential
information, 22 the ethical rule prohibits both disclosure and use
of client confidences. 23 This is, at least in part, because rather
strictly construed."); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1970). Ac-
cording to the Fifth Circuit in Garner:
[Tihe privilege remains an exception to the general duty to disclose. Its bene-
fits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete... It
is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but is nonetheless an ob-
stacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly confined within
the narrowest possible limits, consistent with the logic of its principle.
Id. (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (1940)). See also Samuel H. Gruenbaum, Cli-
ents' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations: A Response to Professor Kramer, 68 GEO.
L.J. 191, 195 (1979) ("[T]he privilege is construed narrowly and strictly because its appli-
cation detracts from full disclosure and thus is detrimental to the administration of jus-
tice. It therefore may be asserted only after careful analysis shows that all of the ele-
ments necessary to bring it into existence are present.").
21. See Burke, supra note 1, at 241 ("The ethical obligation is broader than the at-
torney-client evidentiary privilege. The evidentiary privilege only arises in a situation in-
volving litigation, whereas the ethical obligation governs an attorney's behavior in all his
professional duties.") (footnote omitted). This is also made clear in the comment follow-
ing Model Rule 1.6 ("Confidentiality of Information") which states:
The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which
a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to provide evidence
concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situa-
tions other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through com-
pulsion of law.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1995).
22. In order to be subject to the attorney-client privilege, the communication must
be of a confidential nature. Thus, for example, checks drawn to attorneys are not consid-
ered confidential communications and accordingly are not protected from disclosure. See
Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1969) ("[T]he client, by writing the
check which the attorney will later cash or deposit at the bank, has set the check afloat
on a sea of strangers .... Thus, the check is not a confidential communication, as is the
consultation between attorney and client."); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 463
(9th Cir. 1963) ("The canceled checks and bank statements are not within the attorney-
client privilege. These items were negotiable instruments in commerce and were never
confidential from the time of their creation. Their transfer from the client to the attor-
ney did not constitute a confidential communication."). Similarly, information provided
to a lawyer for preparation of a document that is intended to be disclosed to third par-
ties may not be subject to the privilege. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d
1352, 1355-56 (4th Cir. 1984) (information provided for the preparation of a prospectus
was not privileged); United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983) (informa-
tion to be included in tax return was not privileged).
23. So, for example, under the Code, "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly... reveal a
confidence or secret of his client ... [ulse a confidence or secret of his client to the dis-
advantage of the client... [u]se a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of
himself or of a third person. . ." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-
101(B) (1980) ; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY EC 4-5 (1980) ("A
Fall 1996] THE DILEMMA OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 785
than being a rule of evidence 24 the ethical duty derives from the
law of agency.2
Additionally, in order to be subject to the privilege, the com-
munications must be made under circumstances that manifest
the corporation's intent that the communications be confiden-
tial.26 Disclosure to third parties will waive the protections of
the attorney-client privilege.27 Again in contrast to the privilege,
lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of representation of a client to
the disadvantage of the client and a lawyer should not use such information.., for his
own purposes).
24. Some commentators have suggested that the privilege is of constitutional dimen-
sion as being necessary to the vindication of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. See
Steven Goode, Identity, Fees, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
307, 313 (1991); Note, The Sixth Amendment, Attorney-Client Relationship and Govern-
ment Intrusions: Who Bears the Unbearable Burden of Proving Prejudice?, 40 J. URB.
CONTEnP. L. 109, 123 (1991); Burke, supra note 1, at 262-63; Note, The Attorney-Client
Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARVARD L. REV.
464, 486 (1977). Of course, a corporation does not enjoy a Fifth Amendment privilege.
See George Campbell Printing Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 288-89 (1968); Hale v. Hinkel,
201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906).
25. See Steven S. Gensler, Wrongful Discharge for Attorneys? Holding the Line
Against Lawyers' Self Interest, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 515, 539 (1992). As Gensler notes:
Whereas the attorney-client privilege was born of the law of evidence, attorney-
client confidentiality finds its roots in the law of agency. The professional codes
of legal ethics impose on attorneys a fiduciary duty to their clients. The codes
recognize this duty as a means of regulating and policing the legal community
to ensure that it is the master (the client) and not the servant (the attorney)
who is served by the lawyer's endeavors. Although the client is the beneficiary
of confidentiality, the codes, and not the client, determine the extent to which
these confidences are honored and protected.
Id. (footnote omitted); Kutak, supra note 6, at 579 n.12 ("Under general principles of
agency law applicable to corporations, communication to an officer or other agent of the
corporation acting within the actual or apparent scope of his authority with reference to
a matter to which his employment or authority extends is communication with the cor-
poration."). Thus, under the Code, "[bloth the fiduciary relationship existing between
lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preserva-
tion by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to em-
ploy him." MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980).
26. See, e.g., Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609 (the attorney-client privilege is
applicable to communications if, inter alia, "the communication is not disseminated be-
yond those persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents.");
Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 448 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (court found that "broad
distribution" of document to twelve persons in addition to the addressee reflected a lack
of confidentiality); Cf James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Del.
1982) (distribution of legal opinions prepared by company counsel to seven individuals in
the company did not defeat the privilege, "the distribution was both reasonable and nec-
essary; the status of each of the seven named individuals was such that it was essential
that they know the contents of the memorandum').
27. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 1982) (disclo-
sure of tax analysis to independent auditors waived privilege). As one commentator has
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the attorney's ethical obligation is not necessarily extinguished
as a result of the client's disclosure of confidential information
to a third party.28 Indeed, the confidential information need not
come from the client in the first instance.
29
Further, the attorney-client privilege extends only to com-
munications and does not apply to other information obtained
by the lawyer as a result of the attorney-client relationship. 0
The ethical obligation is not restricted to communications, but,
noted, "if clients themselves divulge such information to third parties, chances are that
they would also have divulged it to their attorneys even without the protection of the
privilege. Thus, once a client has revealed privileged information to a third party, the
basic justification for the privilege no longer applies. ... " Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit
Back into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative
Agency Investigation, 130 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1198, 1207 (1982).
28. Thus, under the Code, "[t]he attorney-client privilege is more limited than the
ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This eth-
ical precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or
source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge." MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTy EC 4-4 (1980). See Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants,
Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Information so acquired is sheltered from use by
the attorney against his client by virtue of the existence of the attorney-client relation-
ship. This is true without regard to whether someone else may be privy to it."); see also
Burke, supra note 1, at 244 ("The lawyer's ethical duty of client confidentiality protects
more client communications than the evidentiary privilege. Unlike the evidentiary privi-
lege, the ethical duty is not waived by the presence of a third party when the informa-
tion is transmitted:).
29. For example, the comment following Model Rule 1.6 states that, "[tihe confiden-
tiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but
also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source" MODEL RULES
OF PIRmOssioNA. CoNDucT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1995).
30. See Upjohn Co., 449 US. at 395 (Mhe privilege only protects disclosure of com-
munications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who commu-
nicated with the attorney"); In re Six Grand Jury Witnesses, 979 F2d 939, 944 (2d Cir.
1992). As the court in In re Six Grand Jury Witnesses stated:
Where the client is a corporation, as here, the privilege extends to communica-
tions between a lawyer and his or her client-both information provided to the
lawyer by the client and professional advice given by an attorney that discloses
such information .... Yet, the cloak of the privilege simply protects the com-
munication from discovery, the underlying information contained in the com-
munication is not shielded from discovery.
Id.; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum dated September 15, 1983 (Marc Rich &
Co., A-G.), 731 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[Ihe attorney-client privilege protects
communications rather than information; the privilege does not impede disclosure of in-
formation except to the extent that the disclosure would reveal confidential communica-
tions"); Doe v. A Corp., 709 R2d at 1046. The court in Doe v. A Corp. stated:
[Diuring the course of representing a client, a lawyer may receive information
that is not shielded by the privilege but is considered confidential by the client.
He may, for example, receive information from some source other than the cli-
ent or information imparted for a purpose other than obtaining legal advice.
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instead, encompasses all information relating to the representa-
tion.31 This may include information gained in the course of in-
vestigation of a matter32 and may include information obtained
in the course of representing the client in other unrelated
matters.
33
Thus, notwithstanding the corporate counsel's dealings with
other senior managers who conduct the business of the corpora-
tion, the client is the corporation itself as distinct from the di-
rectors, officers, employees and the stockholders. Nevertheless,
communications from any of these individuals may constitute
client confidences if the communications are made to corporate
counsel, acting as a lawyer, for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice for the corporation. Accordingly, documents, and commu-
nications and other information that come into corporate coun-
sel's possession in the course of representing the corporation are
subject to the ethical prohibitions against disclosure unless
counsel otherwise has a duty to disclose the misconduct to
others outside the corporation.
II. WHAT ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION ARE AVAILABLE TO
CORPORATE COUNSEL UPON DIscOvERY OF CORPORATE
WRONGDOING?
Having determined that counsel's client is the corporation
and therefore, that no duties run to the individual employees,4
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1995) ('The confiden-
tiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but
also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source."); Doe v. A
Corp., 709 F.2d at 1046 ("The ethical duty extends to shielding the confidentiality of all
information acquired in the course of representing a client, preventing the use of any
such knowledge to the client's disadvantage."). As one commentator has noted, "[tihe evi-
dentiary privilege only includes communications relating to legal advice; the ethical duty
protects any embarrassing or detrimental information." Burke, supra note 1, at 244.
32. See LA CoUNTY B. Ass'N OP. No. 305 (1968) ("Not only are the client's personal
confidences to be kept inviolate, but similarly, evidence obtained by the attorney in his
investigation on behalf of the client is also to be kept inviolate ... ").
33. See, eg., Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Prod. Corp., 691 F. Supp. 109,
113 (N.D. IM. 1988) ("Of course an attorney should preserve all of a client's confidences
and secrets, not just those obtained for purposes of a specific case or those subject to the
attorney-client privilege').
34. The Supreme Court has recognized that "t]he administration of the attorney-
client privilege in the case of corporations ... presents special problems. As an inani-
mate entity, a corporation must act through agents. A corporation cannot speak directly
to its lawyers" Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348
(1985). And when corporate counsel consult with individual employees of the corporate
client there is always the risk that counsel may become entangled in issues of whether
there was an attorney-client relationship established with an individual (and as a result,
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counsel must resolve whether disclosure of corporate wrongdoing
is consistent with counsel's ethical obligations to the corpora-
tion. Counsel must also consider the courses of action available
in the event that the corporation declines to take remedial
action.
Counsel may well find that because continued representa-
tion of the corporation creates an irreconcilable conflict with
a duty of confidentiality running to the individual) based on the individual employee's
expectations at the time the employee communicated information to corporate counsel.
See Wylie v. Marley Co., 891 F.2d 1463, 1471 (10th Cir. 1989) ("The professional relation-
ship for purposes of the privilege hinges upon the belief that one is consulting a lawyer
and his intention to seek legal advice); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648,
650 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978) (-[Ilf [the employee] makes it
clear when he is consulting the company lawyer that he personally is consulting the law-
yer and the lawyer sees fit to accept and give communication knowing the possible con-
flicts that could arise, he may have a privilege."). The employee's subjective belief or in-
tent to consult with company counsel for individual advice is not, alone, dispositive of
the establishment of the attorney-client relationship. See In re Bevill, Bresler & Schul-
man Asset Management Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 575 F. Supp. 777, 780 (N.D. Ga. 1983). According to the court in In re
Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., corporate employees asserting the
privilege must meet the following test:
First, they must show they approached [counsel] for the purpose of seeking le-
gal advice. Second, they must demonstrate that when they approached [coun-
sel] they made it clear that they were seeking legal advice in their individual
rather than their representative capacities. Third, they must demonstrate that
the [counsel] saw fit to communicate with them in their individual capacities,
knowing that a possible conflict could arise. Fourth, they must prove that their
conversations with [counsel] were confidential. And, fifth, they must show that
the substance of their conversations with [counsel] did not concern matters
within the company or the general affairs of the company.
Id. Nevertheless, to avoid possible disqualification of counsel from representing the cor-
poration where the interests of the individual employee conflict, see, e.g., E.F. Hutton &
Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969), Model Rule 1.13(d) admonishes counsel
to "explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organization's interests
are adverse to those of the [organization's] constituents with whom the lawyer is deal-
ing." MODEL RuLEs OF PROFEssIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.13(d) (1995). The commentary fol-
lowing Model Rule 1.13 further states that, "care must be taken to assure that the indi-
vidual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the
organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and
that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be
privileged." MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.13(d) cmt. (1995). Accord-
ingly, when seeking information from individual employees in order to provide legal ad-
vice to the corporation, corporate counsel should, at a minimum, inform the employee:
(1) that counsel represents the corporation; (2) that counsel does not represent the em-
ployee and cannot advise the employee as to the employee's individual rights or obliga-
tions; (3) that while their discussions are subject to the attorney-client privilege, that
privilege belongs to the corporation alone; and (4) that at some future time the corpora-
tion may waive the protections of the attorney-client privilege and disclose to the govern-
ment or another third party the information being provided by the employee.
Fall 1996] THE DILEMMA OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 789
counsel's ethical responsibilities, there is no alternative but to
resign from further representation of the corporation, thus set-
ting the stage for a wrongful termination/constructive discharge
claim. However, this will require an analysis of whether counsel
has an affirmative obligation to disclose the wrongdoing; what
factors must be considered in reaching the decision that disclo-
sure is warranted; and under what circumstances must counsel
withdraw from the representation.
A. Corporate Counsel's Response to the Discovery of Corporate
Misconduct
Obviously, corporate counsel who becomes aware of possible
misconduct involving the corporation must inquire into the facts
and circumstances in order to properly advise the client of coun-
sel's analysis of the corporation's rights and obligations as well
as counsel's recommendations concerning the appropriate re-
sponse to the problem.35 However, who among the corporation's
individual constituents should be advised in the first instance of
counsel's views will depend largely on the circumstances of the
particular matter.
In this regard, the Model Rules caution counsel to be aware
that there are corporate activities which, although they subject
the corporation to risk, do not implicate counsel's ethical obliga-
tions, even though counsel believes that the decisions being
made are not in the best interests of the corporate client. Thus,
the comments to Model Rule 1.13 state that, "[wihen constitu-
35. Neither the Code nor the Model Rules specifically addresses corporate counsel's
ethical duties to investigate when confronted with ongoing or contemplated future mis-
conduct. However, counsel's obligation to inquire into possible misconduct can be in-
ferred from counsel's duty of competence under Canon 6 of the Code. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY EC 6-4, DR 6-101 (A)(2) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.1 (1995). Counsel's obligation to communicate with the client is
specifically recognized under Canon 7 of the Code. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSmrY EC 7-8 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.4 (1995). Ad-
ditionally, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility addressed the
issue of counsel's duty to investigate in Opinion 1479, stating that:
[A] lawyer should not undertake representation in disregard of facts suggesting
that the representation might aid the client in perpetrating a fraud or other-
wise committing a crime .... A lawyer must be satisfied, on the facts before
him and readily available to him, that he can perform the requested services
without abetting fraudulent... conduct and without relying on past client...
fraud to achieve results the client now wants. Otherwise the lawyer has a duty
of further inquiry.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1479 (1981) quoted
in Robert N. Treiman, Comment, Inter-Lawyer Communication and the Prevention of
Client Fraud: A Look Back at O.P.M., 34 UCLA L. REv. 925, 934 n.38 (1987).
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ents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordi-
narily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or
prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and opera-
tions, including ones entailing serious risk, are not such in the
lawyer's province."3 6
On the other hand, "different considerations arise" when the
corporation is engaged in illegal conduct or when future illegal
conduct is contemplated. In those circumstances, counsel must
urge those individuals with control over the conduct to recon-
sider their actions 37 and in the event that those individuals re-
fuse to reconsider, corporate counsel must elevate the matter to
'higher authority within the organization."3
Counsel is cautioned that "[c]lear justification should exist
for seeking review over the head of the constituent normally re-
sponsible for it." 39 And in this connection, Model Rule 1.13(b)
provides guidance in how to proceed. In determining a course of
action, corporate counsel should give "due consideration" to the
following: (1) The seriousness of the violation of law and the
possible consequences; (2) The scope and nature of the lawyer's
representation; (3) The responsibility in the organization and
the apparent motivation of the person involved; and (4) The pol-
icies of the organization concerning such matters.40
Having taken these factors into consideration, the Model
Rule suggests three courses of action: (1) Asking reconsideration
of the matter; (2) Obtaining a separate, independent legal opin-
ion for presentation to the appropriate authority in the organi-
zation; and (3) Referring the matter to higher authority in the
organization including the highest authority that can act on be-
half of the organization. 41
36. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. (1995).
37. As Elihu Root observed, "[a]bout half the practice of a decent lawyer... [rests
upon] telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop." Quoted in
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Doing the Right Thing, 70 WASH. U. H. L. Q. 691, 699 (1992).
38. As stated in the comments to Model Rule 1.13:
[D]ifferent considerations arise when the lawyer knows that the organization
may be substantially injured by action of a constituent that is in violation of
law. In such circumstances, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to
ask the constituent to reconsider the matter. If that fails, or if the matter is of
sufficient seriousness and importance to the organization, it may reasonably be
necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher
authority in the organization.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. (1995).
39. Id.
40. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1995).
41. Id.
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Referral of the matter to the corporation's chief executive of-
ficer or board of directors is plainly not an action to be taken
lightly. The commentary following Model Rule 1.13 states that
such review may be required when "the matter is of importance
commensurate with their authority" and that review by the
board of directors may be necessary in "an extreme case."42
Going over the head of the chief executive to the board of
directors would likely bring to a close counsel's relationship with
the corporation.4 Involvement in responding to corporate mis-
conduct has consequences for the board of directors, as well. As
Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard has observed:
[W]hen [counsel] takes the matter to the board he implicates the board
members in the problem, because their responsibility and potential legal
liability is affected by the extent of their knowledge. If they then take
appropriate remedial action, their very action can alert potential adver-
saries of something afoot that may be the basis of legal action against
the corporation. If they do not act, they may be regarded as having vio-
lated their duties to the stockholders and perhaps have become accom-
plices so far as concerns liability to outsiders."
Thus, upon discovery of ongoing or planned wrongdoing,
corporate counsel is obliged to take action to prevent the mis-
conduct from occurring. In the first instance, counsel must at-
tempt to persuade those involved to abandon the proposed ac-
tion. If that effort fails, and taking into consideration the
seriousness of the wrongdoing and the possible consequences for
the corporation, counsel may be required to pursue the matter
through the management chain of command up to and including
the board of directors. Counsel is not obliged to follow such a
course if the conduct involved is of a policy or operational na-
ture and is merely ill advised. If, however, the proposed action
is likely to result in significant injury to the corporation, counsel
must act to remedy the situation and prevent the harm.
The mere threat of disclosure to the board of directors may
be sufficient impetus to prevent the wrongdoing from occur-
42. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.13 cmt. (1995).
43. Corporate counsel's decision to proceed past the chief executive to the board of
directors would at best be viewed as an act of disloyalty. Involvement of the board of di-
rectors would likely also involve disclosure of information obtained from other senior
managers or from the CEO that was considered confidential, if not in the attorney-client
sense at least with respect to disclosure to the board. Thus, the trust between corporate
counsel and other senior managers, including the CEO, would be irrevocably broken by
the disclosure, rendering counsel's ability to continue impossible as a practical matter.
44. HAZARD, supra note 9, at 52.
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ring. 5 But when it is not and when the board itself refuses to
arrest the pending misconduct, corporate counsel must deter-
mine whether to disclose the situation to others outside the cor-
poration (i.e., to a governmental agency or to affected third par-
ties) or whether resignation is appropriate under the
circumstances.
B. Does Counsel Have a Duty to Disclose Corporate
Misconduct?
The lawyer's twin, or at least sibling, obligations of loyalty
to the client and of confidentiality of client communications, like
their analog, the attorney-client privilege, are deeply rooted in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Lord Brougham's famous credo,
that "an advocate, in the discharge of duty, knows but one per-
son in all the world, and that person is his client," stated in
1820,4 remains vital today.47 Judge George Sharswood's writings
and lectures in the late nineteenth century, which served as the
basis for the first codification of American legal ethics in 1908,48
similarly recognized the lawyer's "moral responsibility" of
"[e]ntire devotion to the interest of the client"49 from which
flowed the lawyer's duty of confidentiality, even if the lawyer
learned of the client's guilt.50
Canon 37 of the Canons of Ethics adopted by the ABA in
1908 codified the lawyer's obligation to preserve client confi-
dences.51 Canon 37 provided, in part, that:
45. See James P. Hemmer, Resignation of Corporate Counsel: Fulfillment or Abdica-
tion of Duty, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 641, 653-57 (1988).
46. Lord Brougham made this statement in his defense of Queen Caroline in the
House of Lords proceedings involving charges of adultery brought against the Queen at
the instance of King George IV. It has been said that Lord Brougham was suggesting a
threat to reveal the King's secret marriage to Mrs. Fitzherbert, a Roman Catholic, a rev-
elation that could have resulted in the King's forfeiture of the crown under the Act of
Settlement. The charges against the Queen were not pursued to conclusion. See DAVID
MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 188-89 (1973).
47. Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard has described Lord Brougham's credo as "[t~he le-
gal profession's basic narrative .. . sustained over two centuries notwithstanding perva-
sive changes in American society and in the profession itself." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1244 (1991).
48. See Rusel G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 259 (1992).
49. Id. at 261 (quoting George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics, 32 ABA
REP. 1 (5th ed. 1907)).
50. Id. at 262.
51. Canon 37 was adopted in 1928 and amended in 1937. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHICS 131 n.25 (1953).
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It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty
outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employees;
and neither of them should accept employment which involves or may in-
volve the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the private ad-
vantage of the lawyer or his employees or to the disadvantage of the cli-
ent, without his knowledge and consent, and even though there are other
available sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue em-
ployment when he discovers that this obligation prevents the perform-
ance of his full duty to his former or to his new client.
52
The ethical obligation was thought to be the same as that of
the attorney-client privilege53 and like the privilege, the ratio-
nale for the ethical duty was to foster free and candid communi-
cation between client and attorney.54 Although not stated specifi-
cally in the rule, an exception was implied for disclosure of
client confidences when essential to the public safety or when
necessary to prevent a contemplated crime or fraud.
55
In 1928, the ABA also adopted Canon 41 to address the
"Discovery of Imposition and Deception." Canon 41 provided
that:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been prac-
ticed, which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he should
endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if his client re-
fuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he should promptly
inform the injured person or his counsel, so that they may take appropri-
ate steps.5
52. Id. at 131-32.
53. Id. at 132. As Drinker stated in regard to Canon 37:
The rule of this Canon, that confidential communications by or on behalf of a
client may not be disclosed without his consent, has long been a rule of the
common law, and is in many jurisdictions the subject of statute. As such, its
application is usually a question of law rather than of ethics.
Id. (footnote omitted).
54. Drinker cites the following statement by Judge W. H. Taft in ETmIcs IN SERVICE,
as setting forth the purpose of the Rule of Confidentiality in Canon 37:
To require the counsel to disclose the confidential communications of his client
to the very court and jury which are to pass on the issue which he is making,
would end forever the possibility of any useful relation between lawyer and cli-
ent. It is essential for the proper presentation of the client's cause that he
should be able to talk freely with his counsel without fear of disclosure ....
The useful function of lawyers is not only to conduct litigation, but to avoid it,
where possible, by advising settlement or withholding suit. Thus, any rule that
interfered with the complete disclosure of the client's inmost thoughts on the
issue he presents would seriously obstruct the peace that is gained for society
by the compromises which the counsel is able to advise.
ID. at 132-33 (quoting WLAM HowARD TAFr, ETHics IN SERVICE 31-32 (1915)).
55. Id. at 137.
56. Victor H. Kramer, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations: A Study in
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Canon 41 represented a significant expansion of the law-
yer's duty to disclose over that in Canon 37 by allowing disclo-
sure of client confidences concerning past as well as future acts.
Canon 41 also departed from the confidentiality rule of Canon
37 by requiring disclosure of the client's fraud to the victim or
the victim's lawyer.57 Because the requirements of Canon 41 cre-
ated obligations that were inconsistent with Canon 37 and the
attorney-client privilege, the ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics held that the disclosure requirements were subordinate
to the duty to maintain confidentiality under Canon 37.58 The
committee also held that the communications subject to Canon
37 confidentiality were the same as those protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege.59 That view changed, however, when the Ca-
nons of Ethics were replaced first by the Code and subsequently
by the Model Rules.
1. Disclosure of Client Confidences Under the Code. The
ABA adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1970.
Like its predecessor, the Code is organized around a set of ca-
nons of ethical principle.60 The Code added additional clarifica-
tion of the ethical norms in the form of "ethical considerations"
61
which were aspirational in nature, and "disciplinary rules,"
Professional Irresponsibility, 67 GEo. L.J. 991, 992 (1979) (quoting 53 ABA REP. 495,
498 (1928)).
57. The purpose of Canon 41 is not entirely clear. The ABA's Special Committee on
Supplements to the Canons of Professional Ethics indicated in its report that Canon 41
was intended to address "particular conduct, whose problems experience has demon-
strated demand solution." Id.
58. See id. at 992. The committee did this principally in Opinion No. 287 issued in
1953. Opinion No. 287 concerned two situations. In the first, an attorney representing
the husband in a divorce proceeding learned from the client that the client had misrep-
resented the date of his wife's desertion and the wife now threatened to reveal the true
date which would render the divorce action premature. The committee'concluded that if
the client refused to recant his perjury to the court, the attorney would be bound by the
duty of confidentiality and accordingly would have to withdraw from the representation.
In the second situation, an attorney learned that a criminal client had been sen-
tenced based on the court's erroneous belief that the client had no criminal record. The
committee concluded that if the attorney's knowledge of the client's criminal record was
derived from a client communication, the attorney could not disclose the client's record
to the court even in the event the client lied to the court and stated that he had no re-
cord. Id. at 992-93, n.10.
59. Burke, supra note 1, at 247.
60. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980).
61. "The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a
body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situa-
tions." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980).
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which were mandatory.6 2 Violation of a disciplinary rule could
subject a lawyer to sanction by the Bar.63
Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules under several
of the Canons touch upon the lawyer's duty to preserve client
confidences. The principal statement of the obligation to main-
tain confidentiality is Canon 4 which states that "a lawyer
should preserve the confidences and secrets of a cient."64 Under
Canon 4, Ethical Consideration 4-1 counsels that both the fidu-
ciary duty of the lawyer to the client as well as "the proper
functioning of the legal system" require that the client's confi-
dences and secrets be preserved.65 Other Ethical Considerations
under Canon 4 make clear that the attorney-client privilege is
more limited than the ethical obligation 66 and the obligation re-
62. The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are
mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer ca n fall without being subject to disciplinary
action. Within the framework of fair trial, the Disciplinary Rules should be
uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their profes-
sional activities. The Model Code makes no attempt to prescribe either dis-
ciplinary procedures or penalties for violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor
does it undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for profes-
sional conduct. The severity of judgment against one found guilty of violat-
ing a Disciplinary Rule should be determined by the character of the of-
fense and the attendant circumstances. An enforcing agency, in applying
the Disciplinary Rules, may find interpretive guidance in the basic princi-




64. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980).
65. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980). Ethical Considera-
tion 4-1 provides:
Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the
proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer
of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him. A
client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a law-
yer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his
client. A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is
handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system.
It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to
separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The
observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confi-
dences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of facts
essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to
seek early legal assistance.
Id.
66. Ethical Consideration 4-4 provides:
The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a
lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept,
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mains in effect after the active representation of the client has
ceased.67
The prohibition against disclosure is set forth in Discipli-
nary Rule 4-101(B)(1) which states that except as otherwise pro-
vided in part C of the Rule, "a lawyer shall not knowingly...
[r]eveal a confidence or secret of his client .... "-61 The Rule de-
fines confidences and secrets to include not only communications
covered by the attorney-client privilege but also "information
gained in the professional relationship....-
69
However, there are two Disciplinary Rules that address dis-
closure: Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C) and Disciplinary Rule 7-
102(B).70 Under Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C), a lawyer may reveal
unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source
of information or the fact that others share the knowledge. A lawyer should en-
deavor to act in a manner which preserves the evidentiary privilege; for exam-
ple, he should avoid professional discussions in the presence of persons to
whom the privilege does not extend. A lawyer owes an obligation to advise the
client of the attorney-client privilege and timely to assert the privilege unless
it is waived by the client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 4.4 (1980).
67. Ethical Consideration 4-6 provides:
The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client
continues after the termination of his employment. Thus, a lawyer should not
attempt to sell a law practice as a going business because, among other rea-
sons, to do so would involve the disclosure of confidences and secrets. A lawyer
should also provide for the protection of the confidences and secrets of his cli-
ent following the termination of the practice of the lawyer, whether termina-
tion is due to death, disability, or retirement. For example, a lawyer might pro-
vide for the personal papers of the client to be returned to him and for the
papers of the lawyer to be delivered to another lawyer or to be destroyed. In
determining the method of disposition, the instructions and wishes of the client
should be a dominant consideration.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUTY EC 4-6 (1980).
68. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B)(1) (1980).
69. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A) defines the subject confidences and secrets as follows:
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental
to the client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1980).
70. A third rule, Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A), provides that a lawyer who possesses
"anprivileged knowledge" of a violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102 "shall report such
knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such vi-
olation." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 1-103(A) (1980). Disciplinary
Rule 1-102 prohibits lawyers from directly or indirectly violating a Disciplinary Rule, en-
gaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude, engaging in conduct involving "dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, and engaging in conduct that is either 'Prej-
udicial to the administration of justice' or adversely reflecting on the lawyer's fitness to
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a client's confidences and secrets when required by law or court
order.7 1 Most significantly, a lawyer may reveal "[t]he intention
of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to
prevent the crime."
7 2
With regard to the client's intention to commit a crime, the
drafters relied on a 1965 opinion of the ABA Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics to the effect that before disclosure was war-
ranted, the attorney had to be in possession of facts that estab-
lished "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the client intended to
commit a crime.73 In like fashion, the other principal disclosure
provision of the Code, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) includes as a
prerequisite to disclosure that the attorney possess "information
clearly establishing" that the client has perpetrated a fraud. The
"clearly establishing" standard has posed decisional difficulties
practice law." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (1980).
71. The Code indicates that this rule was derived from opinions of the ABA Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics concerning several issues arising in criminal cases. In one
situation, an attorney who failed to inform the court of the whereabouts of his absent
client risked aiding and abetting his client's escape. The Committee stated, "[i]t is the
opinion of the Committee that under such circumstances, the attorney's knowledge of his
client's whereabouts is not privileged, and that he may be disciplined for failing to dis-
close that information to the proper authorities .. ." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIILITY Canon 4 n.15 (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Op. 155 (1936)). In the second situation, the Committee ruled that an attorney
was obliged to advise "the proper authorities" if after being counseled by the lawyer to
comply with the conditions of probation, the client refuses to do so. "Such information,
even though coming to the attorney from the client in the course of his professional rela-
tions with respect to other matters in which he represents the defendant, is not privi-
leged from disclosure...." Id.
72. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1980).
73. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 n.16 (1980). The Code
indicates that the drafter's relied on a ruling of the Committee on Professional Ethics in
Opinion 314 (1965) to the effect that a lawyer must disclose client confidences if "the
facts in the attorney's possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be
committed.' ABA Opinion 314 involved the obligations of an attorney, practicing before
the Internal Revenue Service, who "acquires information bearing upon the strength of
his client's claim' ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 315 (1965). The ABA
Committee noted that when negotiating a settlement with the IRS on behalf of a client,
counsel, "will always urge... the strong points of his case and minimize the weak...."
Id. The Committee concluded, however, that the attorney's duty not to make false asser-
tions does not require the disclosure of weaknesses in the client's case, "unless the facts
in the attorney's possession indicate beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime will be com-
mitted." Id. In this connection, the Committee further observed that a "wrong" or an
"unjust" tax result is not a crime. The Committee also noted that an attorney may not
mislead or allow the client to mislead the IRS. Upon discovery of a misrepresentation,
the lawyer must advise the client to correct the misstatement. If the client refuses to do
so, "the lawyer's obligation depends on all-the circumstances." See also Marshall L.
Small, Commentary at the Proceedings of the Arlie House Conference on the Ethical Re-
sponsibilities of Corporate Lawyers, 33 Bus. LAw. 1423, 1428 (1978).
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because the phrase is not used elsewhere in either the Code or
the Canons of Ethics.74 Nevertheless, the Rule has been con-
strued as requiring actual knowledge of the client's fraud rather
than mere suspicion.75
As originally adopted, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) provided
in pertinent part:
A lawyer who received information clearly establishing that: (1) [h]is cli-
ent has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same,
and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to
74. As was observed in Grievance Comm. of the United States District Court, Dis-
trict of Connecticut v. Federal Grievance Comm.:
Determining whether an attorney has received "information clearly establish-
ing" a fraud on the court--and thus triggering his duty to disclose that infor-
mation to the affected tribunal-is a "difficult task7 .... Our inquiry into the
terms meaning is made even more difficult because it is not used in any other
Code provision and was not included in any provision of the Code's predeces-
sor, the Canons of Professional Ethics (1908). Nor is the term included in any
provision of the Code's successor, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(1983), and our exhaustive research has uncovered no court or professional eth-
ics committee decision that has definitively interpreted what the term means.
Grievance Comm. of the United States District Court, District of Connecticut v. Federal
Grievance Comm., 847 F.2d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1988).
75. Id. at 63. According to the court in Grievance Comm. of the United States Dis-
trict Court, District of Connecticut v. Federal Grievance Comm.:
Our experience indicates that if any standard less than actual knowledge
was adopted in this context, serious consequences might follow .... Instead, it
seems that the only reasonable conclusion is that the drafters intended disclo-
sure of only that information which the attorney reasonably knows to be a fact
and which, when combined with other facts in his knowledge, would clearly es-
tablish the existence of a fraud on the tribunal. To interpret the rule to mean
otherwise would be to require attorneys to disclose mere suspicions of fraud
which are based upon incomplete information or information which may fall
short of clearly establishing the existence of a fraud.
Id. In that case, an attorney was told by his client, the plaintiff in an action, that a de-
fense witness told the client that the witness had lied at a deposition on instructions
from defense counsel. The attorney did not believe that the pejury had occurred and did
not disclose the client's statements to the district court. Despite the bar's grievance com-
mittee having exonerated the attorney, the district court concluded that the lawyer had
violated Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(2) and ordered the attorney suspended from practice.
Id. at 58-60. The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that neither the in-
formation the attorney had received from his client nor the attorney's independent infor-
mation concerning the case provided the attorney with the requisite "knowledge" that a
fraud had taken place. Id. at 63. See also Quadrozzi v. City of New York, 127 F.R.D. 63
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (attorney's failure to make inquiry whether his client's denial of having
associated with any organized crime figures was unreasonable in light of a taped inter-
cepted conversation between his client and a prominent member of organized crime. The
court appears to suggest that the intercepted conversation was sufficient to "clearly es-
tablish" his client's misconduct.).
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the affected person or tribunal .... 76
However, as written, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) puts law-
yers at risk of violation of the Code since the lawyer would be
forced to choose between disclosure in accordance with Discipli-
nary Rule 7-102(B) and preserving client confidentiality in ac-
cordance with Disciplinary Rule 4-101. 77 This is particularly
true in corporate representation, where, as one commentator
has observed, "failure to disclose a past crime or fraud may
often constitute an intention to commit a further crime and
raise[s] the possibility of conflict between DR4-101(C)(3) and
DR7-102(B)(1)."78 This ethical and legal ambiguity was further
aggravated by references in the Code to the attorney-client priv-
ilege which, as a rule of evidence, forecloses inquiry into client
communications concerning past criminality79 but does not
76. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSILIrrY DR 7-102(B) (1980).
77. See Kramer, supra note 56, at 993-94 ("In adopting DR7-102(B)(1), the ABA ap-
parently overlooked the probability that the new rule would often require a lawyer to
choose between violating the rule against disclosure of a client's privileged communica-
tions and the rule requiring disclosure of the fraud"). Indeed, as the ABA Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility pointed out in Opinion 341, when the Code was
originally drafted in 1969, there was no disciplinary rule requiring disclosure of client
misconduct. The ABA Committee suggested that this was due to the drafter's "considera-
tion of the high fiduciary duty owed by lawyer to client and consideration of the firm
support found in the law of evidence for the attorney-client privilege." ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
78. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1402-03. Professor Hazard has made a similar obser-
vation that when corporate misconduct comes to the attention of corporate counsel, the
counsel has to address the question how to treat the information received from the "cli-
ent." In that regard, counsel:
must decide whether the situation involves a "past" wrong, so that he must
treat its disclosure as confidential, or a wrong continuing into the future, in
which event the rule of confidentiality may not apply, particularly if the con-
duct may be a crime. This problem of classification... is difficult in itself, ow-
ing to the often illusory character of the distinction between past and future.
HAZARD, supra note 9, at 49.
79. As Mr. Justice Kennedy (then Circuit Judge) explained in United States v.
Hodge and Zweig:
In our legal system the client should make full disclosure to the attorney so
that the advice given is sound, so that the attorney can give all appropriate
protection to the client's interest, and so that proper defenses are raised if liti-
gation results. The attorney-client privilege promotes such disclosure by prom-
ising that communications revealed for these legitimate purposes will be held
in strict confidence. The privilege encourages persons to seek advice as to fu-
ture conduct. But so important is full disclosure that the law recognizes the
privilege even if the advice is sought by one who has already committed a bad
act .... But a quid pro quo is exacted for the attorney-client confidence: the
client must not abuse the confidential relation by using it to further a fraudu-
lent or criminal scheme, and as a condition to continued representation, the
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shield communications in furtherance of ongoing or future
crime.80
lawyer is required to advise the client to cease any unlawful activities that the
lawyer perceives are occurring.
United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Ci. 1977).
Accordingly, the "crime-fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege is held not
to apply in regard to past, completed crimes. See In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC
Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979). In that case, the court stated that:
ITihe district court's finding that "a crime has been committed by FMC".....
does not state whether the crime was committed before or after Mr. Kliever
and his firm were retained for the work during which the documents at issue
were generated. If the crime had been completed before retention of th6 Cleary
firm, then the privilege should be in effect. If, however, the crime was a contin-
uing one, or one that occurred after the firm was consulted, then the prima fa-
cie showing made by the government would suffice to allow inspection by the
grand jury ....
Id.; Lockette v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(attorney who believed his client had committed a past crime was bound by Disciplinary
Rule 4-101).
80. The crime-fraud exception to the privilege will permit inquiry into communica-
tions involving present or future criminality. See, eg., Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385
F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1967) ('The attorney-client privilege is withdrawn upon a prima
facie showing that the lawyer's advice was designed to serve his client in commission of
a fraud or crime."). The reason for this is that the rationale underlying the privilege
does not apply when the lawyer's advice is sought for a criminal purpose. See In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum dated September 15, 1983 (Marc Rich & Co., A.G.),
731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Whereas confidentiality of communications and
work product facilitates the rendering of sound legal advice, advice in furtherance of a
fraudulent or unlawful goal cannot be considered 'sound Rather, advice in furtherance
of such goals is socially perverse, and the client's communications seeking such advice
are not worthy of protection."). Further, it is not necessary that the crime or fraud have
been accomplished in order to defeat the privilege so long as there is evidence that the
purpose of seeking the lawyer's advice was to further the illegal scheme. See id. at 1039
('he crime or fraud need not have occurred for the exception to be applicable; it need
only have been the objective of the client's communication. And the fraudulent nature of
the objective need not be established definitively; there need only be presented a reason-
able basis for believing that the objective was fraudulent."). So, for example, a corpora-
tion was not entitled to assert the attorney-client privilege to prevent disclosure of a re-
port of the findings of an internal investigation conducted by the corporate legal
department. See John Doe Corp. v. United States, 675 F.2d 482, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1982). As
the Court stated in John Doe.Corp.:
Corporate counsel need not run to the FBI upon the first sign of criminality in
an Upjohn protected communication. But such communications are protected
only for the purpose of the corporate client seeking, and the attorney render-
ing, legal advice .... Use of the fact of an investigation to allay the concerns
of third parties about possible criminal acts, to create the appearance of com-
pliance with laws requiring disclosure, or to cover up a crime disclosed through
a protected communication in the course of the investigation will cause the cor-
poration to lose the privilege.
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The ABA addressed this anomaly in 1974 when the rule
was amended by adding the clause "except when the informa-
tion is protected as a privileged communication."81 Thus, infor-
mation clearly establishing that the client committed fraud
could not be disclosed if the information otherwise would be
privileged. The following year, in an opinion published by the
ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, the
exception for privileged communications was construed as in-
cluding "confidences" and "secrets" protected by Disciplinary
Rule 4-101.82 Thus, the exception virtually swallowed the rule
since privileged communications were not restricted to informa-
tion received by the client for purposes of legal representation,
83
but instead included any information received in the course of
the professional relationship from whatever source.M It is diffi-
cult to conceive of information clearly establishing a client's
81. As the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility subsequently
explained in Opinion No. 341, the provision of Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C) permitting a
lawyer to reveal client confidences:
[W]hile quite proper in the preliminary draft, had the unacceptable result
when combined with new DR 7-102(B)(1) of requiring a lawyer in certain in-
stances to reveal privileged communications which he was also duty-bound not
to reveal according to the law of evidence. The amendment of 1974 was neces-
sary in order to relieve lawyers of exposure to such diametrically opposed pro-
fessional duties.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975). The Committee went
on to conclude that in all but the most serious cases, confidentiality took precedence over
disclosure. As the Committee stated:
The tradition (which is backed by substantial policy considerations) that per-
mits a lawyer to assure a client that information (whether a confidence or a se-
cret) given to him will not be revealed to third parties is so important that it
should take precedence, in all but the most serious cases, over the duty im-
posed by DR 7-102(B).
Id.
82. Id. ("The balancing of the lawyer's duty to preserve confidences and to reveal
frauds is best made by interpreting the phrase "privileged communication" in the 1974
amendment to DR 7-102(B) as referring to those confidences and secrets that are re-
quired to be preserved by DR 4-101.").
83. In construing the exception to include "confidences" and "secrets", the ABA Com-
mittee opined that the Committee's interpretation would not "wipe out DR 7-102(B), be-
cause DR 7-102(B) applies to information received from any source, and it is not limited
to information gained in the professional relationship as is DR 4-101!" Id. The Commit-
tee went on to suggest in this regard that the duty of disclosure under DR 7-102(B):
[W]ould remain in force if the information clearly establishing a fraud on a
person or tribunal and committed by a client in the course of representation
were obtained by the lawyer from a third party (but not in connection with his
professional relationship with the client), because it would not be a confidence
or secret of a client entitled to confidentiality.
84. See Kramer, supra note 56, at 994.
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fraud "in the course of the representation" that came into the
attorney's possession outside of the professional relationship.85
Finally, by rendering the disclosure of client crime or fraud
discretionary the attorney was left to make what can only be
considered a momentous decision 6 with no established or consis-
tent standards from which to take guidance.87 Instead, the cor-
porate counsel is left to be guided through conflicting legal obli-
gations and ethical loyalties by counsel's own moral lights.88
85. Contra Forrow, supra note 3, at 1802 ("Though [the 1974 amendment] has been
the subject of considerable controversy, a client's communication of an intention to com-
mit a crime is not privileged and a lawyer may disclose such an intention).
86. One commentator likened the decision by corporate counsel to disclose the cor-
poration's misconduct, thereby irrevocably breaking counsel's relationship to the corpora-
tion, to Greek tragedy:
Whether resignation of any further representation should also occur is proba-
bly academic. That would probably be forced by corporate action with laser-like
speed .... Of course, resignation, usually unpleasant at worst for outside
counsel, rises to the level of crucial life choice for inside corporate counsel. To
sacrifice the fruits (both present and future) of a career devoted single-
mindedly to the affairs of a single client has perhaps even the slight flavor of
Greek tragedy.
Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1410-11 & n.59.
87. Professor Hoffman has suggested that in the absence of established standards,
that counsel balance a variety of factors in determining whether to disclose misconduct.
He suggests the following:
Since we cannot prepare a checklist of intended crimes that should be dis-
closed, it seems fair to suggest that the lawyer's obligation to disclose will turn
not only on the nature of the crime, but also on the balancing of other factors:
the effect of its disclosure would have on the well-being of the corporate client,
the effect its commission or disclosure would have on third parties and
whether third parties are reasonably relying on the lawyer to protect their
expectations.
Id. at 1409.
88. So, for example, it has been observed that:
In deciding whether to disclose a confidence, a lawyer inevitably will face an
ethical conflict. On the one hand, any professional feels loyalty to a client who
has placed his trust in the professional's expertise. What was once called
"honor", purged of its aristocratic limitations as a code of behavior for gentle-
men, will exert a strong moral pull. On the other hand, a lawyer's training
commits him to the rule of law, which presupposes the accuracy of the facts to
which rules are applied. Although likely to be an agnostic about where ulti-
mate truth lies, the lawyer- perhaps on that very account-is committed to a
process untainted by false or incomplete disclosure.
William D. Popkin, Client-Lawyer Confidentiality, 59 TEx. L. REv. 755, 770-71 (1981).
Professor Popkin further observed in this connection that "[d]isclosure depends on the
point at which the client has forfeited his claim to loyalty; this in turn depends on what
the lawyer defines as central to his ethical role. Once the client asks the lawyer to de-
part from that role, his claim on the lawyer's fidelity is broken." Id. at 771. This di-
lemma is particularly acute since the decision not to disclose past misconduct may con-
stitute evidence of intent to commit a future crime or, indeed, may constitute an act in
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This failure of the Code to provide meaningful guidance with re-
spect to disclosure was first addressed in 1977 by the ABA Com-
mission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, chaired by
Robert J. Kutak (also known as the "Kutak Commission"), and
then through the adoption in 1983 of the Model Rules.
2. Disclosure of Client Confidences Under the Model Rules.
A major impetus to the ABAs re-evaluation of the Code was the
failure of the Code to provide meaningful guidance to corporate
counsel 89 who are confronted with corporate criminality, includ-
ing fraud.90 This perceived inadequacy of the Code was under-
scored by the argument of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in the National Student Marketing case91 that a
corporation's lawyers had aided and abetted violations of the
federal securities laws in connection with a merger by failing to
disclose the contents of a "comfort letter" prepared by their cli-
ent's outside auditors. 92 As Chairman Kutak explained, the Code
no longer responded adequately to the ethical demands on
lawyers:
And what does the Code say about the obligations of the advisor and the
evaluator, about the special problems of corporate counsel and the impli-
furtherance of a present or future crime, subjecting corporate counsel to personal crimi-
nal or civil liability. See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1403; Burke, supra note 1, at 255.
And it was observed:
The Code provides no guidance. The corporate lawyer must choose between vio-
lating the law and facing potential civil and criminal liability or disobeying a
disciplinary rule and facing debarment or a damage suit by his client. Corpo-
rate counsel is left to his own conscience and analysis of the personal costs and
benefits to determine the outcome.
Id.
89. See, eg., Reycraft, supra note 1, at 610 ("The Model Code is not particularly en-
lightening on the issue of how a corporate or securities lawyer should respond upon dis-
covering that his organizational client's management has committed securities fraud.:).
90. The ABA Committee interpreted "fraud" as used in Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)
as meaning "active fraud, with a requirement of scienter or intent to deceive!" ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 341 (1975). As has been ob-
served, such a construction of "fraud" is, in essence, a criminal act. See Hoffman, supra
note 12, at 1408. As Hoffman states:
In the corporate and securities areas, something actionable as a "fraud" will al-
most always constitute a "crime" as well. Especially is this so since the inter-
pretations given to the term "fraud" in ABA Opinion 341 ... require an intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. And if such intent is present, some crime
will also almost surely be involved.
Id.
91. Securities and Exchange Commission v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457
F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
92. The Student Marketing litigation is discussed further infra Part I.A2.
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cations of lawyers practicing together? Frankly, either nothing or very
little. Thus, a revision of the Code is necessary if for no other reason
than to acknowledge the problems facing lawyers in the 1980s and to
provide them with some guidance in resolving the questions of profes-
sional ethics which they must face today and which will confront them
tomorrow.93
Certainly one of the most, if not the most, significant and
controversial issues addressed by the Kutak Commission was
whether the corporation's lawyer was obliged to reveal the cor-
poration's confidences in order to prevent the commission of a
crime or fraud and to avoid injury to others.
94
In addition to the debate concerning the lawyer's ethical du-
ties to third parties spawned by the National Student Marketing
litigation,95 there was also substantial interest within the profes-
sion regarding the duty of withdrawing counsel to inform suc-
cessor counsel of the corporate client's misconduct, engendered
by the O.P.M. leasing affair.96 Also, concurrently with the Kutak
Commission's deliberations, the Institute for Public Interest
Representation of Georgetown University Law Center petitioned
93. Kutak, supra note 6, at 576.
94. See James R. McCall, The Corporation as Client: Problems, Perspectives, and
Partial Solutions, 39 HASTMNGs L.J. 623, 632 (1988). As McCall further elaborates:
A significant initial concern of the drafters of Rule 1.13 was whether the entity
as client concept should be adjusted to allow or require a corporation attorney
to divulge confidential information to persons outside the corporation in order
to prevent the client from causing harm through commission of a fraud or
crime that would cause injury to third parties.
Id.
95. See, eg., Ronald D. Rotunda, Law, Lawyers, and Managers, in THE ETHIcs OF
CoRPoRATE CONDuCT, 127 (Walton ed., 1977); Theodore Sonde, Continuing Debate on At.
torneys' Responsibilities to the Public and Third Parties, 36 Bus. LAw. 585 (1981).
96. The OPM Leasing Services, Inc. matter is discussed further infra Part II.C.3. In
essence, during the 1970's, OPM Leasing Services was engaged in the leasing of com-
puter equipment. Many of the leases were with Rockwell International Corp. and were
later found to have been procured by OPM Leasing through bribery. OPM Leasing was
represented by the law firm of Singer, Hutman, Levine & Seeman who assisted OPM
Leasing in closing the leases and in obtaining approximately $196 million in financing
secured by the leases.
In the course of the representation, Singer, Hutman learned from the president of
OPM Leasing that the company was engaged in a massive fraud. This revelation led to
the eventual resignation of Singer, Hutman as counsel. OPM Leasing then retained an-
other firm, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler to represent it. Prior to accepting
the representation, lawyers from Kaye, Scholer contacted Singer, Hutman and asked
whether there was any reason why Kaye, Scholer should not represent OPM Leasing.
Singer, Hutman did not reveal its knowledge of the ongoing fraud but advised Kaye,
Scholer merely that the representation had been terminated by mutual agreement.
Kaye, Scholer undertook OPM Leasing as a client and subsequently closed $2.4 million
in fraudulent leases. See Treiman, supra note 35, at 928-31.
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the SEC for rule making requiring a corporation's attorneys to
report "probable violations of law" to the board of directors and
requiring the board of directors to certify in the corporation's
annual report that the board had taken "appropriate action" in
response to the attorney's report and that the board had made
information concerning the violations available to the corpora-
tion's outside auditors.97 The Institute's proposal was ultimately
rejected by both the SEC98 and the Kutak Commission. 99
The testimony before the Kutak Commission was almost
uniformly hostile to the suggestion that an attorney had ethical
obligations to anyone but the client.100 In a 1980 letter to his
colleagues, Chairman Kutak signalled the Commission's reluc-
tance to impose additional obligations to third parties.'0 ' After
the draft Model Rules were promulgated for consideration by
-the ABA, Commissioner Kutak again emphasized that the cir-
cumstances under which disclosure of client confidences would
97. In June 1978, Professor Victor H. Kramer submitted a petition prepared by the
Institute for Public Representation of Georgetown University Law Center requesting the
SEC to adopt a rule requiring attorneys to reveal their client's frauds committed during
the course of a representation before the SEC, except in circumstances when the knowl-
edge of the fraud was the result of privileged communications. Subsequently, in Novem-
ber 1978, the Institute filed a supplemental petition requesting a rule requiring corpora-
tions to certify in their annual reports that: 1) the board of directors had instructed the
corporation's attorneys to report any corporate activities that violate or "probably vio-
late" a law and that could either "result in material financial liability" or "cal into ques-
tion the quality and integrity of management" or represent "a pattern or practice of re-
curring activity-," 2) the corporation's attorneys had indicated their compliance with the
board's instructions; 3) the board had considered the reports of the attorneys and had
taken appropriate action; and 4) information concerning material violations or probable
violations had been provided to the corporation's outside auditors. See Gruenbaum,
supra note 20, at 204 n.68; Kramer, supra note 56, at 991 n.2.
98. The SEC denied the Institute's first petition. However, over the strenuous objec-
tion of Commissioner Roberta Karmel, the SEC published the Institute's disclosure pro-
posal and invited public comment. Over 300 mostly negative comments were received
and on April 30, 1980, the SEC formally denied the rule making on the grounds that the
ABA was also devoting attention to the same issue. See Burke, supra note 1, at 274-75.
99. As Commission Chairman Kutak explained:
We carefully evaluated these recommendations and heard from the Institute in
the course of our deliberations, but we did not adopt the proposal. We believe
that those triggering events would result in activity on the part of corporate
counsel beyond the legitimate scope in which they should function, injecting
lawyers into matters of judgment concerning business risk that are more ap-
propriately the responsibility of corporate management. Ultimately, such a rule
would create a conflict situation for corporate counsel, encouraging them to act
from a fear of liability rather than from concern for the corporate client.
Kutak, supra note 6, at 578.
100. See Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TE. L.
REV. 639, 674 n.185.
101. Id.
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be permitted were "very limited."10 2 The Model Rules as adopted
by the ABA in 1983 reflect this reluctance to moderate a law-
yer's duty of loyalty to the client by imposing additional obliga-
tions to persons other than the client. So, for example, the Pre-
amble to the Model Rules states:
In reliance on the attorney-client privilege, clients are entitled to expect
that communications within the scope of the privilege will be protected
against compelled disclosure .... The fact that in exceptional situations
the lawyer under the Rules has a limited discretion to disclose a client
confidence does not vitiate the proposition that, as a general matter, the
client has a reasonable expectation that information relating to the client
will not be voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure of such information
may be judicially compelled only in accordance with recognized excep-
tions to the attorney-client and work product privileges. 13
The Preamble recognized that the preservation of client con-
fidences served the public interest by encouraging people to seek
legal advice. 04 However, the Preamble also recognized that con-
fidentiality was to be maintained "except so far as disclosure is
required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law."1 5
The corporation lawyer considering disclosure finds gui-
dance primarily in two rules: Model Rule 1.6, which sets forth
the lawyer's general duty to preserve client confidences; and
Model 1.13, which illuminates the lawyer's ethical loyalties
when the client is an entity. Under Model Rule 1.6, a lawyer is
instructed generally not to reveal "information relating to repre-
sentation of a client" unless the client consents. The Rule ap-
plies regardless of whether the client is an individual or an en-
tity and the commentary following the Rule echoes the
Preamble in noting the central importance of confidentiality to
the full and frank communication which is "essential to proper
representation of the client" and which "encourages people to
102. Kutak, supra note 6, at 583 ("[Under the proposed Model Rules, the Lawyer
has some affirmative obligations to deter or reveal client misconduct, but only in a few,
very limited situations.").
103. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Preamble (1995).
104. As stated in the Preamble, "[a] lawyer can be sure that preserving client confi-
dences ordinarily serves the public interest because people are more likely to seek legal
advice, and thereby heed their legal obligations, when they know their communications
will be private." Id. The Preamble also suggested that "[tihe lawyer's exercise of discre-
tion not to disclose information ... should not be subject to re-examination" because
"[plermitting such re-examination would be incompatible with the general policy of pro-
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seek early legal assistance."0 6
Confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6 is not absolute, how-
ever. Instead, the Model Rule provides for several exceptions,
one of which is the disclosure of information in order to prevent
the commission of a crime.10 7 Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) provides, in
this regard: "A lawyer may reveal [information relating to the
representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary ... to prevent the client from committing a
criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in immi-
nent death or substantial bodily harm .... 1
The Model Rules recognize in this regard that the lawyer
has "professional discretion7 whether to reveal the client's confi-
dences even when the lawyer has learned of the client's inten-
tion to commit a violent crime.109 As the commentary to Model
Rule 1.6 points out, it is difficult to be certain that the client
will carry out that intention because the client "may have a
change of mind,""0 particularly after being counseled to conform
106. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1995). With regard to
the necessity of lawyer-client confidentiality, the commentary following Model Rule 1.6
explains:
The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confi-
dential information of the client not only facilitates the full development of
facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people
to seek early legal assistance.
Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine
what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed
to be legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the client's confi-
dences must be protected from disclosure. Based upon experience, lawyers
know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the law-
yer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The
client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer
even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.
Id.
107. Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) also permits disclosure of client confidences: (a) to estab-
lish "a claim or defense" in connection with a dispute with the client; (b) establish a de-
fense to a criminal or civil charge based on conduct in which the client was involved;
and (c) to respond to allegations concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1995).
108. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1995).
109. As the commentary to Model Rule 1.6 explains, "the lawyer may learn that a
client intends prospective conduct that is criminal and likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm. As stated in paragraph (b)(1), the lawyer has profes-
sional discretion to reveal information in order to prevent such consequences." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1995).
110. Id. The commentary states, "[iut is very difficult for a lawyer to 'know' when
such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may have a change of
mind." Id.
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to legal requirements, as the attorney is ethically required to
do."'
Thus, Model Rule 1.6 is permissive, not mandatory, and al-
lows disclosure only where the client's proposed conduct is likely
to result imminently in a crime involving death or serious injury
to persons.12 Interestingly, the rule as originally proposed by
the Kutak Commission would have allowed an attorney to dis-
close client confidential information necessary to prevent "sub-
stantial injury to the financial interests of another."113 The rule
was rejected because it was thought that the rule would force
the attorney into the role of a policeman." 4 The commentary fol-
lowing the rule adds further emphasis to the lawyer's discretion
in making the disclosure, in light of the public interest in candid
communication between lawyer and client," 5 as well as caution-
111. As discussed supra Part IIA, under Model Rule 1.13, corporate counsel's re-
sponse to learning of client misconduct is to seek "reconsideration of the matter.t " MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.13 (1995). Thus, the commentary to Model Rule
1.6 states, "[w]here the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether
contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. Where necessary
to guide conduct in connection with this Rule, the lawyer may make inquiry within the
organization as indicated in Rule 1.13(b)." MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6 cmt. (1995).
112. Model Rule 1.6 has not found great acceptance among the states. Only six
states have adopted Model Rule 1.6 without modification. Those states are Alabama,
Delaware, Louisiana, Montana, Missouri and Rhode Island. Other states have included
crimes against financial and property interests as being subject to disclosure. Those
states are: Connecticut, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Penn-
sylvania and Utah. While others allow discretionary disclosure of any future crime.
Those states are: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Lonnie Kocontes, Client Confidentiality and the
Crooked Client: Why Silence is Not Golden, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 283, 300 (1992).
113. See Lawrence J. Fox, OTS v. Kaye, Scholer: An Assault on the Citadel, 48 Bus.
LAW. 1521, 1527 n.17 (1993).
114. Id. It has been suggested that this represented the ABA's choice to "structure
the standards of professional ethics to protect the interests of the client over the inter-
ests of third parties." McCall, supra note 94, at 638 n.53. As Professor Hazard, who
served as Reporter for the Kutak Commission, has observed, "recognizing that an advo-
cate could be held criminally and civilly liable if involved in a client's fraud, the Kutak
draft tried to qualify the rules about client confidences to protect an innocent lawyer en-
meshed in such a scheme. This violated the fraternal tradition that client confidences
were .sacrosanct" Hazard, supra note 47, at 1258.
115. The commentary states:
In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the
client intends serious harm to another person. However, to the extent a lawyer
is required or permitted to disclose a client's purposes, the client will be inhib-
ited from revealing facts which would enable the lawyer to counsel against a
wrongful course of action. The public is better protected if full and open com-
munication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited.
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ing the lawyer who makes such a disclosure that "a disclosure
adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose." The com-
mentary also counsels the lawyer contemplating disclosure of a
client confidence to take into consideration: (1) the lawyer's rela-
tionship with the client; (2) the lawyer's relationship with those
who might be injured by the client's action; (3) the lawyer's own
involvement in the transaction; and (4) circumstances that may
extenuate the client's proposed conduct.
However, the attorney must also take guidance from Model
Rule 1.13, which governs the attorney-client relationship when
the client is an entity rather than an individual. In contrast to
Model Rule 1.6, Model Rule 1.13 contemplates the lawyer's re-
sponse to corporate wrongdoing as elevating disclosure within
the corporation up to and including "the highest authority that
can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applica-
ble law."n 6 Model Rule 1.13 does not include disclosure outside
of the corporation among the alternatives available to corporate
counsel, suggesting instead that resignation may be the appro-
priate response to the corporation's intransigence." 7 Unfortu-
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1995). The commentary also
states that "[a] lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph
(b)(1) does not violate this Rule." Id.
116. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b)(3) (1995).
117. Thus, Model Rule 1.13 (c) states:
If despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest au-
thority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a re-
fusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substan-
tial injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule
1.16.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (c) (1995). The text of Model Rule
1.13 underwent a series of significant revisions in this regard. As proposed in the Janu-
ary 1980 draft of the rule, corporate counsel was authorized to disclose client confidences
"to the extent necessary... if the lawyer reasonably believes such action to be in the
best interest of the organization." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13
(Jan. 1980 draft) quoted in STEPHEN GILLERS & NORMAN DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAW.
YERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 593 (1985). The authority to disclose confidential in-
formation was limited in the May 1981 draft to situations involving self dealing by se-
nior management, where the lawyer "reasonably believes that.., the highest authority
in the organization has acted to further the personal or financial interests of members of
that authority which are in conflict with the interests of the organization ... and...
revealing the information is necessary in the best interest of the organization." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (May 1981 draft) quoted in GILLERS & DoR-
SEN, supra, at 593. Although this provision was maintained in the June 1982 draft, as
adopted, Model Rule 1.13(c) "gives the lawyers no authority to reveal organizational con-
fidences even when necessary to prevent self-dealing by the organization's highest au-
thority." GILLERs & DORSEN, supra, at 593.
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nately, neither the Model Rules nor the accompanying commen-
tary attempt to harmonize Model Rule 1.6 and Model Rule 1.13.
Moreover, Model Rule 1.13(b) charges the corporation's at-
torney to "proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best inter-
est of the organization" when a violation of law "is likely to re-
sult in substantial injury to the organization." There are
circumstances under which disclosure of wrongdoing may benefit
the corporation."8 Nevertheless, Model Rule 1.13 does not con-
template disclosure under these circumstances. To the contrary,
Model Rule 1.13(b) can be read to forbid such disclosure in the
absence of authorization by the corporate client. 119 Again, the
Model Rules and the accompanying commentary are silent with
respect to the corporation attorney's obligation to remain silent
when disclosure might otherwise be "in the best interest of the
organization."
118. For example, prosecutors take disclosure and the recognition of responsibility
into consideration when determining whether to exercise discretion to decline prosecu-
tion. Some formal disclosure programs, such as the corporate leniency policy of the Anti-
trust Division of the US. Department of Justice assure that there will be no criminal
prosecution if the corporation comes forward voluntarily and discloses wrongdoing. ANTI.
TRusT DIvisioN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993). Other programs,
such as the program administered by the Department of Defense and the Department of
Justice for the voluntary disclosure of fraud by defense contractors, offer the enhanced
likelihood that the corporation will not be prosecuted. U.S. DEFT OF DEF., THE DEP'T OF
DEF. VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAm-A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS (1990); see also
U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental Vi-
olations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by the
Violator, in DEP'T OF JUST. MANUAL, § 5-11.301A (1991). Additionally, under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants, voluntary disclosure of wrongdo-
ing is a significant mitigating factor in the sentence imposed for corporate crime. See
UNITED STATES SENTENCING CozinssION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8C2.5.(g) (1994). Finally,
for corporations that contract with the United States, a corporation's voluntary disclo-
sure may be viewed as evidencing a contractor's present responsibility thereby allowing
the corporation to avoid, or mitigate, a period of suspension or debarment from govern-
ment contracting. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a)(2) (1994).
119. The Model Rules provide that "(a]ny measures taken shall be designed to mini-
mize disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the
representation to persons outside the organization." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON.
DUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1995) As Professor McCall observed, Model Rule 1.13(b):
[Slpecifically imposes a duty on the corporation lawyer who learns of constitu-
ent misconduct to take measures to protect the best interests of the corpora-
tion, including referring the matter, if necessary, to the corporation's board of
directors. All such measures taken by the attorney must be consistent with the
duty of confidentiality, which binds the attorney not to reveal confidential in-
formation relating to the representation of the corporation. In practical terms,
this means not revealing the information to anyone outside the corporation,
and, within the corporation, revealing it only to those persons who necessarily
must be informed to protect the corporation's interests.
McCall, supra note 94, at 635-36.
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However, the paramount importance of client confidentiality
is underscored in other provisions of the Model Rules as well.
For example, when a lawyer acts as an intermediary between
clients, Model Rule 2.2 requires that the confidentiality of all
clients be respected and if the "delicate balance" of the interests
and confidentiality of each client cannot be maintained, "the
common representation is improper."120 Likewise, under Model
Rule 1.9, the threat of disclosure of client confidence is a basis
for disqualification of counsel where there is a conflict of inter-
ests between current and former clients. 2 1 Similarly, where dis-
120. MODEL RULES OF PRoFEssIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 cmt. (1995). See generally
Dzienkowski, supra note 3, at 803-11.
121. Under Model Rule 1.9, a lawyer may be disqualified from representing a client
if the lawyer had represented another client in "the same or a substantially related mat-
ter" and the interest of the present and former client are "materially adverse." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.9(a) (1995). The lawyer is also forbidden from
using "information relating to the representation" to the disadvantage of the former cli-
ent. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(b) (1995). Courts construing Model
Rule 1.9, and its predecessor Canon 4 of the Code, have noted in this regard that the
lawyer's duty to a client is that of a fiduciary. See, eg., Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc.,
528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976); Elan Transdermal Ltd. v.Cygnus Therapeutic Sys-
tems, 809 F. Supp. 1383, 1386 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Financial General Bank Shares, Inc. v.
Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744, 762 (D.D.C. 1981). The likelihood that a lawyer may disclose
a former client's confidences to the disadvantage of the former client gives rise to a pre-
sumption of a "substantial relationship" between the subject matters of the current and
former representation. See, e.g., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980) ("If
there is a reasonable probability that confidences were disclosed which could be used
against the client in a later, adverse representation, a substantial relationship between
the two cases is presumed."); Elan Transdermal, 809 F. Supp. at 1389; Hagen-Dazs Co. v.
Perche No! Gelato, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 282, 285 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Conversely, establish-
ment that the two matters are substantially related will give rise to an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that client confidences were disclosed in the course of the former representa-
tion. See, e.g., In Re American Airlines, 972 F.2d 605, 614 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Once it is
established that the prior matters are substantially related to the present case, the court
will irrefutably presume that relevant confidential information was disclosed during the
former period of representation."); Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir.
1985); Elan Transdermal, 809 F. Supp. at 1389; T.C. Theater Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pic-
tures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); see also Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan
American World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 22, 38 (D.D.C. 1984) (When the subject matters of
the two representations are substantially related, it is assumed that a genuine threat
exists that the confidences revealed to former counsel will be used for the benefit of the
present adversary despite the attorney's good faith efforts to avoid such use."). For that
reason, courts have adopted a "strict prophylactic rule" of disqualification to prevent dis-
closure of client confidences. See Emile Indus., Inc. v. Patents, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d
Cir. 1973). As the Emilie Industries court states:
Even the most rigorous self-discipline might not prevent a lawyer from uncon-
sciously using or manipulating a confidence acquired in the earlier representa-
tion and transforming it into a telling advantage in the subsequent litigation.
Or, out of an excess of good faith, a lawyer might bend too far in the opposite
direction, refraining from seizing a legitimate opportunity for fear that such a
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closure is sought by the client's independent auditor, Model Rule
2.3 and long standing ABA policy protect client confidences.
122
C. Does Counsel Have an Ethical Duty to Resign?
The corporate counsel confronted with ongoing or intended
criminal conduct, which the corporation's "highest authority" re-
fuses to abandon, is in a precarious position. Although counsel
may not be permitted ethically to disclose the wrongdoing, coun-
sel may nevertheless risk personal involvement in the miscon-
duct, and a serious breach of the attorney's ethical duties, by
virtue of the attorney's silence. Under these circumstances,
counsel may have no choice but to resign.
tactic might give rise to an appearance of impropriety. In neither event would
the litigant's or the public's interest be well served. The dynamics of litigation
are far too subtle, the attorney's role in that process is far too critical, and the
public's interest in the outcome is far too great to leave room for even the
slightest doubt concerning the ethical propriety of a lawyer's representation in
a given case. These considerations require application of a strict prophylactic
role to prevent any possibility, however slight, that confidential information ac-
quired from a client during a previous relationship may subsequently be used
to the client's disadvantage.
Id.; See also United States Football League v. National Football League, 605 F. Supp.
1448, 1461 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The disqualification of one or more attorneys pursuant to
Model Rule 1.9 may also result in the disqualification of all of the lawyers practicing
with them, pursuant to Model Rule 1.10, there being a presumption of shared informa-
tion among them. See, eg., Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1101; Elan Transdermal, 809
F. Supp. at 1390; United States Football League, 605 F. Supp. at 1466.
122. As a result of the criticism of public accountants for failing to uncover fraud in
financial statements they had audited, in March 1975, the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 ("FAS 5") ad-
dressing accrual and disclosure of "loss contingencies," defined as: "an existing condition,
situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible ... loss ... to an
enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur or fail
to occur." AuDrroR's Lm'rsR HANDBOOK, 23 (ABA 1976). Corporate counsel who received
requests from auditors seeking information concerning contingent losses risked waiver of
the attorney client privilege by responding to the request. To address this problem, fol-
lowing discussions between the ABA and the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants, in December 1975 the ABA issued its Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyer's
Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information. The ABA recognized that "[authorizing]
lawyers to respond to general inquiries and disclose information to auditors concerning
matters which have been communicated in confidence is essentially destructive of free
and open communication and early consultation between lawyer and client." Id. at 5.
The ABA distinguished between litigation (pending litigation and litigation which "a
third party has manifested... a present intention to commence"), which was considered
an appropriate subject for evaluation by counsel (at least with respect to the client's po-
sition on the matter and possible exposure), and "other contingencies of a legal nature,"
which was not considered appropriate for a lawyer's response in view of the public inter-
est in encouraging communication and consultation between clients and attorneys. Id. at
6.
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Once counsel has sought reconsideration of the current or
proposed misconduct through the corporate hierarchy and has
been rebuffed, a variety of ethical precepts come into play which
bear directly on whether the lawyer can continue to serve as
corporate counsel. Both the Code and the Model Rules recognize
that there are situations in which counsel must resign, for ex-
ample, where continued representation will involve counsel in
the client's misconduct. Similarly, the Code and Model Rules
identify circumstances when counsel's withdrawal is permissive,
leaving the decision whether to resign in counsel's discretion. Fi-
nally, there is the question of counsel's obligations to the client
and to others once the decision to resign has been made. In each
instance the ethical rules provide only skeletal guidance.
1. Mandatory Withdrawal. The Code requires that a law-
yer withdraw from representing a client when the lawyer
"knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will re-
sult in violation of a Disciplinary Rule"'2 3 The Model Rules con-
tain a similar requirement. 4 For example, a lawyer may not
engage in illegal conduct, or conduct involving dishonesty, fraud
or misrepresentation.125 Neither may a lawyer counsel a client to
violate the law or assist a client in conduct the lawyer knows to
be illegal.2
6
123. Disciplinary Rule 2-110(B)(2) states that, "[a] lawyer representing a client ...
shall withdraw from employment, if... [hie knows or it is obvious that his continued
employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule". MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SiONAL RESPONSIBILrY DR 2-110(B)(2) (1980). So, for example, a lawyer whose client sub-
mitted fabricated records to an administrative agency must resign if the client refuses to
rectify the fraud. Although the lawyer is prohibited from revealing the fraud absent the
client's consent, the lawyer may not, in any event, offer false evidence to a tribunal in
violation of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(6). See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Op. 90-7 (1990).
124. Model Rule 1.16(a)(1) provides, "a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if...
the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law. . . " MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(1) (1995).
125. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(3) (1980) ("A
lawyer shall not ... [e]ngage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude."); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980) ("A lawyer shall not...
[e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmrY DR 7-102(A)(8) (1980) ("In his representation of a
client, a lawyer shall not... [knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct con-
trary to a Disciplinary Rule.").
126. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1980) ("In his
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not... [c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct
that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1995) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client,
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This is not to say, however, that simply providing advice
that the client subsequently uses to commit an unlawful act is
an ethical transgression, 127 or that withdrawal is ethically re-
quired when a client suggests that the lawyer engage in illegal
activity.128 Instead, withdrawal is required when the lawyer's
services materially further criminal or fraudulent conduct' 29
such that the lawyer's continued participation in the matter
could fairly be characterized as engaging in the illegal
conduct. 30
2. Permissive Withdrawal. In keeping with their purpose of
providing a framework for the ethical practice of law and a
structure for regulating conduct,' 31 both the Code and the Model
in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. .... ").
127. As the comment following Model Rule 1.2 states: "[tlhe fact that a client uses
advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent does not, of itself, make a law-
yer a party to the course of action." MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.2
cmt. (1995).
128. As the comment to Model Rule 1.16 states, "t]he lawyer is not obliged to de-
cline or withdraw simply because the client suggests [an illegal or unethical] course of
conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be con-
strained by a professional obligation." MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.16
cmt. (1995).
129. Thus, the comment to Model Rule 1.6 states that i]f the lawyer's services will
be used by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct,
the lawyer must withdraw .... "MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.6 cmt.
(1995). See also MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.13 cmt. (1995) ("If the
lawyer's services are being used by an organization to further a crime or fraud by the or-
ganization, Rule 1.2(d) can be applicable."). As explained in the comment following
Model Rule 1.2, '"There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal
aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud
might be committed with impunity." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.2
cmt. (1995). The comment notes further that the prohibition against assisting client ille-
gality applies even when the lawyer discovers the illegal conduct after the representa-
tion has begun: "[a] lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the law-
yer originally supposes is legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent.
Withdrawal from the representation, therefore, may be required." MODEL RuLEs OF PRO.
FESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1995).
130. As one commentator has observed in this regard, "if a lawyer is sufficiently in-
volved in a particular matter so that he may be viewed as 'engaging' in the illegal or
fraudulent conduct ...the only way to 'disengage' from the conduct would be with-
drawal from representation. This effectively amounts to mandatory withdrawal."
Gruenbaum, supra note 19, at 199.
131. Both the Code and the Model Rules make this point. The Preliminary State-
ment to the Code states, "[tihe Model Code is designed to be adopted by appropriate
agencies both as an inspirational guide to the members of the profession and as a basis
for disciplinary action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the minimum standards
stated in the Disciplinary Rules." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Prelimi-
nary Statement (1980). The Preamble to the Model Rules carries the point forward and
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Rules allow significant discretion in determining whether with-
drawal from representation is appropriate. For that reason,
withdrawal under both the Code and the Model Rules tends to
be permissive rather than mandatory.
For example, as noted above, Disciplinary Rule 2-110(B)(2)
requires withdrawal when the lawyer "knows" or when "it is ob-
vious" that continued representation will result in violation of a
Disciplinary Rule. In contrast, Disciplinary Rule 2-110(C)(2) pro-
vides that a lawyer may withdraw when continued representa-
tion is "likely" to result in violation of a disciplinary rule. And
the ethical considerations under Canon 2 emphasize that a law-
yer should withdraw "only on the basis of compelling circum-
stances . .. "132 Consistent with that ethical premise, the Code
permits but does not require a lawyer to withdraw from repre-
senting a client when the client "seeks to pursue an illegal
course of conduct 33 or the client "[i]nsists that the lawyer pur-
sue a course of conduct that is illegal, 34 or when the client in-
sists that the lawyer "engage in conduct that is contrary to the
judgment and advice of the lawyer" so long as the conduct does
emphasizes that the rules do not form an independent legal duty or basis for civil liabil-
ity. In this regard, the Preamble provides:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create
any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules are designed
to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating con-
duct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil
liability .... [N]othing in the rules should be deemed to augment any sub-
stantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violat-
ing such a duty.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Preamble (1995).
132. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILITY EC 2-32 (1980). Ethical Consider-
ation 2-32 states:
A decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on the basis of com-
pelling circumstances .... A lawyer should not withdraw without considering
carefully and endeavoring to minimize the possible adverse effect on the rights
of his client and the possibility of prejudice to his client as a result of his with-
drawal. Even when he justifiably withdraws, a lawyer should protect the wel-
fare of his client by giving the notice of his withdrawal, suggesting employment
of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the
client is entitled, cooperating with counsel subsequently employed, and other-
wise endeavoring to minimize the possibility of harm.
Id.
133. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) (1980) ("A law-
yer... may not withdraw ... unless ... such withdrawal is because... [hlis client...
[plersonally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct.").
134. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY DR 2-110(C)(1)(c) (1980) "A law-
yer... may not withdraw... unless ... such withdrawal is because ... [h]is client...
[i~nsists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited
under the Disciplinary Rules").
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not violate a disciplinary rule.135
The Model Rules are similarly permissive with regard to
withdrawal by counsel. Although as a general policy, a lawyer is
bound to abide by the client's decisions concerning objectives,136
if the client pursues a course of action "involving the lawyer's
services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or
fraudulent"137 or if the client "has used the lawyer's services to
perpetuate a crime or fraud"13 or if the lawyer considers the cli-
ent's objectives otherwise "repugnant or imprudent,"139 the law-
yer may seek to withdraw from the representation. Withdrawal
may be permitted in these circumstances even though the law-
yer's representation does not further the unlawful or fraudulent
activity.14° Thus, corporate counsel may seek to withdraw if after
135. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(1)(e) (1980) ("A law-
yer ... may not withdraw ... unless ... such withdrawal is because... [h]is client...
[i]nsists ... that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and ad-
vice of the lawyer but not prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules."). Other ethical con-
siderations also suggest that withdrawal is not precipitated by the client's rejection of
the lawyer's advice. Ethical Consideration 7-5 states, a lawyer "may continue in the rep-
resentation of his client even though his client has elected to pursue a course of conduct
contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not thereby knowingly assist the
client to engage in illegal conduct.. . ." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-5 (1980). The ethical considerations recognize that in such circumstances, the legal
consequences of a course of conduct may depend entirely on the client's state of mind
and the ethical considerations counsel the lawyer to resolve doubts in favor of the client.
Thus, Ethical Consideration 7-6 provides:
Whether the proposed action of a lawyer is within the bounds of law may be a
perplexing question when his client is contemplating a course of conduct hav-
ing legal consequences that vary according to the client's intent, motive, or
desires at the time of the action .... In many cases a lawyer may not be cer-
tain as to the state of mind of his client, and in those situations he should re-
solve reasonable doubts in favor of his client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 7-6 (1980).
136. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1995) ("A lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . .and shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.").
137. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT Rule 1.16(b)(1) (1995) ("A lawyer may
withdraw from representing a client if... the client persists in a course of action involv-
ing the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent.").
138. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(2) (1995) ("A lawyer may
withdraw from representing a client if ... the client has used the lawyer's services to
perpetrate a crime or fraud.").
139. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(3) (1995) ("A lawyer may
withdraw from representing a client if... a client insists upon pursuing an objective
that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent.").
140. As the comment following Model Rule 1.16 explains:
Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the
lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not re-
quired to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further
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seeking reconsideration of a proposed course of action, "the high-
est authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists
upon action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law
and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organiza-
tion[.]" 14 It has been suggested, however, that as a practical
matter violations of law of this sort are rarely "clear."142
3. The Manner of Withdrawal. Further complicating the
withdrawal decision is the manner in which the withdrawal will
be effected. That is, should counsel simply resign from the rep-
resentation or must counsel disclose the reason for the resigna-
tion to others (i.e., to successor counsel or to potential victims of
future crimes or frauds), sometimes referred to as a "noisy"
withdrawal. Obviously, resolution of this issue requires a careful
balancing and reconciliation of the obligation of confidentiality
and the prohibitions against furthering a crime or fraud.
The Code and the Model Rules clearly favor withdrawal
that does not adversely affect the client. Canon 2 of the Code re-
quires that the withdrawing lawyer take "reasonable steps to
avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client . . ."143 The
it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the
past even if that would materially prejudice the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.16 cmt. (1995). See also ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992) ("When a lawyer's ser-
vices have been used in the past by a client to perpetrate a fraud, but the fraud has
ceased, the lawyer may but is not required to withdraw from further representation of
the client... :).
141. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.13(c) (1995) ("If, despite the
lawyer's efforts ... the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization in-
sists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to re-
sult in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign....").
142. See Hemmer, supra note 45, at 658 ("The author submits that this professional
rule will seldom permit counsel to resign. In practice, potential violations of law typi-
cally are not 'clear,' particularly if they involve elements of business judgment beyond
the sphere of counsel's expertise.").
143. Disciplinary Rule 2-110(A)(2) provides:
[A] lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable
steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including giving
due notice to his client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, deliver-
ing to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and
complying with applicable laws and rules.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsEBmrrY DR 2-110(A)(2) (1980). In this regard, Eth-
ical Consideration 2-32 also admonishes that the lawyer:
[Not withdraw without considering carefully and endeavoring to minimize the
possible adverse effect on the rights of his client and the possibility of
prejudice to his client as a result of his withdrawal. Even when he justifiably
withdraws, a lawyer should protect the welfare of his client by giving due no-
tice of his withdrawal, suggesting employment of other counsel, delivering to
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Model Rules, as well, provide that withdrawal will be permitted
"if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse ef-
fect on the interests of the client ... "1
However, notwithstanding the almost overriding importance
of maintaining client confidentiality and the clear obligation to
avoid prejudicing the client, the lawyer who withdraws may nev-
ertheless face an equal obligation to disclose confidential infor-
mation in order "to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act
by a client.... ."5 Thus, as the comment to the Model Rules ob-
serves, "[w]hen the client's course of action has already begun
and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially deli-
cate."1 The delicacy of corporate counsel's position in such a sit-
the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, cooperating
with counsel subsequently employed, and otherwise endeavoring to minimize
the possibility of harm.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITv EC 2-32 (1980).
144. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.16(b) (1995). See also MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.16 cmt. (1995) ("Even if the lawyer has been un-
fairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the
consequences to the client."). As an example of the prejudice to a client that can result
from withdrawal, one commentator has observed:
The resignation of counsel, as the legal representative of a large publicly held
corporation, can cost many thousands of dollars simply to bring new counsel
'up to speedy More importantly, it can involve adverse publicity or "signals" to
counter parties, which may in the end be improperly determinative of a client's
course of conduct .... A resignation that jeopardizes the client's chosen course
of conduct would be an abdication of that professional responsibility.
Hemmer, supra note 45, at 662-63.
145. Thus, Model Rule 4.1 provides:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a
false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a
material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting
a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule
1.6.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 4.1 (1995). Although the comment follow-
ing Model Rule 4.1 is clear that there is no general duty to inform the opposing party of
"relevant facts," a lawyer is nevertheless required "to be truthful in dealing with others
on the client's behalf." MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 4.1 cmt. (1995). In
this regard, the comment notes that "[a] misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incor-
porates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false." Id.
Similarly, a misrepresentation "can also occur by failure to act." Id. With regard to a cli-
ent's fraud, the comment also notes that the rule "recognizes that substantive law may
require a lawyer to disclose certain information to avoid being deemed to have assisted
the client's crime or fraud." Id.
146. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1995). As the commen-
tary further observes:
The lawyer is not permitted to reveal the client's wrongdoing except where per-
mitted by Rule 1.6. However, the lawyer is required to avoid furthering the
purpose, for example, by suggesting how it might be concealed. A lawyer may
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uation was amply demonstrated in the O.P.M. affair.
O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc. ("O.P.M.") was a company en-
gaged in leasing computer equipment to businesses. Between
1978 and 1981, O.P.M. (which stood for "Other People's Money")
obtained loans of approximately $225 million to fund the ven-
ture. These loans were collateralized with computer leases and
equipment. Many of the leases were with Rockwell International
Corp. and had been procured by bribing various Rockwell em-
ployees. In addition, virtually from the beginning of its opera-
tion, O.P.M. had defrauded lenders by using a single piece of
computer equipment as collateral for multiple loans without dis-
closing the other security interests. In some instances, lessees'
signatures were forged on leases reflecting exaggerated
payments.147
Between 1970 and 1981, O.P.M. was represented by Singer,
Hutner, Levine & Seeman, P.C. ("Singer, Hutner"), which served
as general counsel to O.P.M. Eventually during the representa-
tion, an attorney from Singer, Hutner served on the O.P.M.
Board of Directors and as an O.P.M. officer. Between 1975 and
1981, O.P.M. represented approximately 60% of Singer, Hutner's
business.148
Although there had been warning signs of problems, 149
Singer, Hunter became aware of the magnitude of the fraud on
June 12, 1980 when Myron Goodman, a founder and president
of O.P.M., admitted to Joseph Hutner that O.P.M. had been en-
gaged in a fraudulent scheme that it was financially unable to
not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposes is
legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent.
Id.; see also Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability for Client Fraud, 1991 COLUM Bus. L.
REv. 1, 18 (1991). As Steinberg observes:
In the client fraud setting, inside counsel is in a particularly troubling di-
lemma. If outside counsel speaks out or resigns, a lucrative client may be lost.
If inside counsel does so, he or she may well have to find another job. Nonethe-
less, inside counsel's professional obligations are not lessened by the fact of in-
house status. As a consequence, inside counsel must be careful not to be co-
opted into being a participant in the client's fraud.
Steinberg, supra, at 18.
147. See generally Kocontes, supra note 112, at 301-09; Treiman, supra note 35, at
928.
148. Kocontes, supra note 112, at 302.
149. For example, O.P.M. had been convicted in March 1980 of twenty-two felony
counts arising from a check-kiting fraud scheme in which O.P.M. had used its controlling
interests in a Louisiana bank to obtain interest free loans from other financial institu-
tions. Also, with regard to the Rockwell leases, O.P.M. instructed Singer, Hutner to for-
ward the Rockwell leases to O.P.M. rather than to Rockwell, as was the practice with
other non-Rockwell leases. Id.
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remedy. It appears that Goodman's confession was prompted by
a letter sent by an O.P.M. accountant controller to Singer,
Hutner just prior to the controller's resignation. 150
Because of the firm's concerns arising from its role in the
fraudulent transactions, Singer, Hutner engaged two experts in
legal ethics, Joseph McLaughlin, Dean of the Fordham Law
School, and Henry Putzel III, a former Fordham Professor of
professional responsibility, to advise the firm of its ethical obli-
gations. 151 The firm was told that it had no ethical obligation to
disclose the fraudulent conduct or withdraw as O.P.M.'s counsel
since there was no evidence that the fraud was ongoing. The
firm was further advised that there was no obligation to with-
draw its opinion letters, now seen to be misleading, because the
documents had been prepared in good faith.5
2
However, when further information was disclosed concern-
ing the fraud and the uses to which the firm's services had been
put in furtherance of the scheme, Singer, Hutner withdrew as
counsel for O.P.M., although on the advice of Professor Putzel,
the firm's withdrawal was a gradual one, over several months,
so as to avoid prejudicing O.P.M.153 The only documentation of
the withdrawal prepared by Singer, Hutner was a letter indicat-
ing that the termination of the representation was by "mutual
agreement."1
54
Following Singer, Hutner's resignation, O.P.M. engaged the
firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays and Handler ("Kaye,
Scholer"). 55 Prior to undertaking the representation, Kaye,
Scholer inquired of Singer, Hutner whether there was any rea-
son why Kaye, Scholer should not represent O.P.M. Kaye,
Scholer was informed by Joseph Hutner that the termination
had been by mutual agreement and that Hutner would not dis-
close the reasons for the termination. 56 A Kaye, Scholer partner
told Hutner in this connection that Kaye, Scholer would accept
O.P.M. as a client because he assumed that Hutner would alert
him if anything was wrong. Kaye, Scholer undertook the repre-
sentation of O.P.M. and assisted O.P.M. in transactions that
proved to be fraudulent which resulted in $15 million in addi-
150. Id.
151. Treiman, supra note 35, at 928.
152. Kocontes, supra note 112, at 304.
153. Id. at 305.
154. Treiman, supra note 35, at 930.
155. Kocontes, supra note 112, at 305.
156. Treimnan, supra note 35, at 929-30.
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tional losses to lenders.
157
As a matter of legal ethics, Singer, Hutner's failure to dis-
close O.P.M.'s fraud was defensible. Goodman's confession to
Hutner was for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and not,
apparently, in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. Accord-
ingly, the information was subject to the obligation to preserve
client confidences under both the Code and the Model Rules.
Further, because the opinions expressed by the firm in a good
faith belief in their accuracy related to past crimes committed
by O.P.M. there does not appear to have been a legal obligation
to rectify what was subsequently revealed to have been possible
misrepresentations on the part of the firm. Finally, again as-
suming that Singer, Hutner had no reason to believe that the
O.P.M. fraud was ongoing, there was no basis for the firm to dis-
close O.P.M.'s past acts to Kaye, Scholer, a disclosure which
would have violated Singer, Hutner's duty of confidentiality to
O.P.M. Thus, even under so egregious a factual setting as the
O.P.M. fraud, there was not an ethical basis for a "noisy"
withdrawal.
In contrast to the O.P.M. affair is the situation addressed by
the ABA Committee on Professional Responsibility concerning
an attorney who knows or has reason to believe that her work
product and services are being used or will be used by her client
to perpetrate a fraud. 158 There, the outside counsel to a small
privately held corporation engaged in providing lighting equip-
ment to commercial buildings issued an opinion in support of
the closing of a $5 million unsecured loan, inter alia, that the
company's installation contracts (the company's principal assets)
were enforceable obligations against the company's dustomers.
After the transaction closed, the CEO and Treasurer of the cli-
ent confessed to counsel that for the preceding three years, they
had falsified millions of dollars of contracts by altering existing
contracts and forging change orders to inflate receivables. As a
result, both the lawyer's opinion and the audited financial state-
ments were materially misleading. 159
The confessing officers informed the lawyer that they were
unwilling to issue corrected financial statements. They also in-
formed her that the company intended to engage new counsel
who would be called upon to assist with additional loans and to
maintain the company's line of credit with the defrauded lender.
157. Id.




The officers stated that they would not disclose the fraud to the
new counsel.16
0
In effecting these transactions, the lender would rely on the
lawyer's earlier opinion. The lawyer advised the third member of
the company's board of directors, who was not involved in the
fraudulent activity, and was informed that the board member
intended to take no action "other than to assist the CEO and
treasurer in avoiding the company's insolvency."161
With regard to the lawyer's intention to resign from repre-
senting the company, while the ABA Committee agreed that the
lawyer was required to withdraw from any representation that
would have the effect of directly or indirectly assisting the cli-
ent's fraud, the committee suggested that withdrawal from rep-
resentation unrelated to the fraudulent activity would not be re-
quired.162 Further, the Committee concluded that to the extent
the client's fraud was completed and the lawyer did not know or
have reason to believe that the client would use the lawyer's
services and work product in a future fraud, the lawyer could
withdraw from the representation but could not disavow her
work product. 63 However, the lawyer could disavow her work
product to prevent its use in a continuing or future fraud unless
the mere fact of her withdrawal would put the lender on notice
that something was wrong.164
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. The Committee stated:
It is not clear from the facts presented to the Committee whether severance of
the entire relationship is ethically compelled in this case, as the lawyer appar-
ently believes, or whether she is ethically required to withdraw from represen-
tation of the client only in matters relating to the fraud. We do not believe that
knowledge of a client's ongoing fraud necessarily requires the lawyer's with-
drawal from representation wholly unrelated to the fraud, even if the fraud in-
volves the lawyer's past services or work product. On the other hand, complete
severance may be the preferred course in these circumstances, in order to
avoid any possibility of the lawyer's continued association with the client's
fraud. We would simply point out, however, that withdrawal from matters to-
tally unrelated to the fraud is more likely to be permissive, and governed by
Rule 1.16(b), than mandatory under Rule 1.16(a)(1).
Id.
163. Id. The Committee concluded in this regard:
[I]f the fraud is completed, and the lawyer does not know or reasonably believe
that the client intends to continue the fraud or commit a future fraud by use of
the lawyer's services or work product, the lawyer may withdraw from represen-
tation of the client but may not disavow any work product.
Id.
164. Id. As the Committee stated:
[W]e conclude that the instant inquiry presents a situation in which a "noisy"
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The Committee took pains to make clear that such a "noisy"
withdrawal should be "a last resort" and should be limited to
that disclosure necessary to accomplish the purpose and no
more. For example, in the context of the underlying facts, the
Committee suggested the possibility of notifying successor coun-
sel rather than the lender.165 Thus,.the Committee concluded:
Our present opinion reads the Rules as permitting limited disclosure
only where the client is determined to continue the fraudulent conduct
which the lawyer has unwittingly facilitated, or to make use of the law-
yer's services or work product in a future fraud, and there is no other
way for the lawyer to avoid giving assistance to such continuing or fu-
ture fraud in violation of Rule 1.2(d). In these limited circumstances,
where silence would result in a violation of the lawyer's duty under
Model Rule 1.2(d) not to assist a client's ongoing or intended future
fraud, we are persuaded that her duty to keep client confidences must
withdrawal would be proper since the client has declared itself determined to
engage in further fraudulent conduct that will implicate the lawyer's past ser-
vices, and the lawyer knows it. Withdrawal from further representation of the
client is therefore mandated by Rule 1.16(a)(1). And, if the lawyer reasonably
believes that her withdrawal in silence will be ineffective to prevent the client
from using the lawyer's work product to accomplish its unlawful purpose, in or-
der to avoid violating Rule 1.2(d), she may take the additional step of disaf-
firming her work product, with the hope and expectation that this will prevent
reliance on that work product by future victims of the client's continuing fraud.
Indeed, disavowal of her opinion may be the only way of making her with-
drawal effective.
Id.
165. Id. The Committee opined:
[D]isaffirmance should be a last resort, and should in any event go no further
than necessary to accomplish its purpose of avoiding the lawyer's assisting the
client's fraud. Before taking this drastic step, the lawyer should determine
whether the circumstances are such that disaffirmance is necessary to disasso-
ciate herself from the client's fraud, or whether measures short of disaffirm-
ance will suffice. We can envision situations in which the lawyer's simple silent
withdrawal from representation would be sufficient to accomplish this end. We
can also envision situations in which the lawyer's intention to disaffirm, an-
nounced to the client, would accomplish the same result as actual disaffirm-
ance. And even where disaffirmance is necessary, it may be enough to take
measures short of notifying the bank. For example, it may be sufficient for the
lawyer to notify the client's new lawyers that she can no longer stand behind
the opinion she gave at the loan closing about the enforceability of the installa-
tion contracts. Finally, if the bank must be notified, in disaffirming her work
product the lawyer should take only such steps as are reasonably necessary to
accomplish the intended purpose of preventing use of her work product in the
client's fraud. The lawyer may and indeed must decline to discuss or otherwise
reveal anything about the disaffirmed work product beyond the simple fact
that she no longer stands behind it.
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give way to the extent necessary to avoid this result. 116
In addition to the risk of violating the ethical prohibitions
against assisting client illegality or fraud, the corporate counsel
who elects to remain silent concerning corporate misconduct
risks criminal prosecution and civil suit for violating or avoiding
and abetting the violation of law. In such situations, corporate
counsel's position is indeed "delicate" particularly when counsel
represents the corporation in its dealings with federal regula-
tory authorities.
III. CONSEQUENCES IF CORPORATE COUNSEL REMAINS SILENT IN
THE FACE OF CORPORATE ILLEGALITY
In light of the Model Rules' prohibition against knowing as-
sistance of a client's fraud or other illegal conduct, the corporate
counsel who remains silent in the face of ongoing or planned il-
legality risks significant liability on several fronts. Despite the
bar's consistent view that disclosure may be made only in lim-
ited circumstances, 167 an attorney's failure to disclose client mis-
conduct, particularly violations of regulatory statutes, may re-
sult in prosecution by government regulatory authorities and
civil suits by third parties who were damaged by the corporate
client's misconduct. The Securities and Exchange Commission
has sought through civil enforcement actions and administrative
166. Id. In a strongly worded dissent, three members of the Committee challenged
the fundamental premise of the majority's opinion as well as the Committee majority's
interpretation of Model Rules 1.2(d) and 1.16(a)(1) to require post hoe disavowal of the
attorney's opinion letter. The Committee minority concluded that because the lawyer's
representation with regard to banking matters had been concluded, Model Rule
1.16(a)(1) did not require noisy withdrawal since Model Rule 1.16(a)(1) "clearly contem-
plates mandatory withdrawal only if future ongoing representational services will be im-
properly used by the client. Only then would a 'noisy withdrawal' be permissible." Id.
The Committee minority also found the majority's conclusion that the lender would be
"lulled" absent disavowal to be "artificial." Instead, the Committee minority concluded
that "disaffirmance is only possible if withdrawal is mandatory" and that"[w]ithdrawal is
mandatory only if continued representation will violate Model Rule 1.2(d) by assisting
the client in committing a fraud on the bank." Id.
167. Recently, in August 1991, the Business Law Section of the ABA proposed an
amendment of Model Rule 1.6 that would permit disclosure of client fraud in cases
where the lawyer's services were used to perpetrate a fraud. Under the amendment, dis-
closure would only be permitted when the client had withheld information and thereby
had involved an innocent lawyer in the client's fraud. Despite arguments that requiring
confidentiality under these circumstances would in effect reward a client's lack of can-
dor, the House of Delegates rejected the proposed amendment. See Richard M. Phillips,
Client Fraud and the Securities Lawyer's Duty of Confidentiality, 49 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
823, 827-29 (1992).
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proceedings to impose on securities lawyers duties of disclosure
that exceed the lawyer's ethical duties. So too, in its efforts to
recoup federal insurance funds lost through the failures of sav-
ings and loan associations, the Office of Thrift Supervision has
been successful in aggressively asserting liability on the part of
lawyers for the failure to disclose fully the financial condition of
their clients to the banking regulators. Regardless of whether
one applauds or condemns the regulators' activities in these re-
gards, the complexity of corporate counsel's potentially conflict-
ing duties of confidentiality and disclosure are at least troubling
and are a source of grave personal and professional concern for
corporate counsel.
A. The Securities and Exchange Commission
Following the revelations that Salomon Brothers had on at
least three occasions violated SEC and Treasury rules in connec-
tion with trading in Treasury notes in 1991, the SEC and its
Chairman commented on the responsibility of Salomon's Chief
Legal Officer, Donald M. Feuerstein, to bring Salomon's miscon-
duct to the attention of government regulators. Although the
SEC's comments were equivocal with respect to the obligation of
a lawyer in Feuerstein's position to come forward and report cli-
ent misconduct, the SEC report regarding Feuerstein's actions
(and failure to act) revived issues of professional responsibility
that have been the subject of debate by securities law practition-
ers for the past twenty years.
1. The Salomon Brothers Case. In February 1991, Salomon
bid for 35% of the five-year Treasury notes then at auction. Sal-
omon's bid was the maximum that any one bidder could lawfully
submit. Salomon exceeded this limit by submitting unauthorized
bids in the names of two Salomon customers. As a result, Salo-
mon was able to secure 56.7% of the auctioned Treasury notes.
Salomon then readjusted its books to make it appear that the
customers, in whose names the bids had been made, had sold
their positions to Salomon.
168
168. For the facts of the Salomon Brothers case, see the report of the SEC concern-
ing the actions of Salomon Brothers' management in In Re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 31, 554, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 85,067, at 83,600
(Dec. 3, 1992); James R. Doty, Regulatory Expectations Regarding the Conduct of Attor-
nays in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws: Recent Development and Lessons
for the Future, 48 Bus. LAw. 1543, 1556-57 (1993).
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Paul Mozer, who was in charge of Salomon's government
trading desk, later admitted to his manager, John W. Mer-
iwether, that he had submitted false bids. Meriwether then ad-
vised Salomon's President, Thomas W. Strauss and Donald
Feuerstein of Mozer's admission. Feuerstein stated that the mat-
ter should be disclosed to the government. 16 9
The following week, Strauss, Meriwether and Feuerstein
met with John H. Gutfreund, Chairman and CEO of Salomon.
In the course of that meeting, Feuerstein advised that in his
opinion the submission of a false bid was a criminal act. Feuer-
stein reiterated his advice that the matter be disclosed to the
government. There was, or there appeared to be, agreement that
the false bids would be disclosed to the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, Salomon's regulator in its dealings in Treasury
securities.'70
Despite Mozer having been told by his manager Meriwether
that his earlier submission of the false bid was "career threaten-
ing,"171 Mozer again caused false and unauthorized bids to be
submitted at the Treasury actions on April 25, 1991 and May
22, 1991.172 In the meantime, in mid-May 1991, Feuerstein met
with Gutfreund and Strauss concerning Mozer's February trad-
ing and again urged that the February false bids be disclosed.
Both Gutfreund and Strauss assured Feuerstein that they in-
tended to make the disclosure. 73
Finally, on June 10, 1991, after rumors of a "squeeze" were
reported in the press specifically naming Salomon, Gutfreund
met with Treasury representatives. Gutfreund did not disclose,
however, the false bids in February but confined his discussion
to trading at the May 22 auction. Gutfreund stated that Salo-
mon had acted properly in regard to the auction and that Salo-
mon would cooperate with the Treasury's inquiry 74
Gutfreund met subsequently with Strauss and Meriwether
on June 19 and the decision was made to delay disclosure of the
February bids. Feuerstein was not present at the meeting and
apparently was not informed of the decision to delay
169. In Re Gutfreund, supra note 168, at 83,600-83,601.
170. Id. at 83,601. The SEC subsequently noted in In Re Gutfreund, that "each of
the four executives who attended the meetings in late April placed the responsibility for
investigating Mozer's conduct and placing limits on his activities on someone else." For
his part, Fenerstein claimed he believed that once disclosure was made, the government
would instruct Salomon how to investigate the matter. Id. at 83,602.
171. Id. at 83,600.
172. Id. at 83,602.
173. Id. at 83,603.
174. Id.
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disclosure.
175
In early July, after having been contacted by the SEC and
other agencies regarding the May auction, Feuerstein engaged
outside counsel to investigate Salomon's actions with respect to
the May 22 auction. Counsel was not informed of the February
bids at that time. Feuerstein informed Salomon's outside counsel
of the February bids after the head trader on Salomon's govern-
ment trading desk declined to answer counsel's question regard-
ing other trading similar to that in the May auction. When
counsel expanded the inquiry into these areas, it was learned
that false bids had also been submitted in the December 27,
1990 and February 7, 1991 auctions.17 6
Counsel reported its findings to Feuerstein on August 6 and
to Gutfreund, Strauss and Meriwether on August 7, 1991. On
August 9, Salomon issued a press release stating that "irregu-
larities and rule violations" with respect to "submission of bids
in certain auctions of Treasury securities" had been uncov-
ered.177 In telephone conversations with government officials on
August 9, Gutfreund and Strauss disclosed that Salomon had
known of a false bid since late April 1991. A second press re-
lease issued on August 14, 1991 disclosed that Salomon had
been informed in late April that "a single unauthorized bid had
been submitted in the February 1991 auction . . ."178 Four days
later, on August 18, Gutfreund, Strauss and Meriwether re-
signed. Feuerstein resigned his position of Chief Legal Officer on
August 23, 1991.179
In light of these events, SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden,
was invited to testify concerning the government's response to
the Salomon matter before the House Subcommittee on Telecom-
munications and Finance. In his testimony, Chairman Breeden
opined that when companies become aware of wrongdoing
among their employees, they have a duty not only to take
prompt corrective action but also to report the wrongdoing to
government regulators. Chairman Breeden stated in this regard,
"it should be seen as the personal obligation of every chief exec-
utive to make an immediate and full investigation of the possi-
ble wrongdoing, to report it promptly to the appropriate regula-
tory bodies and to seek to take corrective action .... ,180
175. Id. at 83,603-83,604.
176. Id. at 83,604.
177. Id. at 83,605.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Salomon Brothers and Government Securities: Hearing Before the Subcommittee
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Chairman Breeden concluded that, "prompt and vigorous public
accountability for willful, unlawful acts should be seen as the re-
sponsibility of the firm itself and not just the government."18'
Not surprisingly, Chairman Breeden's views were also re-
flected in the SEC's decision in In Re Gutfreund, which held
that Gutfreund, Strauss and Meriwether had breached their
duty to supervise under section 780(b)(4)(E) of the Exchange
Act.182 Feuerstein was on a different legal footing, however, and
the SEC took some pains to elucidate what it considered to be
his duty under the circumstances.
First, because Feuerstein had not been a direct supervisor
of Mozer, Feuerstein was not named as a respondent in the Gut-
freund proceedings. The SEC felt constrained, nevertheless, to
examine Feuerstein's actions and issue a report "to amplify [the
SEC's] views on the supervisory responsibilities of legal and
compliance officers in Feuerstein's position .... ",183 The SEC
then went on to find that notwithstanding the fact that he did
not have direct supervisory authority over Mozer, Feuerstein
was nevertheless a supervisor for purposes of section 15
(b)(4)(E) liability because of his responsibilities and position
within Salomon Brothers as Chief Legal and Compliance
Officer.'84
In this connection, the SEC particularly noted that Feuer-
stein had been informed of the misconduct by senior manage-
ment "in order to obtain his advice and guidance, and to involve
him as part of management's collective response to the prob-
lem." 85 The SEC also noted that on other occasions Feuerstein
had directed Salomon's response to misconduct and had made
on Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce House of
Representatives, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 136, 147 (1991) (statement of Richard C.
Breeden, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission) (quoted testimony ap-
pears on p. 12 of the document submitted to subcommittee).
181. Id.
182. 15 U.S.C. § 780(b)(4)(E) (1994). Under this section, the SEC may impose liabil-
ity where a broker-dealer has "failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing
violations [of the federal securities laws], another person who commits such a violation,
if such person is subject to his supervision." Id.
183. In re Gutfreund, supra note 168, at 83,608.
184. The SEC stated, however, that an employee of a brokerage house does not be-
come a supervisor solely because the employee has legal or compliance responsibilities.
Instead, "determining if a particular person is a supervisor depends on whether, under
the facts and circumstances of a particular case, that person has a requisite degree of
responsibility, ability or authority to affect the conduct of the employee whose behavior
is at issue." Id. at 83,608-83,609.
185. Id.
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recommendations concerning disciplinary action.18 6 The SEC
concluded therefore that "given the role and influence within the
firm of a person in a position such as Feuerstein's and the fac-
tual circumstances of his case, such a person shares the respon-
sibility to take appropriate action to respond to the
misconduct."
187
According to the SEC, once Feuerstein became involved in
formulating management's response to Mozer's misconduct,
Feuerstein was "obligated to take affirmative steps to ensure
that appropriate action was taken to address the misconduct."
88
The SEC cautioned, however, that the obligations of a person in
Feuerstein's position are not limited to the person's own actions.
The SEC stated that "[i]f such a person takes appropriate steps
but management fails to act and that person knows or has rea-
son to know of that failure" he or she should consider additional
steps "appropriate to address the matter."18 9 The SEC suggested
that such steps include "disclosure of the matter to the entity's
board of directors, resignation from the firm, or disclosure to
regulatory authorities."190 The SEC recognized, however, that for
an attorney, the applicable ethical rules "may bear upon what
course of conduct that individual may properly pursue."19'
2. The National Student Marketing Litigation. Largely as
the result of the Watergate disclosures of illicit, off-book "slush
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. For example, the SEC suggested that Feuerstein could have directed that
an investigation be undertaken or that he could have made "appropriate recommenda-
tions" for limiting Mozer's activities or recommended "the institution of appropriate pro-
cedures, reasonably designed to prevent and detect future misconduct, and verify that
his or her recommendations, or acceptable alternatives are implemented." Id.
189. Id. The SEC has also emphasized that persons with supervisory authority have
a duty to inquire into possible wrongdoing and to follow up on that inquiry when there
are "red flags" indidating irregularities. As the SEC stated in its order in In Re Joseph:
The federal securities laws also impose on supervisors the obligation to re-
spond vigorously even to indications of possible wrongdoing. In large organiza-
tions it is especially imperative that those in authority exercise particular vigi-
lance when indications of irregularity reach their attention .... Red flags and
suggestions of irregularities demand inquiry as well as adequate follow-up and
review. When indications of impropriety reach the attention of those in author-
ity, they must act decisively to detect and prevent violations of the federal se-
curities laws.
In Re Joseph, Exchange Act Release No. 32340, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) S 85,200, 84,175-84,176 (1993) (citation omitted).
190. In Re Gutfreund, supra note 168, at 83,609.
191. Id. at 83,609 n.26.
830 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
funds,"192 as well as the SEC's inquiry into questionable over-
seas payments by U.S. Companies,193 the SEC came to view the
role of a corporation's securities lawyers as being more akin to a
corporation's outside accountants rather than as advocates for
the corporation. 94 Thus, lawyers were considered by the SEC to
be direct participants in the enforcement of the securities laws
with disclosure obligations running to the corporation's share-
holders and to the SEC itself. 95
192. See David P. Doherty, The SECs Management Fraud Program, 31 Bus. LAw.
1279 (1976).
193. See STAFF OF SENATE Co~ia. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMSSION ON QUESTIONABLE
AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976).
194. Thus, for example, SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. observed that although:
[Tihe lawyers' position in corporate and financial matters is subtler and less
obvious [than that of accountants]... when it comes to matters affecting pub-
lic stockholders and investors, we are not prepared to agree that the corporate
lawyer's duty is solely, or even primarily, to protect the interests of the individ-
uals constituting corporate management, when he is retained to serve the
corporation.
Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1400-01. In this same vein, SEC Commissioner, A.A. Som-
mer, Jr., had also suggested that:
In securities matters (other than those where advocacy is clearly proper)
the attorney will have to function in a manner more akin to that of the auditor
than to that of the advocate. This means several things. It means he will have
to exercise a measure of independence that is perhaps uncomfortable if he is
also the close counselor of management in other matters, often including busi-
ness decisions. It means he will have to be acutely cognizant of his responsibil-
ity to the public who engage in securities transactions that would never have
come about were it not for his professional presence. It means he will have to
adopt the healthy skepticism toward the representations of management which
a good auditor must adopt. It means he will have to do the same thing the au-
ditor does when confronted with an intransigent client-resign.
Id.
195. This position was summarized as follows:
The overwhelming responsibility for enforcement of the Securities laws rests
with the Securities Bar rather than with the SEC. The SEC is a small agency,
with a limited budget and staff and overwhelming responsibilities. Because of
the unique position of lawyers in the securities process, the obligation rests
with the lawyers to investigate and assure themselves of their clients' compli-
ance with the law. The SEC accepts, on faith in the lawyers' probity and dili-
gence, their clients' registration statements, proxy statements and other vital
disclosure documents which the lawyers file. Hence, lawyers who fail to exer-
cise diligence in enforcing and administering the securities laws breach their
responsibility to the SEC, the financial community and the public, and violate
the Federal Securities Laws.
Donald J. Evans, Disclosure Obligations of Lawyers Advising in the SEC Area, 31 Bus.
LAw. 468, 469 (1975). This same view was also subsequently expressed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
By the very nature of its operations, the Commission, with its small staff and
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The SEC strenuously asserted this position in its controver-
sial complaint filed in the National Student Marketing case in
1972.196 There, the SEC alleged, among other things, that law-
yers in the law firms of White & Case and Lord, Bissell and
Brook had engaged in acts and practices in violation of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934197 and the Commis-
sion's Rule 10b-5198 in connection with the dissemination of inac-
curate financial statements and proxy materials.
The lawyer defendants represented the two parties to the
merger of National Student Marketing Corporation ("NSMC")
and Interstate National Corporation ("Interstate") in 1969. In
essence, the SEC alleged that the financial statements for
NSMC's fiscal year ending August 31, 1968 and for the nine
month period ending May 31, 1969 were materially inaccurate
in that they overstated sales and retained earnings.199 The SEC
alleged that the proxy statement issued by NSMC was similarly
inaccurate and misleading.
200
At the closing which occurred on October 31, 1969, NSMC's
counsel received an unsigned "comfort letter" that had been dic-
tated by NSMC's outside accountants, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co. ("PMM"). The comfort letter showed that various substan-
tial downward adjustments had been made to the unaudited fi-
nancial statements for the period ending May 31, 1969. Later
that same day, PMM informed NSMC's counsel that PMM
wished to add a paragraph to the comfort letter to the effect
that if the referenced adjustments were made, the statement of
earnings would reflect a net loss for the period ending May 31,
1969 rather than net earnings of $700,000 as reflected in the
NSMC financial statements provided to Interstate.201 NSMC's
lawyers did not provide this information to Interstate and the
closing meeting concluded.202 Nor did they provide Interstate
limited resources, cannot possibly examine, with the degree of close scrutiny
required for full disclosure, each of the many financial statements which are
filed. Recognizing this, the Commission necessarily must rely heavily on both
the accounting and legal professions to perform their tasks diligently and
responsibly.
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1979).
196. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 93,360 (1972) [hereinafter NSMC Complaint].
197. 15 US.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
198. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
199. See NSMC Complaint, supra note 196, at 91,913-6 to 91,913-8.
200. Id. at 91,913-8.
201. Id at 91,913-16.
202. After the conclusion of the closing meeting, PMM informed NSMC's counsel
that an additional paragraph would be added to the comfort letter stating, "[iun view of
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with the comfort letter they received from PMM.20 3
The SEC alleged that under these circumstances, NSMC
should have notified the SEC of the misleading nature of the fi-
nancial statements.214 This contention that NSMC's lawyers had
a legal duty to inform the SEC of inaccuracies in their client's
financial statements engendered substantial concern among the
Bar 205 and resulted in the adoption in 1975 of the ABA's State-
ment of Policy Regarding Responsibilities and Liabilities of Law-
yers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by Clients with
Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.2 0o As noted above, this debate became part of the formula-
tion of the Model Rules.
20 7
However, when the case was finally decided in the district
court,208 the precise boundaries of the attorney's disclosure re-
sponsibility remained unresolved. The district court found that
the attorneys had aided and abetted in the violation of the se-
curities laws by failing to interfere with the closing of the
merger.209 In this connection, the district court held that the at-
torneys were required to "speak out" regarding the inaccuracies
the above mentioned facts, we believe the companies should consider submitting cor-
rected interim unaudited financial information to the shareholders prior to proceeding
with the closing." Id. at 91,913-19.
203. Id.
204. The SEC stated in this regard that "[as part of the fraudulent scheme,
[NSMC's lawyers]... failed to insist that the financial statements be revised and share-
holders be resolicited, and failing that, to cease representing their respective clients and,
under the circumstances, notify the plaintiff commission concerning the misleading na-
ture of the nine month financial statements." Id. at 91,913-17.
205. See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1404.
206. See ABA Comm. on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, Statement of Policy
Adopted by American Bar Association Regarding Responsibilities and Liabilities of Law-
yers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by Clients with Laws Administered by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 Bus. LAw. 543 (1975) [hereinafter ABA
Statement]. The ABA statement forcefully reiterated the view that client confidentiality
and fiduciary loyalty to the client "are vital to the basic function of the lawyer as legal
counselor. .. ." Id. at 544. For that reason, the SEC position in National Student Mar-
keting was forthrightly rejected by the ABA, which noted that:
[The] vital confidentiality of consultation and advice would be destroyed or se-
riously impaired if it is accepted as a general principle that lawyers must in-
form the SEC or others regarding confidential information received by lawyers
from their clients even though such action would not be permitted or required
by the [code] .... [Ilt must be recognized that a lawyer cannot, consistently
with his essential role as legal adviser, be regarded as a source of information
concerning possible wrong-doing by clients.
Id.
207. See supra Part II.B.2.
208. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
209. Id. at 712.
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in the financial statements.210 However, the district court side-
stepped the central issue of the attorney's disclosure obligation
by concluding that once the merger was completed, the attor-
neys' subsequent actions did not "substantially assist the
violation. 21'
210. Id. at 713. The district court stated that:
Upon receipt of the unsigned comfort letter, it became clear that the
merger had been approved by the Interstate shareholders on the basis of mate-
rially misleading information. In view of the obvious materiality of the infor-
mation, especially to attorneys learned in securities law, the attorneys' respon-
sibilities to their corporate client required them to take steps to ensure that
the information would be disclosed to the shareholders. However, it is unneces-
sary to determine the precise extent of their obligations here, since it is undis-
puted that they took no steps whatsoever to delay the closing pending disclo-
sure to and resolicitation of the Interstate shareholders. But, at the very least,
they were required to speak out at the closing concerning the obvious material-
ity of the information and the concomitant requirement that the merger not be
closed until the adjustments were disclosed and approval of the merger was
again obtained from the Interstate shareholders. Their silence was not only a
breach of this duty to speak, but in addition lent the appearance of legitimacy
to the closing.
Id. This view was reiterated by Samuel Gruenbaum in his response to Professor Kramer.
Gruenbaum, supra note 20, at 211. According to Gruenbaum:
The lawyer is more than a scrivener or an aid.
Therefore, it is certainly not acceptable to say that a lawyer must, in the
name of loyalty and devotion to his client, remain silent when the client has,
in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud on others. As an ad-
viser, a lawyer must consider the impact of his client's conduct on others. He
must be sensitive to his client's responsibility to remain within the strictures of
the law, and must not permit himself to become an unwitting participant in
the unlawful conduct. If he finds that he has become such a participant, he
must take prompt steps to undo the wrong done. This includes speaking out.
Id.
211. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. at 714-15. According to the
district court:
The SEC's contention with regard to counsel's alleged acquiescence in the
merger transaction raises significant questions concerning the responsibility of
counsel. The basis for the charge appears to be counsel's failure, after the
merger, to withdraw their opinion, to demand resolicitation of the sharehold-
ers, to advise their clients concerning rights of rescission of the merger, and ul-
timately, to inform the Interstate shareholders or the SEC of the completion of
the merger based on materially false and misleading financial statements.
... The Commission's charge, however, concerns the period following the
transaction, even if the attorneys' fiduciary responsibilities to the Interstate
shareholders continued beyond the merger, the breach of such a duty would
not have the requisite relationship to a securities transaction, since the merger
had already been completed. It is equally obvious that such subsequent action
or inaction by the attorneys could not substantially assist the merger.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Representatives of the SEC justified the SEC's position that
counsel should have disclosed the inaccuracy of the financial
statements to the SEC on the grounds that the information was
not a privileged communication. 212 The ABA Statement and
other commentators have forcefully argued that putting lawyers
in the role of enforcers of the law would radically alter the at-
torney-client relationship and impair the lawyer's effectiveness
as a counselor.213 Nevertheless, the Feuerstein Report and other
administrative decisions of the SEC addressing the responsibil-
ity of compliance personnel strongly suggests that the SEC con-
tinues to regard attorneys, at least those with compliance re-
sponsibilities, to be adjuncts to the Commission's enforcement
212. See Sonde, supra note 95, at 586. Sonde emphasizes:
What [the National Student Marketing] case points up... is the way in which
the Bar misread what the Commission was saying in that case. The Commis-
sion's concern in that case was not to tamper with privileged communications.
... The Commission was talking about a need to disclose information that
could never be considered privileged.
Id.
213. ABA Statement, supra note 206, at 545. The ABA Statement notes that:
Efforts by the government to impose responsibility upon lawyers to assure the
quality of their clients' compliance with the law or to compel lawyers to give
advice resolving all doubts in favor of regulatory restrictions would evoke seri-
ous and far-reaching disruption in the role of the lawyer as counselor, which
would be detrimental to the public, clients and the legal profession.
Id.; Forrow, supra note 3, at 1821 ("The role of counsel as informant would greatly jeop-
ardize the long-accepted confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship. The attorney-
client privilege... is of fundamental importance and an integral part of our judicial sys-
tem and should become even more vital as government regulation-ever more complex-
permeates the conduct of business); Evans, supra note 195, at 470. Evans notes that:
Whenever a proposal is made that a lawyer go beyond his fundamental
role of advising his client and assume a function that could require him pub-
licly to contradict his client or disclose possible deficiencies, on the basis of in-
formation gained in the course of his professional engagement, there is cause
for concern on the part of the public as well as the bar, since the attorney-
client relationship is of fundamental importance to our legal system.
Id.; Burke, supra note 1, at 277. According to Burke:
Requiring securities counsel to disclose client wrongdoing presumes that
the public good is maximized by substituting the public interest for that of the
client. However, the effect of the resulting erosion of the attorney-client privi-
lege on corporate compliance with the law is dubious. Extending disclosure ob-
ligations to corporate securities counsel is "anomalous ... at a time when seri-
ous commentators are questioning whether the entire disclosure process is
working sufficiently well to justify its expense."
Id.; Hemmer, supra note 45, at 648 ("Most practitioners, including the author, find ab-
horrent the notion that counsel must inform a governmental regulatory agency of the
improper conduct of a client. The notion directly conflicts with the common-law attorney-
client privilege and the professional rules of conduct governing lawyer-client
confidentiality.").
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efforts.214
Additionally, the SEC has utilized its administrative pro-
ceedings under its Rule 2(e)215 to express the view that a law-
yer's representation of a client in the face of the client's materi-
ally false or misleading disclosures (or omissions) implicates not
only the lawyer's professional standards of conduct but also le-
gal responsibility for the consequences of the client's conduct.
Thus, a lawyer may be compelled to take action beyond counsel-
ing the client to comply with the requirements of the law in or-
der to avoid personal liability for client fraud.
3. The SEC's Rule 2(e) proceedings: In Re Carter and John-
son. The SEC has used the vehicle of its Rule 2(e) proceedings,
under which the SEC may suspend lawyers from practicing
before the Commission because of "unethical or improper profes-
sional conduct," to engage in protracted and controversial litiga-
tion with lawyers on the question of the lawyer's personal re-
sponsibility for client misconduct, arising from the attorney-
client relationship. Such was the case in In Re Carter and John-
son2 6 which the Commission instituted following the National
Student Marketing litigation.
William R. Carter and Charles J. Johnson were partners in
the firm of Brown, Wood, Ivey, Mitchell & Perry, which repre-
sented National Telephone Company, a commercial telephone
leasing company, from 1973 until National ceased operations in
1975. During the critical period from 1974 until 1975 when Na-
tional entered bankruptcy, Carter and Johnson were in "close
and continuing contact with the company."21 7
In May and June 1974, Carter and Johnson represented Na-
tional in the negotiation of an interim credit agreement with
five banks resulting in a revolving loan of up to $15 million. As
part of this transaction, National granted the banks a security
interest in substantially all of National's assets.2 18
214. See In re First Albany Corporation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-30515, 51
SEC Docket 87 (Mar. 25, 1992) (chief legal and compliance officer held liable for failing
to supervise a registered representative for failing to conduct an inquiry or establish a
procedure to determine whether employees were in compliance with firm's policies and
procedures); see generally Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate
Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 507, 560-70 (1994); Doty, supra note 168,
at 1564-65.
215. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1995).
216. Exchange Act Release No. 17, 597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) $ 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
217. Id. at 84,153.
218. Id. at 84,153-84,154.
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The transfer of the assets under the agreement required the
approval of National's stockholders. The 1974 annual report
which accompanied the proxy materials projected that lease in-
stallations would double from $13.3 million in 1974 to $27 mil-
lion in 1975. Carter advised National that these projections
could only be made if they were accompanied by the assump-
tions on which they were based. National ignored Carter's ad-
vice and the annual report was published without disclosure of
the assumptions.2
19
At the board of directors meetings, attended by Johnson, in
July, August, and October 1974, National's financial straits were
discussed. In July it was revealed that the growth projections in
the annual report were dependent on National's securing $17
million dollars in additional funding. In August, several direc-
tors questioned the projected growth rate in view of National's
immediate need for funding. Despite these discussions and reve-
lations, letters sent by National's management to the sharehold-
ers announcing the declaration of stock dividends did not dis-
close the company's difficulties in securing necessary
financing.22
0
At the October board meeting, there were further discus-
sions of National's "tight cash position" and the concern that
National's operations would have to be curtailed and sales ter-
minated unless financing was obtained. Two days later, how-
ever, National issued a press release reporting a substantial in-
crease in lease installations, net income and earnings per share.
No mention was made of National's financial crisis.2 21
Also in October, during negotiations for an amended credit
agreement, in which Carter and Johnson participated, Na-
tional's management revealed plans to "wind down." National
rejected the lawyers' advice to inform the stockholders of Na-
tional's financial condition. 222
In December, National issued a press release disclosing the
borrowing but not the company's financial condition.223 A letter
was also sent to shareholders stating that the company was
"stronger now than ever before in its history," that the company
had "a greater availability of capital, expanding productivity and
growing earnings," and that the company was "looking forward
219. Id. at 84,154.
220. Id. at 84,154-84,155.
221. Id. at 84,156.
222. Id. at 84,157.
223. Id. at 84,159-84,160.
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to an outstanding year." 2 4 Although Carter and Johnson felt the
letter did not make adequate disclosure, they concluded that it
was not materially false or misleading and accordingly, and that
no corrective action was required.
2 25
In February 1975, a creditor-imposed wind down plan was
triggered by National's deteriorating financial condition. In
April, Carter and Johnson advised National's management that
disclosure of the plan was required but it was not until May, af-
ter the independent directors learned of the implementation of
the plan, that the public was informed of the plan and Na-
tional's need for financing.2 26 Thereafter, the market for na-
tional's stock "became virtually non-existent" and in July, Na-
tional instituted proceedings in bankruptcy.
2 7
Despite there being evidence that Carter and Johnson had
advised at various times that disclosure be made, an adminis-
trative law judge found that Carter and Johnson had engaged in
unethical and improper professional conduct by willfully aiding
and abetting National's violation of the securities laws.228 Al-
though finding the matter a "close question", the SEC did not
find sufficient evidence of willfulness to sustain the finding of
aiding and abetting.
29
With regard to the violation of ethical and professional con-
duct standards, the SEC was at somewhat greater pains. The
SEC noted that practice before the Commission "generates great
leverage ... in the administration of the securities laws 230 The
SEC also noted that the lawyer's traditional role as advisor to a
client and not the public does not absolve the lawyer from com-
plying with ethical or professional standards.2 31 The Commission
224. Id. at 84,160.
225. Id
226. Id. at 84,164.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 84,146-84,165.
229. Id. at 84,167-84,169. In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Evans would
have found that Carter aided and abetted the violations. Id. at 84,176.
230. Id. at 84,150. As the Commission explained:
Rule 2(e) represents a balancing of public benefits. It rests upon the recog-
nition that the privilege of practicing before the Commission is a mechanism
that generates great leverage-for good or evil-in the administration of the
securities laws. A significant failure to perform properly the professional's role
has implications extending beyond the particular transaction involved, for
wrongdoing by a lawyer... raises the specter of a replication of that conduct
with other clients.
Id.
231. Id. The Commission further explained that:
[T]he traditional role of the lawyer as counselor is to advise his client, not the
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recognized, however, that when a lawyer learns that a client has
violated the securities laws, a lawyer's ethical and professional
responsibilities "have not been so firmly and unambiguously es-
tablished that . . . all practicing lawyers can be held to an
awareness of generally recognized norms." 23 2 For that reason, the
Commission did not make findings of unethical or unprofes-
sional conduct against Carter and Johnson.
233
The Commission took the opportunity of the Carter and
Johnson decision to enunciate standards of professional conduct
to which lawyers practicing before the Commission would there-
after be held. In essence, the Commission stated that a lawyer
who becomes aware of a client's failure to comply with disclo-
sure requirements must take "prompt steps to end the client's
noncompliance" or otherwise, the lawyer's continued representa-
tion will be considered a violation of professional standards. 234
The Commission also cautioned that "a lawyer is not privileged
to unthinkingly permit himself to be co-opted into an ongoing
fraud and cast as a dupe or a shield for a wrongdoing client."235
The Commission enumerated the actions it considered to be
consistent with a lawyer's professional responsibility. As an ini-
tial matter, the Commission found that "counseling accurate dis-
closure" would be sufficient even if the lawyer's advice was not
followed by the cient.23 However, when the client is engaged in
public, about the law. Rule 2(e) does not change the nature of that obligation.
Nevertheless, if a lawyer violates ethical or professional standards, or becomes
a conscious participant in violations of the securities laws, or performs his pro-
fessional function without regard to the consequences, it will not do to say that
because the lawyer's duty is to his client alone, this Commission must stand
helplessly by while the lawyer carries his privilege of appearing and practicing
before the Commission on to the next client.
Id.
232. Id. at 84,170 (footnote omitted).
233. Id. at 84,173. Nevertheless, the Commission pointed out that: "[wjhile precise
standards have not yet emerged, it is fair to say that there exists considerable accept-
ance of the proposition that a lawyer must, in order to discharge his professional respon-
sibilities, make all efforts within reason to persuade his client to avoid or terminate pro-
posed illegal action." Id. at 84,170.
234. Id. at 84,172. The Commission stated in this regard:
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a com-
pany's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal securities
laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in substantial and continuing
failure to satisfy those disclosure requirements, his continued participation vio-
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a continuing course of violative conduct such that a reasonable
lawyer would conclude that the lawyer's advice "is not being fol-
lowed, or even sought in good faith" at that "critical juncture"
additional "more affirmative steps" must be taken by the lawyer
"to avoid the inference that he has been co-opted, willingly or
unwillingly, into the scheme of non-disclosure."2 7 The Commis-
sion suggested that a "direct approach" to members of senior
management or members of the board may be appropriate or
resignation may be called for2 8 The Commission recognized that
the lawyer is in the best position to determine a course of ac-
tion, but emphasized that "prompt action" demonstrating that
the lawyer "is engaged in efforts to correct the underlying prob-
lem" is ethically required.239 Interestingly, despite the position
regarding disclosure that the Commission had taken in National
Student Marketing, the Commission did not include disclosure,
either to the public or to the Commission itself, among the spe-
cifically enumerated options to be considered by counsel under
the circumstances in Carter and Johnson.
240
The involvement of Carter and Johnson in Nationals affairs
was more extensive than simply providing legal counsel. Carter
had advised National's management concerning sources of fund-
ing outside the United States241 and Johnson became secretary
of the corporation, which led one commentator to characterize
their relationship with National as one of "interdependent deci-
sion making" in which the lawyers had acted as "monitors of
237. Id.
238. With respect to resignation, the Commission suggested that:
[T]here may occur situations where the lawyer must conclude that the miscon-
duct is so extreme or irretrievable, or the involvement of his client's manage-
ment is so thoroughgoing and pervasive that any action short of resignation
would be futile. We would anticipate that cases where a lawyer has no choice
but to resign would be rare and of an egregious nature.
Id. at 84,173 (footnote omitted).
239. Id. As the Commission stated, "[w~hat is required, in short, is some prompt ac-
tion that leads to the conclusion that the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the un-
derlying problem, rather than having capitulated to the desires of a strong-willed but
misguided client." Id.
240. The Commission explained in this regard that:
This case does not involve, nor do we here deal with, the additional ques-
tion of when a lawyer, aware of his client's intention to commit fraud or an il-
legal act, has a professional duty to disclose that fact either publicly or to an
affected third party. Our interpretation today does not require such action at
any point, although other existing standards of professional conduct might be
so interpreted. See, ag., ABA D.R. 7-102(B).
Id. at 84,173 n.78.
241. Id. at 84,157.
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management conduct."242 The SEC had earlier held that such a
close relationship between lawyer and client gave rise to a duty
to assure that filings with the Commission included all material
facts of which the lawyers were aware.2m
The other principal administrative action brought by the
SEC involving a lawyer's responsibility for client misconduct
was the protracted proceedings against George C. Kern, a part-
ner in the firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, arising from the alleged
failure of Kern's client, Allied Stores Corporation, to disclose ne-
gotiations with a "white knight" when Allied was the subject of
a tender offer.24 In the order instituting administrative proceed-
ings (i.e., the Division of Enforcement's complaint), it was al-
leged that following a hostile tender offer, Allied sought to sell a
"material portion" of its assets (i.e., six shopping centers) to a
friendly "white knight." It was further alleged that although
Kern, who was responsible for preparing Allied's filings with the
SEC, knew of the negotiations with the "white knight," Kern de-
cided that an amendment of Allied's Schedule 14D-9 would not
be made.24 The order also alleged that after the decision had
242. Painter, supra note 214, at 565.
243. In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15982 [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 82,124 (July 2, 1979). There, members of the
law firm were directors of subsidiaries of the client corporation and were involved in
transactions with the client. The Commission concluded that because of their close in-
volvement, the lawyers knew or should have known of the material misrepresentations
and omissions in their client's financial statements which the law fir-m had prepared. As
the Commission stated:
A law firm has a duty to make sure that disclosure documents filed with
the Commission include all material facts about a client of which it has knowl-
edge as a result of its legal representation of that client ... it is clear that
substantial additional procedures were required here, for the Commission con-
cudes that [the firm] failed to carry out its professional responsibilities with
regard to the ... filings of [the client], when despite its extensive representa-
tion of [the client] and the knowledge of the members of [the firm] relating to
material transactions, it did not have a system which assured that the knowl-
edge of the members of the firm was communicated to the persons responsible
for preparing disclosure documents so that adequate disclosure of material in-
formation-which was within the firm's knowledge-was made.
Id. at 81,989.
244. In re Allied Stores Corp. and George C. Kern, Jr., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,142 (June 29, 1987) (order instituting administrative proceed-
ings); In re George C. Kern, Jr., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
T 84,342 (Nov. 14, 1988) (initial decision of the administrative law judge); In re George
C. Kern, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 29356, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 84,815 (June 21, 1991) (order of the SEC affirming the initial decision of the
administrative law judge).
245. In re Allied Stores Corp. and George C. Kern, Jr., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,142, at 88,764-88,765.
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been made to sell all of Allied to a "white knight," Allied again
failed to file an amendment of the Schedule 14D-9.24 Finally, it
was alleged that after the Allied board of directors directed
management to execute an agreement of merger with the "white
knight," Kern, who had attended the board of directors' meeting
and who was aware of the board's resolution, decided that dis-
closure would not be made pending resolution of the "white
knight's" financing problems. 247 As a result, Allied did not
amend its Schedule 14D-9 until after the agreement of merger
was executed approximately a week later.248 The order charged
that Allied had failed to comply with section 14(d)(4) of the Ex-
change Act 249 and SEC Rule 14d-9250 and that Kern was a cause
of Allied's failure to comply
2 51
On November 14, 1988, almost a year and a half after the
Commission instituted proceedings against Kern, Administrative
Law Judge Warren E. Blair issued his decision.252 He found in
regard to the failure to disclose the agreement to sell Allied's
shopping centers, that Allied's management "expected and un-
derstood that Kern would make legal decisions on disclosure
questions without consulting officers of Allied except as Kern
saw fit" and that Kern "decided, without consultation with any
officer or other director of Allied, that an amendment was not
required."2 3 Kern was found to have caused Allied's failure to
disclose the merger negotiations 254 and Allied's failure to timely
disclose the agreement in principal to merge.255 In sum, by tak-
246. Id. at 88,765-88,766.
247. Id. at 88,766.
248. Id. at 88,767.
249. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1994).
250. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1996).
251. In re Allied Stores Corp. and George C. Kern, Jr.; [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,142, at 88,767.
252. In re George C. Kern, Jr., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,342 (Nov. 14, 1988).
253. Id. at 89,582.
254. Id. at 89,584. The administrative law judge found that:
Continuing to exercise the legal discretion vested in him,... Kern, with-
out consultation with any officer or other director of Allied, decided that no
amendment to Allied's Schedule 14D-9 disclosing the merger negotiations ...
would be filed. It appears from the record that Kern's decision not to file such
amendment was erroneous and that as a result Allied failed to comply with
section 14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14d-9 thereunder. It also ap-
pears that Kern was a cause of Allied's failure to comply and knew or should
have known that the omission to amend Allied's Schedule 14D-9 would contrib-
ute to the failure to comply.
Id.
255. Id. at 89,587. According to the administrative law judge:
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ing on discretionary authority to make the disclosure decisions
on behalf of Allied, Kern also accepted responsibility for Allied's
compliance with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the
SEC's rules.
2 6
Notwithstanding the administrative law judge's imputation
of disclosure responsibility on to Kern, the proceedings were in-
conclusive as to a lawyer's responsibility under the circum-
stances because the administrative law judge terminated the
proceedings on jurisdictional grounds. 257 And four years after the
commencement of the action, the SEC affirmed the administra-
tive law judge's decision solely on that basis.
58
4. Disclosure to Third Parties Under the Securities Laws.
The Student Marketing assertion that lawyers have a duty of
disclosure to third parties under the federal securities laws has
not gained acceptance in the courts. As a general matter, a duty
to disclose is considered to arise from a "fiduciary or other simi-
lar relation of trust and confidence."259 For that reason, courts
have consistently declined to impose a general duty to disclose
even a client's fraud absent a fiduciary duty owed by the attor-
ney to the injured third party.
260
Kern was well aware of the developments leading up to and including the
reaching of the agreement in principle between Allied and EJDC on the price
and terms of their contemplated merger and of the passing of the Allied Board
Resolution on October 3. Because he assumed sole responsibility for determin-
ing when an amendment to Allied's Schedule 14D-9 would be filed, Kern must
be found to have caused Allied's violation.
Id.
256. As the administrative law judge observed:
It appears from the record that during the relevant period Kern found
himself in the center of a complex and fast-changing series of negotiations
which required him to exercise his authority to have Allied comply with the
disclosure requirements of Rule 14d-9 .... When Kern accepted discretionary
authority to make those decisions he also accepted the responsibility the Allied
officers had for compliance with Rule 14d-9 and cannot be heard now to com-
plain that his legal judgments are being second-guessed in these proceedings.
Id. at 89,592.
257. The administrative law judge concluded that because Kern had no authority to
make or correct Allied's filings going forward, the Commission was not authorized to is-
sue an order directing future compliance by Kern. Id. at 85,593.
258. In re George C. Kern, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 29356, [1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,815 (June 21, 1991).
259. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TomTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
260. See, eg., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 490 (4th Cir. 1991) ("We... hold
that a lawyer or law firm cannot be held liable for misrepresentation under section 10(b)
for failing to disclose information about a client to a third party absent some fiduciary or
other confidential relationship with the third party."); Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 E2d
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As suggested by the Kern proceedings, however, it is a
much closer question when the attorney's representation materi-
ally furthers a fraudulent transaction. On the one hand, in
cases when the attorney's involvement in the transaction has
been viewed as being that of a mere "scrivener," simply prepar-
ing the documents necessary to effect the transaction, liability
generally has not been imposed.261 On the other hand, lawyers
have long been regarded as the "passkey" to a securities trans-
action.262 For that reason, it has been argued that the role of a
1040, 1048-49 (7th Cir. 1990) (attorney was not liable under Section 10(b) for losses re-
sulting from client's fraudulent cattle leasing program because the attorney had no fidu-
ciary duty to the investors and thus had no duty to disclose even if he knew of the
fraudulent scheme); Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1133 (5th Cir. 1988),
vacated on other grounds, 492 US. 914 (1989) ("'Neither lawyers nor accountants are re-
quired to tattle on their clients in the absence of some duty to disclose." (quoting
Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Hoalt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986)); Tew
v. Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver & Harris, 655 F. Supp. 1573, 1574 (S.D.
Fla. 1987) (attorney had no general duty of disclosure to client company's auditors and,
absent a specific identification of a claim and request for comment, attorney's ethical ob-
ligation to preserve client's confidence foreclosed disclosure) aff'd mem., 846 F.2d 753
(11th Cir. 1988); Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 585, 590 (D. Haw. 1985) ("Clearly, per-
forming corporate legal work does not, by itself, create [a duty of disclosure] to investors
in the corporation."); Van Boeckel v. Weiss, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 99,648 (N.D. Ca. 1983) (defendants position as corporate counsel did not create
a duty on his part to disclose information to persons investing in his client company); see
also Quintel Corp. v. Citibank, 589 F. Supp. 1235, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (in the absence of
an attorney-client relationship between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff cannot establish
a breach of duty of disclosure).
261. See, e.g., Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Schatz v.
Rosenberg, 943 F.2d at 497).
262. Such was the view expressed by SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer in his 1974
address, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, in [1973 - 1974 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,631. Sommer observed that:
In a word ... the professional judgment of the attorney is often the "pass-
key" to securities transactions. If he gives an opinion that an exemption is
available, securities get sold; if he doesn't give the opinion, they don't get sold.
If he judges that certain information must be included in a registration state-
ment, it gets included (unless the client seeks other counsel or the attorney
crumbles under the weight of client pressure); if he concludes it need not be in-
cluded, it doesn't get included.
Id. at 83,869; In Commissioner Sommer's view, the attorney's role in a securities trans-
action was "more akin to that of (an] auditor" meaning that the attorney would "have to
exercise a measure of independence" and would have to be "acutely cognizant of his re-
sponsibility to the public who engage in securities transactions that would never have
come about if not for his professional presence." Id. at 83,689-83,690; See Simon M.
Lorne & W, Hardy Callcott, Administrative Actions Against Lawyers Before the SEC, 50
Bus. LAw. 1293 (1995). Lorne and Callcot note that:
Starting in the late 1960s, the SEC began to bring claims against lawyers who,
in the agency's view, participated or assisted in their clients' securities law vio-
lations. The actions were based on the premise that lawyers are "gatekeepers"
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lawyer in a securities transaction is more akin to a participant
than to a traditional adviser.263 Liability may result from a fail-
ure to correct inaccurate or false information, of which the law-
yer is aware, in documents which the lawyer prepared knowing
they would be relied upon by third parties.
264
So for example, a lawyer who prepares an opinion in con-
nection with a securities transaction does not thereby engender
a general duty of disclosure to third parties. 265 But, in contrast,
a lawyer who has been extensively involved in the operations of
a company and who is directly involved in the transaction, i.e.,
through preparation of the offering documents, risks liability266
to the securities markets, and that, in rendering professional services to cli-
ents, they may facilitate their clients' securities law violations. By sanctioning
lawyers, the SEC sought indirectly to deter misconduct by clients.
Id. at 1297.
263. See Gruenbaum, supra note 20, at 201. Gruenbaum states that:
A lawyer acting in the capacity of an advisor may be viewed as having re-
sponsibilities that run to the client as well as to others. This responsibility
stems from the lawyer's participation and involvement in the client's decision
making process concerning the client's contemplated conduct. In many if not
most securities transactions, a lawyer's opinion or judgment is the "pass key"
to consummation. In addition, lawyers play an almost indispensable role in the
disclosure process of the federal securities laws. The lawyer, then, may be
viewed as a "participant" in the conduct that takes place upon issuance of the
pass key or in the disclosure made by the client.
Id.
264. Thus, it has been observed with regard to the SEC actions in National Student
Marketing, Carter and Johnson, and In re Kern, "[tihe thrust of the series of complaints
issued by the SEC was to emphasize its view that the attorney in these situations has
responsibilities to the public at large, or at least to certain segments of it, as well as to
the party paying the fee and that whether the source of that responsibility is statute,
common law, or the lawyer's disciplinary rules, liability will follow from its breach." AN-
DREW KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY 295 (1989).
265. See, eg., Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469, 472
(4th Cir. 1992) (lawyers preparing tax opinion did not have duty to discover and disclose
misrepresentations by offeror that were unrelated to the tax opinion); Roberts v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646, 653-54 (9th Cir. 1988) (lawyers preparing title
opinions in oil or gas transactions were not obliged to disclose that the property had
been sold to the partnership by an interested party at allegedly inflated prices when
such information would not affect the state of the title to the property).
266. See Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 917-18 (6th Cir.
1991) (attorney who prepared documentation and edited marketing information was
obliged to disclose that information in the offering circular was misleading); Eisenberg v.
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir. 1985) ("fAin opinion that has been issued without a
genuine belief or reasonable basis is an 'untrue' statement which, if made knowingly or
recklessly, is culpable conduct actionable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."); SEC v. Coven,
581 F.2d 1020, 1029 (2d Cir. 1978) (attorney who wrote a letter falsely stating that the
required portion of the offering had been purchased, where the attorney had no basis to
make the statement, was liable under section 10(b) since under the circumstances, the
attorney should have been able to conclude that his letter "was qikely to be used in fur-
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therance of illegal activity' "); SEC v. Universal Major Industries Corp., 546 F.2d 1044,
1046 (2d Cir. 1976) (attorney aided and abetted sale of unregistered stock by preparing
an opinion letter for the transfer agent stating that the transfer of the unregistered
stock was legal when the attorney had previously concluded it was not); SEC v. Manage-
ment Dynamics, 515 F.2d 801, 809 (2d Cir. 1975) (lawyer who reviewed and edited press
releases and other statements that misrepresented the risk that a real estate venture
would not be completed violated the anti-fraud and registration provisions of the securi-
ties laws). The court in Management Dynamics noted that:
As an experienced securities lawyer, [defendant] surely should have known
that contingencies cloud the horizon of almost every business venture, and
[defendant] should have asked ... about potential obstacles to the planned de-
velopments. Moreover, and particularly because of his expertise, he should
have insisted that these possible impediments be identified in any communica-
tion which described the projects.
Id.; SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973) (lawyer who prepared opin-
ion letter in reliance on which unregistered securities were sold, based solely upon an
earlier letter prepared by another lawyer, was held to have aided and abetted the un-
lawful sale). The court in Spectrum observed that:
In the distribution of unregistered securities, the preparation of an opinion let-
ter is too essential and the reliance of the public too high to permit due dili-
gence to be cast aside in the name of convenience. The public trust demands
more of its legal advisers than "customary" activities which prove to be care-
less. And, to be sure, where expediency precludes thorough investigation, an
attorney can prevent the illicit use of his opinion letter by prohibiting its utili-
zation in the sale of unregistered securities by a statement to that effect
clearly appearing on the face of the letter.
Id.; SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cin 1968) (lawyer held liable for preparation of
a misleading offering circular. "[A] lawyer, no more than others, can escape liability for
fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw and could readily understand."); SEC v. Elec-
tronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 60 (D. Conn. 1988), aff'd, 891 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.
1989) ("Attorneys may be liable as aiders and abettors where, if it is reasonably foresee-
able that potential investors will rely on documents they draft, they omit material infor-
mation or include erroneous information in reckless disregard of the truth"); Arden Way
v. Boesky, 664 F. Supp. 855, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (purchasers of limited partnership inter-
ests stated a claim against law firm for violation of the securities laws in connection
with misrepresentations in a private placement memorandum); Andreo v. Friediander,
Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (D. Conn. 1987). Ac-
cording to the court in Andreo:
[A]ttorneys should be held accountable if they draft certain documents for se-
curities offerings with reckless disregard of the truth. This does not mean that
attorneys who draft such documents have an affirmative duty to verify all in-
formation provided by their clients, or to discover if any pertinent information
might have been omitted. Rather, those attorneys have a responsibility to not
act in reckless disregard of the truth when using the information provided by
clients in performing their professional duties and preparing offering memo-
randa and tax opinions.
Id.; Koehier v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. 829, 845 (S.D. Cal. 1985) ("[Blecause [attorney] lent
his name and provided necessary and substantial services to promote and facilitate the
sale of securities which he should have known [were] issued in violation of registration
and disclosure requirements, he proximately caused the investors' injuries."); Antinore v.
Reavis & McGrath (In re Flight Transportation Corp. Securities Litigation), 593 F. Supp.
612, 618 (D. Minm. 1984) (law firm could be held liable for preparing allegedly false and
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even though the Supreme Court has lessened that risk by elimi-
nating civil aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. 267
misleading prospectus); Felts v. National Accounts Systems Ass'n, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 54,
68 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (lawyer for issuer of promissory notes liable for misrepresentations
in connection with the offering). The court in Felts stated that:
Peters, [the attorney for National Account Systems], owed a special duty of dil-
igent investigation and disclosure. Not only was he the lawyer responsible for
the issuer's compliance with applicable laws, he also permitted his name (and
his office) to be exploited ....
The court concludes that without the active, affirmative assistance of Pe-
ters as lawyer for the issuer, including the use and exploitation of his name,
the sale would not have been accomplished. Therefore, under applicable law,
Peters was a participant in the sale and is jointly liable with the issuer for all
damages.
Id.; SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 649 (D.D.C. 1975) (law-
yer who issued opinions concerning the legality of back dating the effectiveness of a
transaction aided and abetted securities laws violations. The defendant "either knew
that NSMC planned to issue a false financial statement, or he ignored what should have
been evident to him as a lawyer with some expertise in corporate mergers and acquisi-
tions."). Cf Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd. Partnership, 730 F. Supp. 521, 531
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). As the Friedman court stated:
Where counsel drafted the offering memorandum and were acting on behalf of
the general partner, they are not, without more, corporate insiders or affiliates
to whom relaxed pleading's standards are applicable. Thus, they are not ordi-
narily liable for the general statements in the offering memorandum but
rather plaintiffs must specifically attribute misstatements or omissions to
them.
Id.; In re National Smelting of New Jersey, Inc. Bondholder's Litigation, 722 F. Supp.
152, 173 (D.N.J. 1989) (lawyer's opinion concerning the stability of stock to be issued
which was not intended to be included in the offering statement but was nevertheless
distributed to the trustee for plaintiff bondholders was too tenuous a link to the transac-
tion to impose a duty of disclosure); Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 585, 596 (D. Haw.
1986). According to the Bush court:
Unless a lawyer knew or should have known that his advice would be trans-
mitted to and relied on by investors in the client firm, or unless the investors
were intended beneficiaries of the advice, the lawyer has no duty to them, al-
though it is obviously foreseeable that someone may purchase the securities.
Id.; Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 957, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affid mem.,
729 F.2d 1443 (2d Cir. 1983) (general counsel of limited partnership was not liable under
the securities laws in connection with the issuance of an allegedly false and deceptive
prospectus where there was no showing that the general counsel knew that the maxi-
mum tax benefits from the transaction were impossible to achieve).
267. "Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 US. 164
(1994). Although holding that there was no civil liability under section 10(b), the Court
cautioned that:
[Tihe absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean that secon-
dary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under the
securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer... who employs a
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which
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B. The OTS and the Matter of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays
and Handler
Like the SEC, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") and
other bank regulatory authorities have aggressively pursued
lawyers and their firms for alleged misconduct arising from the
lawyers' representation of savings institution clients in their
dealings with bank regulators. Actions by the OTS and the Res-
olution Trust Corporation have resulted in settlements in the
tens of millions of dollars26 and have riveted the attention of
scholars and practitioners on the lawyer's duty to preserve client
confidences when dealing with the regulators on the client's
behalf.26
9
Many of these cases arose in connection with the failure of
the Lincoln Savings and Loan Association and the criminal
wrongdoing of Charles H. Keating, Jr. It was in connection with
Keating's attempt to regain control over Lincoln Savings from
the receiver appointed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
270
that Judge Stanley Sporkin strongly criticized the failure of Lin-
coln's lawyers to speak out or disassociate themselves from the
"looting of Lincoln."271
a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary 'violator
under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule
10b-5 are met.
Id. at 191. Thus, as was earlier explained:
A person undertaking to furnish information which is misleading because of a
failure to disclose a material fact is a primary participant. Conversely, a per-
son who does not undertake to furnish any information, and who is not aware
of what information has been furnished, is under no duty to disclose material
information in his possession.
SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 223 (6th Cin 1982).
268. For example, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue agreed to a settlement of $50 million,
Paul, Weiss, Riflknd, Wharton & Garrison agreed to a $45 million settlement and Trout-
man, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore agreed to settle claims by the RTC for $20 mil-
lion. Painter, supra note 214, at 572 n.277.
269. See, eg., Nancy Amary Combs, Understanding Kaye, Scholer: The Autonomous
Citizen, the Managed Subject and the Role of the Lawyer, 82 CAL. L. Rav. 663, 683
(1994); Fox, supra note 113, at 1525; Note, Inside Fraud, Outside Negligence and the
Savings and Loan Crises: When Does Management Wrongdoing Excuse Professional Mal-
practice?, supra note 5, at 1208.
270. Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 902 (D.D.C. 1990).
271. [T]he Court permitted the parties the widest latitude to develop a full
and complete record. What has emerged is not a pretty picture. It is abun-
dantly clear that ACC's [American Continental Corporation, Lincoln's par-
ent] officials abused their positions with respect to Lincoln. Bluntly speak-
ing, their actions amounted to a looting of Lincoln. This was not done
crudely. Indeed, it was done with a great deal of sophistication. The trans-
actions were all made to have an aura of legality about them. They even
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The seemingly conflicting duties of confidentiality and dis-
closure of wrongdoing was sharply focused in the action brought
by the OTS against the firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays
and Handler for its role in representing Lincoln. 2 2 Although
joined, the issues raised by the Kaye, Scholer action were not
determined because Kaye, Scholer agreed to settle the adminis-
trative charges, and to pay $41 million six days after an order
was entered by OTS Director, Timothy Ryan, freezing the firm's
assets.27 3 Nevertheless, the record in the Kaye, Scholer matter,
entered into a so-called formal tax sharing agreement in order to claim they
had the approval of the regulatory authorities for this phase of their illicit
activities. While it is clear ACC overreached in its relationship with Lin-
coin, it is not discernible why ACC's officials acted as they did.
Id. at 919 (footnote omitted).
There are other unanswered questions presented by this case. Keating tes-
tified that he was so bent on doing the "right thing" that he surrounded him-
self with literally scores of accountants and lawyers to make sure all the trans-
actions were legal. The questions that must be asked are:
Where were these professionals, a number of whom are now asserting
their rights under the Fifth Amendment, when these clearly improper transac-
tions were being consummated?
Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the
transactions?
Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these trans-
actions were effected?
What is difficult to understand is that with all the professional talent in-
volved (both accounting and legal) why at least one professional would not
have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching that took place in this case.
Id. (footnote omitted).
While we in this nation have been trying to place blame for the savings
and loan crisis on the various governmental participants in the crisis and on
the government's fostering of deregulation within the thrift industry, this
Court believes far too little scrutiny has been focused on the private sector. We
are the world's greatest example of the success of the private enterprise sys-
tem. It would thus seem that the private sector ought to be able to put in place
a system that would prevent the kinds of excesses that took place in Lincoln
from recurring. Here it is clear the private sector was not willing to cooperate
with the public oversight regulators. Indeed, the private sector at times im-
peded the regulatory authorities from discharging their duties. All too often
Keating and those individuals working with him adopted strategies to thwart
and frustrate the regulatory process.
Id. at 919-20 (citations omitted).
272. Notice of Charges and of Hearing for Cease and Desist Orders to Direct Resti-
tution and Other Appropriate Relief; Notice of Intention to Remove and Prohibit from
Participation in the Conduct of the Affairs of Insured Depository Institutions; and Notice
of Intention to Debar From Practice Before the Office of Thrift Supervision, In re Fish-
bein, OTS AP-92-19 (filed March 1, 1992) [hereinafter Kaye, Scholer Complaint], in THE
ATrORNEY-CmENT RELATIONSHIP AFrER KAYE, SCHOLER, at 239 (PLI Corp. Law and Prac.
Course Handbook Series No. 779, 1992).
273. See Temporary Order to Cease and Desist, In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-20 (filed
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as well as the debate the proceedings have engendered, are fur-
ther indications of the wearing away of the protection of client
confidences.
1. The Allegations Against Kaye, Scholer. In the adminis-
trative complaint filed against Kaye, Scholer, the OTS alleged
that three Kaye, Scholer partners, Peter M. Fishbein (Kaye,
Scholer's managing partner), Karen E. Katzman and Lynn Toby
Fisher, had "participated in the conduct of the affairs" of Lincoln
and its parent and were "institution-affiliated parties" by virtue
of their legal representation of Lincoln and ACC.
274
According to the complaint, Kaye, Scholer was engaged by
ACC in 1984 (the year ACC acquired Lincoln) to develop Lin-
coln's position in opposition to the limitations on direct invest-
ments being proposed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB).275 After the limitations were imposed in January
1985, Kaye, Scholer was engaged to advise Lincoln on the legal-
Mar. 1, 1992), in THE ATroRNEY-CLENr RELATIONSHIP AFMER KAYE, SCHOLER, at 323 (PLI
Corp. Law and Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 779, 1992).
274. Kaye, Scholer Complaint, supra note 272, at I 9-13. Fishbein was identified
as "principal outside counsel" for ACC and Lincoln with supervisory authority over
Kaye, Scholer's representation of ACC and Lincoln. Id. at 9. Katzman was identified
as having had "significant and continuing responsibilities" for Lincoln's response to the
1986 examination by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and as having acted as "sec-
ond-in-command" to Fishbein. Id. at 1 10. Fisher, according to the Complaint, "had prin-
cipal responsibility for providing ACC and Lincoln with legal advice and representation
on securities matters" as well as having had "significant responsibility for the develop-
ment of factual materials to be submitted in connection with the 1988 [Federal Home
Loan Bank Board] examination." Id. at T 11. In this regard, Fishbein, Katzman and
Fisher were alleged to have:
a. Provided advice to Lincoln and ACC, represented and acted as agent of
Lincoln before the FHLBB, and participated in defining the course of conduct
by Lincoln and ACC in conducting their business and in responding to the
FHLBB's regulation and examination of Lincoln's operations as a federally-
insured depository institution;
b. Represented and acted as agent for Lincoln and ACC before the FHLBB
and, in connection therewith, omitted material facts from and made misrepre-
sentations in submissions to the FHLBB that are the subject of this Notice of
Charges;
c. Acted as securities counsel to ACC, were intimately familiar with its af-
fairs and operations and those of its subsidiaries and affiliates, including Lin-
coln, and prepared and/or reviewed security disclosure documents that were
filed with the FHLBB and other federal regulatory agencies.
d. Acted as Lincoln's counsel and agent in providing information and oth-
erwise responding to FHLBB in connection with the examination of Lincoln in
the 1986-1989 period.
Id. at 13.
275. Id. at 9 15-16.
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ity of its direct investments in light of the limitation.276 Kaye,
Scholer undertook'an extensive review of Lincoln's direct invest-
ments including interviewing Lincoln employees and reviewing
documents relevant to the transactions. 277 During the course of
its review, in September 1985, Kaye, Scholer learned that unan-
imous consents of the Board of Directors authorizing the invest-
ments had been back-dated to appear to have been created prior
to December 10, 1984, the date after which the FHLBB's direct
investment limitation would apply.
278
According to the complaint, notwithstanding its knowledge
that material documents had been back-dated, Kaye, Scholer
provided Lincoln with a written opinion that in excess of $750
million of direct investments were legally "grandfathered" under
a provision of the direct investment rule.279 Kaye, Scholer also
was alleged to have misrepresented the legal status of the direct
investments in Lincoln's responses to inquiries from the FHLBB
during an examination of Lincoln in 1986.280 Indeed, the crux of
the OTS' complaint against Kaye, Scholer was the manner in
which Kaye, Scholer represented Lincoln in regard to FHLBB
examinations in 1986 and 1988.
In June 1986, Kaye, Scholer was retained to represent Lin-
coln in connection with an examination being conducted by the
FHLBB of San Francisco. On July 16, 1986, Kaye, Scholer sent
a letter to the FHLBB demanding that all requests for informa-
tion from banking examiners be directed to Kaye, Scholer.281 In
so doing, "Fishbein interposed Kaye Scholer between Lincoln
and the FHLBB with respect to all factual matters relating to
the 1986 Examination of Lincoln."282 In the view of OTS, Kaye,
Scholer thereby became Lincoln's agent and assumed various of
Lincoln's regulatory obligations to the FHLBB.283 By failing to
advise Lincoln to disclose and by failing itself to disclose mate-
276. Id. at I 16, 22-27.
277. Id. at 27.
278. Id. at IT 23, 28.
279. Id. at $$ 29-32.
280. See id. at I 139-52.
281. Id. at $S 17, 45.
282. Md at 45.
283. According to the OTS, Kaye, Scholer was obligated to maintain accurate and
complete records of all business transactions available for inspection; Kaye, Scholer was
prohibited from knowingly making any false or misleading statement with regard to a
material fact concerning any matter within the jurisdiction of the FHLBB; and Kaye,
Scholer was prohibited from "engaging in any dilatory, obstructionist, egregious, con-
temptuous, or unethical or improper professional conduct before the FHLBB .. ." Id. at
IT 46-48.
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rial facts "thereby rendering false and misleading many repre-
sentations that Kaye Scholer made to the FHLBB on behalf of
and as agent for Lincoln," Kaye, Scholer was deemed to have
participated in and to have aided and abetted Lincoln's conceal-
ment of those material facts.284 The complaint detailed a series
of those transactions.
The OTS action against Kaye, Scholer was defended by its
then-Chief Counsel, Harris Weinstein, on several grounds.28 6 Ac-
cording to Weinstein, the OTS' complaint was grounded on legal
principles which Weinstein characterized as being "unremark-
able and well established."2 7 These principles were: (1) that a
284. Id. at IT 49-50.
285. The complaint alleged that Kaye, Scholer had misrepresented circumstances
under which Lincoln's independent auditor, Arthur Andersen & Co., had resigned by
stating that the resignation was not the result of concern with Lincoln's operations or
asset/liability management when, in fact, Kaye, Scholer had been advised by Andersen
that Lincoln was considered high risk for financial failure and regulatory intervention.
Id. at IT 36-44. Kaye, Scholer was also alleged to have omitted material facts concerning
Lincoln's income and net worth by failing to disclose its knowledge of "fictitious and con-
trived" real estate transactions (that Lincoln officials had characterized as "trading dead
horses for dead cows") which artificially inflated Lincoln's income and net worth. Id. at
58-73. In was also contended that Kaye, Scholer had omitted to disclose material in-
formation concerning Lincoln's loan underwriting and documentation including the re-
moval of adverse information from loan files, the creation of misleading loan summaries
and other deficiencies in loan underwriting documentation. Id. 1 74-106. Further,
Kaye, Scholer was alleged to have represented a real estate transaction as a loan despite
information that the transaction was in actuality a joint venture thereby allowing the
premature recognition of income. Id. at T 107-138. Finally, it was alleged that Kaye,
Scholer failed to disclose to both the FHLBB and the SEC that loans to a partnership
for the acquisition of a hotel violated the prohibition against loans to affiliated persons
and entities. Id. at 1 153-171.
Kaye, Scholer was also accused of other acts of misconduct and disloyalty to its cli-
ent. The complaint charged that Kaye, Scholer had breached its fiduciary duties of care,
candor and loyalty by failing to advise Lincoln's board of directors that Keating and
other members of management were not acting in the best interests of Lincoln as well
as by having "persisted in representing and acting on behalf of and as agent for Lincoln,
notwithstanding its conflict of interest in representing both Lincoln and ACC," thereby
placing the interests of ACC and Keating ahead of Lincoln. Id. at 91 52-57. Kaye,
Scholer partner Lynn Toby Fisher was also alleged to have engaged in self-dealing by
obtaining a loan on very favorable terms while acting as Lincoln's securities counsel. Id.
at IT 172-81.
286. Weinstein made these remarks in a speech before the Pennsylvania Association
of Community Bankers at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on March 23, 1992. Harris Wein-
stein, Remarks at the Meeting of the Pennsylvania Association of Community Bankers
(Mar. 23, 1992) [hereinafter March 1992 Speech], in THE ATroRNEY-CLENT RELATIONSHIP
AFTER KAYE, SCHOLER, at 403 (PLI Corp. Law and Prac. Course Handbook Series No.
779, 1992).
287. Id. A slightly different tack was taken by another defender'of the OTS action,
Stuart M. Gerson, who was the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Divi-
sion of the U.S. Department of Justice. In an op-ed piece in the NEw YoRK Tnms, Gerson
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lawyer may not issue an opinion based on assumptions of fact
that the lawyer knows, at the time, to be false; (2) that a lawyer
must report corporate wrongdoing "up the chain" within the cor-
poration up to and including the board of directors;288 (3) that a
lawyer may not knowingly further a client's unlawful activity;
(4) that "representatives and agents" of depository institutions
are bound to abide by regulatory disclosure regulations; 289 and
(5) that "when a lawyer goes beyond the role of lawyer and be-
comes the provider of facts, the lawyer steps into the client's
shoes and becomes subject to the institution's disclosure and re-
cord keeping obligations."290 While the first three enumerated
also contended that "[n]otwithstanding the alaruims and excursions on the status of the
attorney-client privilege and ethical rules, the government's approach does not represent
any novel theory or radical departure from traditional standards." Stuart M. Gerson,
When Lawyers Must Disclose, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1992, at A25. Gerson went on to argue
that with respect to Kaye, Scholer's obligation to disclose matters to the FHLBB, the
lawyer's right not to disclose confidential information derives from the client's right not
to disclose. Id. "Ultimately, the client's position defines the lawyer's. Thus, lawyers can
have no independent exemption from disclosure when they substitute for clients having
a duty to disclose." Id.
288. Indeed, Weinstein has suggested that the lawyer's duty extends beyond report-
ing suspected wrongdoing up through the corporate hierarchy. Instead, Weinstein has
stated that lawyers "have a responsibility to try to keep their clients on the legal high
road, not just the technical straight and narrow. . . ." Susan Schmidt, Panel: 'Where
Were the Lawyers During S&L Crisis?, WAsH. PosT., May 23, 1991, at B1. It has been
pointed out, however, that:
Mr. Weinstein argued that this dates from Helvering v. Gregory, which he mis-
takenly claimed stood for the principle "that while you might have a scheme
that technically complies with or accurately drives through an apparent loop-
hole in the law, because of its basic fundamental law avoidance character, it is
nonetheless unlawful
Fox, supra note 113, at 1523.
289. In this connection, Weinstein cited the OTS and FHLBB rule prohibiting "any
written or oral statement to the [agency] that is false or misleading with respect to any
material fact concerning any matter within the jurisdiction of the [agency]." March 1992
Speech, supra note 286, at 407. Weinstein noted that the regulation was "virtually the
twin" of the SEC's Rule 10b-5 and was construed as broadly. Id. Weinstein observed,
"[t]he regulation applies to all submissions by any person. Lawyers are as subject to the
rule as anyone else." Id. Weinstein also noted that the OTS had a rule governing the
conduct of attorneys practicing before the agency that was "virtually identical to SEC
Rule 2(e)." Id. According to Weinstein, "[i]t should come as no surprise to the bar eleven
years after the SEC's decision in In Re Carter ... that administrative agencies take
these rules seriously" Id.
290. Id. at 405. As Weinstein explained elsewhere:
Our position in the OTS case against Kaye Scholer was that by taking that
step, by interposing itself between the Bank Board and the bank, Kaye Scholer
assumed the bank's obligations for making the necessary disclosures required
by the statute and by our rule. This point is at the heart of the OTS charges
against the firm.
Harris Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the Savings and Loan Crisis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV.
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principles seem safely within Weinstein's description, the latter
two, which Weinstein said were of special importance to the
OTS case, 91 are neither unremarkable nor well established.
29 2
2. The Hazard Opinion. In fact, the OTS theory that law-
yers representing regulated entities who interpose themselves
between their clients and the regulators thereby become
"agents" of their clients (and thereby succeed to their client's
disclosure and record keeping obligations) was the essence of the
Kaye, Scholer debate.2 93 Not surprisingly, Kaye, Scholer charac-
terized the participation of its attorneys in dealings between
Lincoln and the OTS in a very different way.
As reflected in the summary of the expected testimony of
Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., who was engaged to provide
expert testimony concerning the standards of professional and
ethical conduct applicable to Kaye, Scholer's representation of
Lincoln, Kaye, Scholer took the position that it had been en-
gaged by Lincoln as litigation counsel to defend Lincoln in con-
53, 56-57 (1993).
291. Weinstein made this observation as a panelist at a Prentice Hall Law & Busi-
ness Conference. Weinstein's comments are summarized in ABAIBNA Lawyer's Manual
on Professional Conduct, Vol. 8, No. 5, 77-79 (1992).
292. Thus, it has been observed that:
[PIremising legal malpractice liability on violation of federal securities laws is
not new. Nor does holding attorneys liable for fraudulent conduct before a reg-
ulatory agency signal a departure from the traditional, common law bases of
attorney liability. However, the concept that attorneys have a duty to investi-
gate, and indeed even to regulate, their clients' activities and transactions is a
departure from the traditional notion of liability. Similarly, the concept that an
attorney representing a financial institution owes the governmental agencies
regulating such institutions an affirmative duty to disclose any wrongful or
questionable conduct by the client is also a marked departure from the tradi-
tional bases of attorney liability. Specifically, both of these concepts represent a
deviation from common law theories of duty and liability.
J. Randolph Evans & Ida Patterson Dorvee, Attorney Liability for Assisting Clients with
Wrongful Conduct: Established and Emerging Bases of Liability, 45 S.C. L. Rav. 803, 827
(1994); see Fox, supra note 113, at 1532 ("The OTS' view of the lawyer's role as client
'watch dog' is a marked departure from the traditional view of a lawyer as staunch de-
fender of client interests within the bounds of law and the ethical rules.").
293. See, eg., Combs, supra note 269, at 683. Combs notes that:
According to Kaye Scholer, OTS brought suit simply because Kaye Scholer ad-
vanced arguments on its client's behalf which it believed were supported by the
facts and law without going further and disclosing weaknesses in its client's
position or contrary arguments available to OTS. The bottom line, says Kaye
Scholer (and others), is that OTS is trying to redefine the role of a lawyer.
Id. Of course, another significant issue, not considered here, was the propriety of the ad-
ministrative order freezing Kaye, Scholer's assets.
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nection with the 1986 FHLBB examination. 294 In that capacity,
Kaye, Scholer lawyers met with regulators, defended Lincoln
employees at investigative depositions, moved to disqualify the
FHLBB chairman from participating in Lincoln matters, as-
sisted Lincoln in responding to the charges of misconduct in the
1986 report of examination, filed suit against the FHLBB as a
result of the disclosure of confidential information concerning
Lincoln, negotiated a settlement of the issues raised in the 1986
examination, conducted a series of reviews of Lincoln's real es-
tate loan files and reported the findings to Lincoln's general
counsel, and assisted Lincoln in responding to the FHLBB's
1988 report of examination. 295 Kaye, Scholer stressed that
throughout the period of its involvement with Lincoln, Kaye,
Scholer had not served as Lincoln's sole counsel, nor had Kaye,
Scholer acted as Lincoln's regulatory counsel.296
In consideration of these factual representations, it was Pro-
fessor Hazard's opinion that Kaye, Scholer was acting as Lin-
coln's litigation counsel and accordingly, "its conduct was gov-
erned, by the standards applicable to an advocate in a matter
that has become adversarial and which involves a reasonable
anticipation of possible litigation."297 Thus, "[a]s litigation coun-
sel, Kaye, Scholer had a duty to present Lincoln's case in its
best light subject to the restriction against frivolous claims and
contentions."28 Further, in its role as litigation counsel, "Kaye,
294. The summary of the expert opinion of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. is reprinted in
THE ATroRNEY-CLmENT RELATiONSHn AFTER KAYE, SCHOLER, at 381 (PLI Corp. Law and
Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 779, 1992).
295. So, for example, rather than interposing itself between Lincoln and the exam-
iners, Kaye, Scholer described its role as that of an intermediary in the 1986 examina-
tion. According to Kaye, Scholer:
Pursuant to the agreement reached with the Office of Enforcement, a Kaye,
Scholer litigation associate was assigned to be on Lincoln's premises to receive
and pass on the examiners' requests for information to the appropriate Lincoln
personnel so that responses could be provided, and to inform the examiners
when and from which Lincoln personnel and records the responses could be
expected.
Id. at 385.
296. Kaye, Scholer identified Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue as Lincoln's principal reg-
ulatory counsel. Kaye, Scholer also stated that Lincoln had obtained regulatory advice
from Arnold & Porter; Mariscak, Weeks & MacIntyre; Sidley & Austin; Strook, Strook &
Levan; Hill, Wynne, Troop & Meisinger; and Hogan & Hartson. Id. at 383, 393.
297. Professor Hazard noted in this regard that the applicable standards were
Model Rule 3.1, Disciplinary Rule 7-102 and California Code of Professional Conduct
Rule 2-110. Id. at 396.
298. Id. at 396. In this connection, Professor Hazard's opinion notes that the
FHLBB's policy statement at the time its rules governing the conduct of lawyers was
promulgated, specifically stated that the FHLBB "does not intend to establish special
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Scholer did not have a duty to disclose weaknesses in Lincoln's
position." s9 Likewise, it was Professor Hazard's opinion that
Kaye, Scholer was under no duty "to make affirmative disclo-
sure of confidential information gained through consultation
with its client based on the information's materiality to the
Bank Board."
3 °
Instead, in Professor Hazard's opinion, the ethical standard
applicable to Kaye, Scholer was "whether, given the information
available to Kaye, Scholer, there were non-frivolous legal and
factual bases for the arguments and assertions in Lincoln's re-
sponse to the 1986 ROE and the other Lincoln submissions to
the Bank Board . .. ." Professor Hazard concluded that Kaye,
Scholer had not violated applicable ethical standards and, in
contrast, would have breached the standards of ethical conduct
and professional responsibility had Kaye, Scholer made the dis-
closures and representations that the OTS contended should
have been made.30 1
Professor Hazard also directly disputed the other principal
contentions in the OTS complaint. In Professor Hazard's opin-
ion, Kaye, Scholer did not assume a higher or different standard
of conduct by virtue of its direct interaction with the FHLBB ex-
aminers. Indeed, in Professor Hazard's view such interactions
were "integral aspects of the usual and expected functions of lit-
igation counsel."
30 2
Similarly, Professor Hazard rejected the OTS contention
that Kaye, Scholer was required to address conflicts of interest
between Lincoln and ACC which were not raised in the 1986 re-
port of examination.30 3 Kaye, Scholer was not obliged to advise
Lincoln's Board of Directors concerning Lincoln's compliance
with FHLBB regulations since Kaye, Scholer had not been en-
gaged to conduct a regulatory review and had not held itself out
as having regulatory expertise. 30 4
standards of conduct for attorneys or other professionals appearing before the Board"
and that the regulations "are not intended to require attorneys to report to the Board vi-
olations of laws and regulations by their clients or to infringe otherwise on the attorney-
client privilege Id. at 397 (quoting 49 Fed. Reg. 25,618 (1984)).
299. Id. at 397.
300. Id. at 398.
301. Id. at 398-99.
302. Id. at 399. Thus Kaye, Scholer could not have assumed and did not assume
Lincoln's record keeping and disclosure responsibilities. Id.
303. Id. at 396. Professor Hazard noted that when conflict issues were raised in the
1988 report of examination they were addressed directly by Lincoln's board of directors
before Kaye, Scholer was engaged to respond. Id. at 400.
304. Id. at 400. Professor Hazard likewise rejected the specific allegations that
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C. The American Bar Association
1. The ABA Working Group On Lawyers' Representation Of
Regulated Clients. A working group of practitioners, scholars
and regulators have met for several years to discern the bounds
of zealous advocacy in the context of the regulated banking in-
dustry. In a draft report issued in January 1993, the working
group examined many of the issues raised in the Kaye, Scholer
litigation.3 0
5
The working group noted that the overriding concern of
practitioners representing banking institutions was the need for
certainty concerning the standards by which their conduct is to
be scrutinized. 3 6 Interestingly in this regard, the working group
noted that the regulators did not want to be bound by state eth-
ical rules that might interfere with the accomplishment of what
they considered to be statutory mandates and instead favored
the Model Rules as a standard of general applicability.
307
Kaye, Scholer had failed to advise Lincoln's board that the unanimous consent of the
board was subject to challenge and had failed to report to the Board on the findings of
the real estate loan review. With regard to the unanimous consent issue, Professor Haz-
ard noted that the validity or invalidity of the consents would not have altered Kaye,
Scholer's conclusions concerning Lincoln's compliance with the direct investment regula-
tion. Id. at 401. With regard to the loan review findings, Professor Hazard was of the
view that because the 1986 report of examination had already put Lincoln's board on no-
tice of the FHLBB's criticism of Lincoln's lending and record keeping practices, it was
"reasonable and proper professional conduct for Kaye, Scholer to report the results of the
loan file reviews in writings sent to Lincoln's general counsel and to other Lincoln em-
ployees with direct responsibility for maintaining the loan files." Id.
305. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION WORKING GROUP ON LAwYERs' REPRESENTATION OF
REGULATED CLIENTS, LABORERS IN DIFFERENT VINmARDs? THE BANKING REGULATORS AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) (discussion draft).
306. Id. at 143. -As the working group noted:
The recent spate of cases against lawyers by the OTS, FDIC and RTC indi-
cates at a minimum that these agencies are going to enforce vigorously stan-
dards of conduct for lawyers. If that is the case, lawyers need to know with
some precision what those standards are. Are they traditional professional re-
sponsibility, statutory and common law principles with which lawyers are al-
ready familiar? Or are they novel duties created by the agencies? Even if they
are traditional principles, will they be expanded to apply in contexts where
they did not previously apply?
Id.
307. When asked whether the well-established principles of professional re-
sponsibility were those of the lawyer's state of practice or licensure, how-
ever, the answer of the government lawyers seemed to be that the varia-
tions of professional standards found in the different states would be
unworkable before federal agencies. They argued that a more uniform set of
principles would be needed. At the October meeting, the government law-
yers seemed to shift their position to accept applicable state rules as gov-
erning. It was recognized that conflict of law rules for applying appropriate
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The working group also found that banking agency regula-
tions as applied to counsel for financial institutions also contrib-
uted to the lack of clarity with respect to the -lawyer's obliga-
tions. The working group took exception to the statements by
Weinstein and Gerson that the OTS regulations prohibiting
false statements imposed the same duties as SEC Rule 10b-5
and found instead, that the OTS regulations were much broader
in their prohibitions, particularly in regard to omissions.308 The
apparent disparity between the broad language of the rule and
the more narrow interpretation ascribed by Weinstein and Ger-
son was criticized as being a cause of confusion.
309
The working group also criticized Weinstein's agency theory
of liability under which the lawyer is deemed to "step into the
shoes" of the client when the lawyer takes on responsibility for
being the sole source of information made available by the client
to the regulator. The working group found that the erosion of
the distinction between the client's duty to the regulator and the
duty of the lawyer was a matter of concern to the bar because
there were many instances in which the lawyer acted on behalf
standards to lawyers representing institutions doing business in a number
of states were not well developed. In addition, the regulators also did not
want to be bound by a bar rule which would prevent the government from
accomplishing statutory mandates. As Mr. Weinstein put it, an agency could
not accept a state bar rule that permitted conduct that was flatly unaccept-
able to the agency. Generally, the government lawyers seemed to believe
that, in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, the Model Rules
proved the most reliable common standard.
Id. at 144-45.
308. At the May meeting, Mr. Weinstein and Stuart Gerson analogized [the
OTS] regulation to the duties imposed by SEC Rule 10b-5. The regulations
as written, however, are not the same. The OTS provision prohibits a
broader range of conduct than does the SEC rule. In regard to omissions,
for example, the OTS regulation bars omissions of "a material fact concern-
ing any matter within the jurisdiction of the Office." The SEC regulation is
more narrowly crafted, prohibiting the omission of "a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading". The SEC regulation
further requires a person to come forward with material facts if failure to
do so would work a deception. The OTS regulation seems to require a per-
son to come forward whether or not failure to do so would cause a decep-
tion. In addition, the OTS regulations applies [sic] to "any matter within
the jurisdiction of the Office" which would include a myriad of interactions
with the agency.
Id. at 147-48 (citation omitted).
309. "While Mr. Weinstein seems to have said in meetings and speeches that the
OTS interprets its regulation to mean what the SEC regulation says, the fact remains
that the OTS regulation does not say that. Such a lack of clarity causes confusion!' Id.
at 148.
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of the client without thereby assuming the client's responsibility
for coming forward with information.310
As part of its report, the working group analyzed various
hypothetical problems. In one of them, during a regulatory ex-
amination, outside counsel to the subject bank discovers a loan
that should be aggregated with other loans under the "loan-to-
one-borrower" rule. If the loan is aggregated, however, the rule
would be violated. Under the hypothetical facts, the examiner
has not raised a question concerning this loan. However, the ex-
aminer has inquired concerning another loan which the lawyer
believes can be shown not to require aggregation. 31 With regard
to the lawyer's advice to the client prior to the exit interview,
there was general agreement that the lawyer had no obligation
to disclose to the regulators the lawyer's opinion that the loans
should be consolidated even if the client informs the lawyer that
the client intends not to make such a disclosure.3 2
In the instance in which the client makes misleading state-
ments, concerning the existence of other loans, to the examiner
in the lawyer's presence, there was agreement that if the lawyer
did not know of the deception beforehand, the lawyer's mere
presence during the making of the statement, standing alone,
would not subject the lawyer to liability.3 13 With regard to the
lawyer's subsequent actions, there was also agreement that al-
though the lawyer was obliged to elevate the issue through
management, the lawyer would not face liability even if the
highest corporate authority declined to remedy the deception.
Weinstein suggested, nevertheless, that if the lawyer attended
subsequent meetings with the examiners at which the existence
of other loans was misrepresented, and the lawyer did not act to
310. The Working Group worried that there was no clear identification of
the unusual circumstances in which a lawyer would be assumed to have
stepped into the shoes of his client .... Mr. Weinstein suggested that this
assumption would occur only where counsel in connection with the exami-
nation process had taken on the responsibility for being the sole source of
facts made available by the client to the regulator. Narrowing the concept
in the way articulated by Mr. Weinstein may make it a less troubling asser-
tion than it first appeared. The bar remains concerned, however, by erosion
of the distinction between duty of client and duty of lawyer because there
are many instances when the lawyer speaks for the client, and even makes
some judgments for the client, but does not believe that doing so imposes on
him all the responsibilities of the client for coming forward with
information.
Id. at 156 (citation omitted).
311. Id. at 169.
312. Id. at 171.
313. Id. at 172.
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correct the misconception, the lawyer could be viewed as having
aided and abetted the company's deception. 314 Although Wein-
stein's views were not generally accepted, the working group
was of the view that the lawyer could not under any circum-
stances make a false representation to the examiner.315
In its analysis of the hypothetical, the working group again
commented on the regulator's agency theory of liability. The
working group noted that the distinction between agent and ad-
vocate in practice was rarely clear-cut in the context of bank ex-amination. In response to the suggestion that the demarcation
between agent and advocate lay at the point when the bank is
notified of the resolution of the investigation, the working group
observed that there are many points at which the lawyer may
appropriately advocate the bank's position before the
regulators. 316
2. The ABA Opinion Concerning Representation During a
Bank Examination. In an opinion issued in 1993, the ABA Com-
mittee on Ethics and Professional Conduct also attempted to
elucidate the ethical obligations of lawyers representing finan-
cial institutions during a regulatory audit.31 7 In that opinion, the
committee considered the same loan-to-one-borrower hypotheti-
cal situation analyzed by the working group.
In responding to the hypothetical, the committee noted ini-
tially that because the lawyer was acting solely in an advisory
capacity, "the duty to respond remains that of the client."318 The
committee cautioned, nevertheless, that the lawyer may succeed
to the client's disclosure obligation if the lawyer takes responsi-
bility for responding on behalf of the client and cuts off access to
314. Id. at 172-73.
315. Id.
316. But the difficulty with the agency/advocacy distinction is that it is
rarely clear cut in practice, at least in the context of a bank examination.
When asked to identify a dividing line between the two roles, Mr. Weinstein
suggested that it lay at the point where the bank receives formal notice of
resolution of the investigation. But there are many situations long before
this point where a lawyer may be acting perfectly appropriately in advocat-
ing a position on behalf of his client. Moreover, examinations are sometimes
used as "record laying" exercises by enforcers who have already decided to
take action against the client.
Identifying the point at which the lawyer crosses the line between advo-
cacy and agency during an examination is inherently difficult.
Id. at 174-75.
317. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 375 (1993).
318. Id
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the client and its employees. 19 However, in the hypothetical, be-
cause the lawyer's involvement is "indirect and attenuated," the
lawyer's sole obligation is not to mislead the agency, whether or
not such description is considered necessary to protect the cli-
ent's confidences.
320
The committee recognized that the lawyer's ethical obliga-
tion to be forthcoming is "somewhat less clear."321 The committee
commented that the duty of disclosure only takes precedence
over the duty of confidentiality in adjudicative proceedings
before a tribunal.322 The regulatory agency is not a "tribunal"
and in the opinion of the committee the bank examination was
not an "adjudicative proceeding" that would engender a duty of
candor.323 The committee concluded that because of the impor-
tance of protecting client confidences, the prohibition against
disclosure must be respected under the circumstances of the hy-
pothetical even if the failure to disclose would result in allowing
the client to engage in fraud.324 However, the lawyer may not
assist the fraud.
325
319. Thus, the committee observed that:
Where ... a lawyer is employed simply to advise the client about how the cli-
ent should respond to the examining agency's inquiries, the duty to respond re-
mains that of the client. Similarly, if the client simply asks the lawyer to rep-
resent him before the agency, the client's duty of disclosure does not ipso facto
become that of the lawyer ....
However, a lawyer may put herself in a situation where she has assumed
such obligations. When the lawyer is the only individual to deal directly with
the bank examiners during the course of the examination, takes full responsi-
bility for gathering factual information and preparing the client's submissions
to the regulators, and cuts off the regulator from access the regulator other-
wise might have to employees of the regulated entity, the lawyer may well
have taken on the client's own obligation under the regulations to respond.
Id.
320. Id.
321. The committee framed the issue as:
[W]hether and to what extent a lawyer representing a client in a bank exami-
nation by a government regulatory agency has an affirmative obligation to
come forward with information that is material to the purposes of the exami-
nation, the disclosure of which would be against the client's interests or other-
wise violate her duty of confidentiality.
Id,
322. The committee considered in this connection, Model Rules 3.3, 3.9 and 4.1. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. As the committee stated:
Because of the importance the profession placed on protecting client confi-
dences, we also believe that the prohibition on disclosure of client confidences
expressly stated in Rule 4.1 must be given effect in this context, even if the re-
sult is to allow the client to engage in fraud. On the other hand, we also be-
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The committee used the vehicle of the hypothetical to pro-
vide guidance concerning the lawyer's ethical obligations at vari-
ous points in the representation. Thus, with respect to counsel-
ing the client during the pendency of the examination, the
committee opined that if the lawyer determined that the client
had a duty to disclose to the examiner the unaggregated loan,
the lawyer was obliged to counsel the client to make the disclo-
sure. The committee made it clear, however, that counseling dis-
closure is all that is required and because the lawyer was not
directly involved, the lawyer could continue to represent the cli-
ent even if the client determined not to make the disclosure.
326
The committee next considered the lawyer's obligations
when the lawyer counsels the client to disclose and, in the law-
yer's presence, the client falsely represents that there are no
loans which should be aggregated, beyond those of which the ex-
aminers were aware. In the face of such a false statement in the
lawyer's presence, the lawyer must disassociate from the client's
decision to commit fraud. The committee noted, however, that if
the lawyer was not informed in advance of the client's inten-
tions, a "noisy withdrawal" was not required. Instead, the law-
yer should counsel reconsideration and compliance with legal re-
quirements. If the client refuses to correct the
misrepresentation, the lawyer should not attend any further
meetings with the examiners and should consider terminating
the representation.32
7
The committee also considered the implications of the law-
yer's direct involvement in the misrepresentation. The commit-
tee stated that the lawyer may not under any circumstances
make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false and mis-
leading. The committee made clear that this prohibition did not
vary whether the false statement was made voluntarily by the
lawyer or was directed to be made by the client or whether the
statement was made in response to a question from the exam-
iner. In the latter case, the committee counseled the lawyer not
to answer the examiner's question regardless of the inferences
the examiner might draw from the lawyer's refusal to answer.328
lieve that a lawyer faced with client fraud is required to conduct herself in




328. In an opinion issued almost thirty years earlier, the committee had expressed
essentially the same view with respect to the lawyer's ethical obligation of disclosure,
under the Code,, in the context of appearances before the Internal Revenue Service. ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Conduct, Formal Op. 314 (1965). There the committee
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The prohibition against the lawyer making false representa-
tions extends to the omission of material facts that the lawyer
knows would likely mislead the examiners.329 The committee
stressed that the lawyer's disclosure obligation depends on the
lawyer's role in creating the misrepresentation and not on a de-
termination of whether the lawyer was acting as an "agent" or
as an "advocate."
330
observed that the service is "neither a true tribunal, nor even a quasi judicial institu-
tion," but rather the service "is the representative of one of the parties" and "is not de-
signed and does not purport to be unprejudiced and unbiased in the judicial sense." Id.
Under those circumstances, the committee concluded that while the lawyer has an abso-
lute duty not to make false assertions of fact when dealing with the service, "the abso-
lute duty not to make false assertions of fact [does not] require the disclosure of weak-
nesses in the client's case and in no event does it require the disclosure of his
confidences, unless the facts in the attorney's possession indicate beyond reasonable
doubt that a crime will be committed." Id. Further, the lawyer ethically is not permitted
to allow the client to mislead the service and, as the committee noted, "[tihe difficult
problem arises where the client has in fact misled... without the lawyer's knowledge or
participation." Id. In that case, when the lawyer discovers the misrepresentation, "the
lawyer must advise the client to correct the statement." Id. If the client refuses to make
the correction and if the lawyer believes the service relies on the lawyers involvement
as corroborating the false statements of the client, the lawyer is obliged to disassociate
from the statement ("unless it is obvious that the very act of disassociation would have
the effect of violating Canon 37") and if a direct question is put to the lawyer by the ser-
vice, the lawyer "must at least advise the service that he is not in a position to answer"
Id.
329. As the committee explained in the context of the hypothetical:
[I]f the lawyer knows that the examiners are unaware of [the undisclosed loan]
and/or its implications for the [loan-to-one-borrower] rule, and if what she says
to them affirmatively leads them to conclude that there is no such loan, or that
it need not be aggregated, the lawyer may have violated her ethical obligation
under Rule 4.1(a) not to mislead a third party. On the other hand, if the law-
yer limits her statements to the question whether [another loan] should be ag-
gregated, and says nothing at all about any other loans, she cannot be faulted
for failing to volunteer information about [the undisclosed loan] even if the ex-
aminers themselves make statements in the lawyer's presence to the effect
that there are no other loans that need be aggregated. If [the other loan] has
escaped the examiners' notice through no fault of the lawyer, the lawyer has
no ethical obligation to dispel their erroneous impression that no such loan ex-
ists, and indeed is precluded from doing so by Rule 1.6.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Conduct, Formal Op. 375 (1993).
330. In a seemingly direct reference to the Kaye, Scholer controversy, the committee
emphasized that:
Our conclusion here does not depend upon a determination that the lawyer
is acting as an "advocate" or as an "agent" for the client; rather, it is based on
a purely practical analysis of what the lawyer does or says. We do not believe
it helpful to make a lawyer's ethical obligation of disclosure depend upon how
she or someone else may abstractly characterize her role in representing a cli-
ent. Most people, including even lawyers themselves, will doubtless find it eas-
ier to decide what responsibility a lawyer had for making or reinforcing a mis-
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Finally, the committee considered the situation when the
lawyer provides a written compliance opinion before learning
facts that reveal noncompliance. In those circumstances, the
lawyer has an obligation to see that the opinion is not used by
the client to assist the client's fraudulent course of conduct. The
committee reiterated its earlier view that the lawyer has an af-
firmative duty to disaffirm the lawyer's work product if failure
to do so would lend assistance to a continuing fraud, even if do-
ing so would create the risk of inferential disclosure of client
confidences. The committee noted in this regard, however, that
before disallowing the work product, the client should be in-
formed of the lawyer's intention to do so and the client should
be given the opportunity not to make use of the work product.3 3
1
In any event, the lawyer must be guided by what the lawyer in-
dependently believes the client's obligations to be and not by
what the lawyer believes the regulators' view to be.
332
IV. HOBSON'S CHOICE AND CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
The aggressive positions taken by government regulatory
authorities to pierce the distinction between the client's obliga-
tion to the regulators and the obligations of counsel do not bode
well for the practitioner who may be forced to choose between
the ethical obligation to preserve client confidences and the risk
of administrative disbarment and significant civil liability.333 The
only safe harbor when faced with such a dilemma may be with-
drawal from the representation, either silent or "noisy" depend-
ing on the circumstances. For the attorney in private practice,
withdrawal will likely result in the loss of a lucrative client and
a commensurate loss of income to the firm (and the individual,
representation by simply looking at what the lawyer said and did rather than




333. As one scholar has observed:
[I]f recent developments indicate a trend, federal agencies are equivocally
abandoning the presumption that there is a sharp distinction between lawyer
and client conduct. In securities and banking law, lawyers have been accused
of facilitating or causing client conduct so that they are legally responsible for
that conduct, or at least responsible for taking afrmative steps to rectify that
conduct. This legal responsibility may only mean the threat of administrative
sanctions as in Carter and Johnson and In Re Kern, but may also, as illus-
trated in the Kaye, Scholer proceeding, involve hundreds of millions of dollars
of potential liability.
Painter, supra note 214, at 574.
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as well). But although such a loss is not a happy prospect, the
lawyer in a law firm will usually have the opportunity to serve
other clients.
The in-house counsel, whose practice is tied to the fortunes
of one client, is on a very different footing. Indeed, withdrawal
for corporate counsel means loss of employment, a precipitous
loss of income and the possibility that counsel's career is either
at an end or is limited in other opportunities.
When counsel's dilemma is the result of the corporation's in-
transigence, that is, after having counseled compliance with a
legal obligation up through the management, the highest au-
thority in the corporation refuses to abandon the illegal practice,
and counsel is faced with the Hobson's choice of violating ethical
obligations to the corporate client or suffering personal liability,
the corporate counsel who withdraws may fairly be said to have
suffered a constructive discharge. However, because the lawyer-
client relationship has traditionally been viewed as one termina-
ble at will, at least by the client, corporate counsel have been
foreclosed from recovery for wrongful termination or construc-
tive discharge by their corporate employer/clients. A growing
body of precedent and legal commentary suggests that this may
no longer be the case.
A. Breach of Implied Contract Claims by Corporate Counsel
Since the late nineteenth century, private sector employees,
who have neither a contract nor a collective bargaining agree-
ment, have been presumed to be "at-will employees." That is,
their employment can be terminated at the will of their em-
ployer, at any time, for any reason (even a morally reprehensi-
ble one) or for no reason at all.334 Over time, however, several
significant exceptions have been implied which ameliorate the
harshness of the rule.
One of these exceptions is the "implied-in-fact contract"
under which courts have implied promises of continued employ-
ment from such sources as employee handbooks, personnel pol-
icy manuals, oral statements and the employer's general em-
ployment practices. 33 1 Courts have only lately, and with some
334. Gensler, supra note 25, at 518; Stephen Gillers, Protecting Lawyers Who Just
Say No, 5 GA. ST. U. L. Rlv. 1, 5 (1988); Sara A. Corello, Note, In-House Counsel's Right
to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 92 COLUM. L. Rnv. 389, 390 (1992).
335. See Joseph J. Fleischman, et. al, The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and
the Employment At-Will Rule as Applied to In-House Counsel, 48 Bus. LAW. 611, 622
(1993).
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understandable reluctance, considered implied-in-fact contracts
as arising from the attorney-employer relationships.
It is difficult to imagine a clearer example of an at-will em-
ployment relationship than that between attorney and client. In-
deed, in view of the high degree of trust and confidence that
must be reposed in the attorney, the client must be permitted to
sever the relationship at any time.33 6 Nevertheless, courts have
begun to look beyond the mere fact that the claimant is an at-
torney, to examine whether attorney-employer relationships
have given rise to compensable rights in the employee/attorney.
In several notable instances, courts have found that they have.
Thus, in Nordling v. Northern State Power Co.,337 in-house
counsel who was terminated after objecting to the company's
surveillance of employees was permitted to sue his employer on
the grounds that the company had failed to follow the multi-step
progressive discipline procedure set forth in the company's em-
ployee handbook.338 In another case, Mourad v. Automobile Club
Insurance Co., 339 the code of professional conduct was read into
the just-cause employment contract implied from statements in
the company's policy manual and supplemental pamphlets.30 In
a third case, Weider v. Skala,31 a law firm associate was held to
have a cause of action for breach of an implied-in-fact contract
where the law firm had presented the associate with a Hobson's
choice of violating an ethical duty to report misconduct or face
336. See, eg., Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972). In the Fracasse case, the cli-
ent terminated a contingent fee agreement, before any recovery, in order to retain new
counsel. Id at 10. The former attorney sought declaratory judgment that he had been
discharged without cause in breach of the agreement. Id. The court held that "a client
should have both the power and the right at any time to discharge his attorney with or
without cause Id. at 13.
337. 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991).
338. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary dismissal of
discharge suits by in-house counsel and allowed the suit to proceed so long as there was
no "violence to the integrity of the attorney-client relationship," particularly with regard
to disclosure of company confidences and secrets. Id. at 502-03.
339. 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. App. 1991).
340. Mourad claimed to have been demoted to a position, which he subsequently re-
signed, because he had refused to implement policy decisions that he believed were con-
trary to the state's code of professional conduct. Id. at 397. On appeal from a jury ver-
dict in Mourad's favor, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Mourad's contract claim
concluding that because the employer was aware at the time Mourad was hired that as
an attorney he was bound by the code of professional conduct, the code was, in essence,
incorporated into the employment relationship. Id. at 400. The court side-stepped the at-
torney-client issue, however, by finding that Mourad was in actuality the attorney for
the insured's and served only as a manager with respect to the company. Id. at 400-01.
341. 80 N.Y.2d 628 (1992).
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Recently, in General Dynamics Corporation v. Superior
Court,343 an in-house counsel's right to sue his employer for
breach of an implied contract was upheld in the face of a pre-
vailing rule that a client has the unilateral power to discharge
an attorney at will.3 While specifically affirming the at-will na-
ture of an attorney's engagement, the court noted that simply
because plaintiff could be terminated by his employer did not
mean that the employer could do so without liability.3 45 The
court concurred in the finding that because the plaintiff had
been hired as a "career oriented" employee with the expectation
of permanent employment subject to satisfactory performance
and because the plaintiff had been promised job security and
substantial retirement benefits, there had been a "course of con-
duct" creating "a reasonable expectation" that plaintiff would
not be terminated absent good cause. 346 The court concluded
that General Dynamics was bound to honor this obligation.
347
342. Plaintiff reported to his employer that a fellow associate had been engaged in
fraud, deceit and malpractice and should be reported to the disciplinary committee of
the bar. Id. at 632. In response, although the firm acknowledged the associate's miscon-
duct, plaintiff was forbidden from reporting the matter outside the firm. Id. Plaintiff re-
ported the matter to the committee and subsequently was fired. Id. The trial and inter-
mediate appellate courts denied plaintiff's claim in reliance on New York's presumption
of at-will employment. Id. at 633. However, the New York Court of Appeals reversed
concluding that because legal service was the "core purpose" for which plaintiff had been
hired, there was an implied obligation on the part of his employer not to fire him for
complying with the ethical responsibilities of a lawyer and that to force upon plaintiff
the Hobson's choice of violating his ethical responsibility to report misconduct or other-
wise to face termination prevented plaintiff from performing his part of the employment
agreement. Id. at 638.
343. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (hereinafter Rose).
344. Rose claimed that after 14 years of commendable service to the company he
was fired as part of a "cover-up" of wide spread drug use among the company's work
force. Id- at 490.
345. Id. at 495 ("To the extent that General Dynamics' claim [sic] that its 'unfet-
tered' right to discharge a member of its corporate legal department means that it may
do so without liability of any kind under all circumstances, that is not, and never has
been, the law of this state."). In this regard, the court noted that even though the client's
right to discharge an attorney at will was a well established and long standing rule, "[iun
exercising their common law powers, courts do not kneel in blind obedience to such mis-
guided reliance on precedent Id. at 494. Thus, "[w]hile the 'unfettered' right of the cli-
ent to discharge his attorney at any time is an important value that should be upheld in
most cases, the legal consequences of such an act will vary depending on the strength of
competing interests that are present in a particular case Id.
346. Id. at 495.
347. Id. at 496. The General Dynamics court stated:
It is true, as we have just affirmed, that General Dynamics has a right to dis-
charge any member of its general counsel's staff in whom it has lost confi-
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B. Recovery in Tort for Wrongful Termination or Retaliatory
Discharge
In addition to claims grounded on a breach of implied con-
tract, in-house counsel have also pursued actions against their
employers under a second exception to the at-will employment
rule for terminations that contravene "public policy." Under this
exception, employees can recover damages in tort for wrongful
termination for the employer's retaliation against the employee
refusing to violate the law or insisting upon legal compliance.348
The "public policy" exception had its origins in California3 49
and has slowly gained acceptance by other jurisdictions. 350 The
applicability of the cause of action to cases of terminated in-
house counsel has not been universally accepted, however, even
in circumstances where similarly situated non-attorney employ-
ees would be allowed to seek recovery. Indeed, case law is gener-
ally to the contrary.
Even in states that have recognized a public policy excep-
tion to the at-will employment rule, courts have declined to ex-
tend the exception to treat in-house counsel in the same way as
their non-attorney counterparts. So, for example, in Willy v.
Coastal Corp., 351 an in-house lawyer who was discharged be-
cause he refused to engage in illegal conduct and who counseled
compliance with federal environmental and securities laws was
held to be bound by the at-will employment rule, the court con-
cluding that in-house counsel's only recourse was withdrawal. 352
dence. That right does not mean, however, that it may do so without honoring
antecedent contractual obligations to discharge an attorney-employee only on
the occurrence of specified conditions.
Id.
348. See Raymis H.C. Kim, In-House Counsel's Wrongful Discharge Action Under the
Public Policy Exception and Retaliatory Discharge Doctrine, 67 WAsH. L. REv. 893, 894
(1992).
349. Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1959). There an employee was fired for refusing to give false testimony, before
a California legislative committee, favorable to his union. Under these circumstances, it
was held that plaintiff had a cause of action for wrongful discharge because "in order to
more fully effectuate the state's declared policy against peijury, the civil law, too, must
deny the employer his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose em-
ployment is for an unspecified duration... " Id. at 27.
350. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism and Public Policy: The Case of House Coun-
sel, 2 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 449, 468-69 (1988).
351. 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th
Cir. 1988).
352. Although the Texas Supreme Court had recently recognized the public policy
exception to the at-will employment rule, the U.S. District Court and Court of Appeals
declined to extend its applicability to in-house counsel. Willy was the company's environ-
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Similarly, in Herbster v. North American Co. for Life and Health
Insurance,53 in-house counsel who refused to destroy documents
that were the subject of discovery in pending civil litigation was
foreclosed from suing for retaliatory discharge, despite the state
having recognized a public policy exception, on the grounds that
the attorney-client relationship precluded a wrongful termina-
tion claim by an attorney. 54 Thus, in that case, as well, with-
drawal was considered the only available course of action.
355
The sanctity of the attorney-client relationship prevented
recovery for wrongful termination in a third case, Balla v. Gam-
bro, Inc.,356 in which in-house counsel's employment was termi-
nated after he had objected to the company's sale of defective
medical equipment.357 The court was of the view that a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge was not necessary to serve the
public interest since in-house counsel were bound by the rules of
professional conduct to prevent client conduct that could result
in death or grave bodily harm.358 The court also concluded that
because a fundamental tenet of the attorney-client relationship
is that the attorney will maintain the confidentiality of client
mental counsel and claimed that he had been discharged because he had refused to par-
ticipate in illegal conduct and had counseled the company to comply with federal envi-
ronmental and securities laws. 647 F. Supp. at 117. Rejecting Willy's claim that his
discharge was retaliatory, the district court observed that '[i]f an attorney believes that
his client is intent upon pursuing an illegal act, the attorney's option is to voluntarily
withdraw from employment. When an attorney elects not to withdraw and not to follow
the client's wishes, he should not be surprised that his client no longer desires his ser-
vices." Id at 118 (citation omitted).
353. 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
354. Herbster was North American's chief legal officer. Id. at 344. During the course
of litigation involving the company, Herbster was directed to remove documents from a
file that was to be produced pursuant to a discovery request. Id. Herbster refused on the
grounds that to do so would violate the law and the ethical rules applicable to him as an
attorney. Id. The court concluded, however, that the attorney-client relationship includ-
ing the "special obligations" of an attorney to the client "permeates all phases of the re-
lationship, including the contract for employment." Id. at 347.
355. Id. at 348.
356. 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991).
357. Balla, in-house counsel for Gambro, became aware of a shipment of dialysis
machines from Gambro's German parent that did not comply with FDA regulations. Id.
at 106. After advising Gambro's president of the situation and being assured that the
shipment would not be accepted, Balla learned that the equipment had been accepted
and was to be sold. Id. Balla then informed the president that he "would do whatever
[was] necessary to stop the sale of the dialyzers Id. Several weeks later, Balla was fired
and the following day, Balla reported the shipment to the FDA which then seized the di-
alyzers and found them to be defective. Id.
358. Id. at 109 ("In-house counsel must abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct.
[Balla] had no choice but to report to the FDA Gambro's intention to sell or distribute
these dialyzers, and consequently protect the aforementioned public policy.").
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confidences and secrets, extending the tort of retaliatory dis-
charge (grounded on those confidences and secrets) to attorneys
would impair the communications between clients and attor-
neys. 59 Finally, the court simply declined to recognize a cause of
action for attorneys against their clients based on actions the at-
torneys were ethically bound to take in any event.3 60
This disparate treatment of in-house counsel from other em-
ployees of the same company has been justified on grounds that
to allow attorneys a cause of action for wrongful or retaliatory
discharge would undermine the sanctity and the efficacy of the
attorney-client relationship. First, it is thought that recognition
of the cause of action would be directly contrary to the accepted
notion that the client can terminate the attorney's rep iesenta-
tion at will. Second, it is thought that allowing attorneys to sue
clients will necessarily impinge on the preservation of client con-
fidentiality and will thereby cause a lack of confidence and trust
reposed by the client in the attorney.361
359. Id. at 110.
360. Id. ("[A]ll attorneys know or should know that at certain times in their profes-
sional career, they will have to forgo economic gains in order to protect the integrity of
the legal profession.").
361. See generally Fleischman et al., supra note 335, at 628-29; William L. Kandel
& Kearney W. Kilens, In-House Counsel as Whistle-Blower: At-Will Employment on Trial,
19 EmmL REL L.J. 91, 93-94 (1993); Kim, supra note 348, at 903; Corella, supra note
334, at 406-15. Several commentators have noted in this regard that there are signifi-
cant practical restraints on an in-house counsel's willingness to sue a former employer
which reduce the likelihood that counsel would undertake litigation lightly or otherwise
abuse counsel's former position of trust. See Gensler, supra note 25, at 551-52. Gensler
notes that:
Practical considerations also mitigate against the fear that attorneys will
abuse such a cause of action. First, law suits, even for attorneys, are expen-
sive, especially for the attorney who is unemployed. In addition, a law suit
presents many opportunity costs. If the attorney is unemployed, the existence
of a law suit against the former employer may make the discharged attorney a
pariah; surely many corporations would be hesitant to hire a "litigious" individ-
ual, especially for their in-house corporate staff. If the attorney is employed,
the new employer likely will not appreciate the new attorney's taking days off
to vindicate a personal grievance. Thus, although a discharged attorney pos-
sesses a potentially damaging arsenal in a discharge suit, concerns of abuse
stemming solely from "inside information" probably are mitigated by economic
forces.
Id.; Gillers, supra note 334, at 21. According to Gillers:
[W]e should be conscious of the practical constraints on lawyers who would
make themselves wrongful discharge plaintiffs. They will usually have to hire
counsel. By suing, they too go public, an act that may reduce their prospects of
future employment. Their action may invite countercharges of incompetence as
the true reason for termination. They will likely be less well-funded and less
able to sustain a war of attrition than their former employers. If the worry is
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In contrast, it has been pointed out that, notwithstanding
the ethical requirement that an attorney withdraw rather than
violate the standards of professional conduct, an attorney who
elects to withdraw rather than engage in criminal conduct has
plainly been "discharged.3 62 To insulate the corporate employer
from liability under those circumstances only protects the
"scoundrel" employer who directs counsel to violate the law and
either actually or effectively terminates counsel for properly re-
fusing to do so. 363 It has also been pointed out that the possibil-
ity of a wrongful termination suit (and the threat of disclosure
of confidential information) should not affect client trust and
candor, at least as to those clients who seek the lawyer's advice
in order to comply with the law.364 Additionally, both the stan-
dards of professional conduct and the rules of evidence impose
lesser requirements of confidentiality where client communica-
tions are in connection with an ongoing or future crime.
365
This view found support in the decision in Rose which, in
addition to upholding the right to sue for breach of an implied
contract, held that in-house counsel could also pursue a cause of
action for wrongful discharge when adherence to counsel's ethi-
cal obligations results in the termination of counsel's employ-
about a rash of strike suits, it seems unfounded.
Id.
362. Schneyer, supra note 350, at 470 ("[Siurely when a lawyer who refuses to do
something illegal for her company is compelled for that reason to withdraw, her depar-
ture can be construed as a discharge even when technically she has not been fired but
has resigned.").
363. See Kim, supra note 348, at 906 ("Denial of in-house counsel's discharge ac-
tions under the public policy exception and retaliatory discharge doctrine protects mostly
'scoundrel' employers who discharge a counsel for upholding law and ethics.").
364. See id at 906-07. As one observer has noted:
The principal argument against the recognition of such causes of action is that
an employer would be less candid regarding potentially questionable corporate
conduct knowing that counsel could use this information in a retaliatory suit.
This argument, however, presupposes that an employer would discharge the
in-house counsel if the attorney disagrees with the questionable conduct. Nor-
mally, corporations seek advice from in-house counsel to avoid, rather than to
commit, illegal activities in their business conduct. Corporate employers that
seek legal counsel for the purpose of avoiding illegal acts would thus be recep-
tive to the in-house counsel's advice. Companies that seek to gain competitive
advantage at any cost by engaging in illegal activities, however, are not likely
to heed the in-house counsel's advice, and are far more likely to discharge in-
house counsel for upholding the law and ethics.
Id. (citation omitted).
365. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(c)(3) (1980); MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.6(b) (1995). The attorney-client privilege does
not shield from disclosure communications that are in furtherance of an ongoing or fu-
ture crime. See supra notes 72-73.
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ment.3 6 In so concluding, the Rose court was particularly critical
of the rationale underlying Willy, Herbster and Balla that the fi-
duciary nature of the attorney-client relationship required that
in-house counsel be viewed differently from other employees.
367
Indeed, because of what the court recognized as the unique
pressures on in-house counsel due to counsel's obligation to con-
form to ethical norms and dependence on the corporation, the
court observed that in-house counsel have a greater claim to ju-
dicial protection than other corporate employees. 368 The court
also found the suggestion in Willy, Herbster and Balla that
withdrawal was the only appropriate remedy to be "illusory."
369
366. The Rose court noted in this regard that unlike implied contract claims, cases
of wrongful termination are not affected by whether the terminated employment was at-
will or subject to contract. 876 P.2d at 496.
367. See id. at 500 ("If their reasoning and conclusions can be faulted, it is because
one searches in vain for a principled link between the ethical duties of the in-house at-
torney and the courts' refusal to grant such an employee a tort remedy under conditions
that directly 'implicate those professional obligations."). The Rose court also rejected the
suggestion in Balla, Herbster and Willy that "to the extent that the retaliatory discharge
tort rests on underpinnings designed to secure fundamental public policies, a tort rem-
edy for in-house counsel is redundant .... 7 Id. The court observed, in this connection,
that:
[It is precisely because of [the role of the lawyer to receive and protect client
confidences] that attorneys should be accorded a retaliatory discharge remedy
in those instances in which mandatory ethical norms embodied in the Rules of
Professional Conduct collide with illegitimate demands of the employer and the
attorney insists on adhering to his or her clear professional duty. It is, after all,
the office of the retaliatory discharge tort to vindicate fundamental public poli-
cies by encouraging employees to act in ways that advance them. By providing
the employee with a remedy in tort damages for resisting socially damaging or-
ganizational conduct, the courts mitigate the otherwise considerable economic
and cultural pressures on the individual employee to silently conform.
Id. at 501.
368. Id. at 498. The court found that:
[Trhe distinguishing feature of the in-house attorney is a virtually complete de-
pendence on the good will and confidence of a single employer to provide liveli-
hood and career success.
The case for shielding the in-house attorney-among all corporate employ-
ees-from retaliation by the employer for either insisting on adhering to
mandatory ethical norms of the profession or for refusing to violate them is
thus clear. And because their professional work is by definition affected with a
public interest, in-house attorneys are even more liable to conflicts between
corporate goals and professional norms than their non-attorney colleagues. On
this view, then, in-house counsel, forced to choose between the demands of the
employer and the requirements of a professional code of ethics have, if any-
thing, an even more powerful claim to judicial protection than their non-
professional colleagues.
Id.
369. Id. at 502. The Rose court also observed that:
[T]he emphasis by the Balla, Herbster and Willy courts on the "remedy" of the
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The court noted, however, that whether an attorney has a
wrongful termination claim may depend to a great extent on
whether termination resulted from the attorney's adherence to a
mandatory ethical standard.370 The court recognized that the
case of a termination resulting from ethically permissible (but
not mandatory) conduct is more complex,37' requiring inquiry
whether the employer's conduct would ordinarily give rise to a
cause of action for retaliatory discharge and then, whether the
attorney was justified, by statute or ethical rule, to depart from
the usual requirement of confidentiality and to engage in the
conduct for which termination resulted.
372
Thus, the court concluded, there are several limitations on
the availability of the cause of action to in-house counsel.373 The
first of these, as noted above, is the limitation to claims arising
from "explicit" and "unequivocal ethical norms" and to claims
which would be actionable by non-lawyer employees and which
involve circumstances, in which the obligation of confidentiality
in-house attorney's duty of "withdrawal" strikes us as illusory. Courts do not
require non-lawyer employees to quietly surrender their jobs rather than "go
along with" an employer's unlawful demands. Indeed, the retaliatory discharge
tort claim is designed to encourage and support precisely the opposite reaction.
Why, then, did the courts in these three cases content themselves with the
bland announcement that the only "choice" of an attorney confronted with an
employer's demand that he violate his professional oath by committing, say, a
criminal act, is to voluntarily withdraw from employment, a course fraught
with the possibility of economic catastrophe and professional banishment?
Whatever the reason, the withdrawal "remedy" fails to confront seriously
the extraordinary high cost that resignation entails.
Id.
370. Id. at 502-03.
371. Id. at 503.
372. Id. The Rose court stated that:
Under these circumstances a court must resolve two questions: First, whether
the employer's conduct is of the kind that would give rise to a retaliatory dis-
charge action by a non-attorney employee . .. second, the court must deter-
mine whether some statute or ethical rule, such as the statutory exceptions to
the attorney-client privilege ...specifically permits the attorney to depart
from the usual requirement of confidentiality with respect to the client em-
ployer and engage in the "non-fiduciary" conduct for which he was terminated.
Id.
373. As an initial matter, the Rose court also noted that the doctrine of wrongful
discharge is subject to three general restraints. Id. at 497. First, the public policy at is-
sue must be both "fundamental" and "clearly established" in the constitutional and posi-
tive law of the state. Id. Second, the policy to be vindicated must be a truly public one
which benefits the public at large rather than the particular employee or employer. Id.
And third, the action must seek to protect the public by protecting the employee who re-
fuses to commit a crime or who reports illegal or unethical conduct to the proper author-
ity. Ia
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does not apply.374 In this connection, the court emphasized that
the requirement of client confidentiality must be strictly ob-
served and where the elements of a wrongful discharge claim
cannot be established without breaching the attorney-client priv-
ilege, the suit must be dismissed.37 5 And second, the contours of
the statutory attorney-client privilege are to be strictly observed
without dilution to accommodate claims of retaliatory
discharge37
6
The Rose court's establishment of a limited wrongful termi-
nation cause of action for in-house counsel was adopted in the
recent decision, GTE Products Corp. v. Stewart.3 17 The Stewart
court agreed with Rose that the public interest is better served
by providing judicial recourse to in-house counsel whose ethical
duties irreconcilably conflict with the demands of counsels cor-
porate employer.378 Nevertheless, the Stewart decision empha-
sized the limited nature of the remedy particularly with respect
to the protection of client confidences. Indeed, like Rose, Stewart
holds that the cause of action is only available if the claim can
374. Id. at 503. The Rose court also went on to state that:
First, those values that underline the professional relationship-the fiduci-
ary qualities of mutual trust and confidence can be protected from the threat
of damage by limiting judicial access to claims grounded in explicit and une-
quivocal ethical norms embodied in the Roles of Professional Responsibility and
statutes, and claims which are maintainable by the non-attorney employee...
under circumstances in which the legislature has manifested a judgment that
the principle of professional confidentiality does not apply.
Id. (citation omitted).
375. Id. According to the Rose court:
Except in those rare instances when disclosure is explicitly permitted or man-
dated by an ethics code provision or statute, it is never the business of the law-
yer to disclose publicly the secrets of the client. In any event, where the ele-
ments of a wrongful discharge in violation of fundamental public policy claim
cannot, for reasons peculiar to the particular case, be fully established without
breaching the attorney-client privilege, the suit must be dismissed in the inter-
est of preserving the privilege.
Id. at 503-04.
376. Id. at 504.
377. 653 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1995).
378. Id. at 166. The court in GTE Products Corp. v. Stewart stated that:
We would be reluctant to conclude that an employee, solely by reason of his or
her status as an attorney, must be denied all protection from wrongful dis-
charge arising from the performance of an action compelled by a clearly de-
fined public policy of the Commonwealth .... We agree with the Supreme
Court of California that public interest is better served if in-house counsel's re-
solve to comply with ethical and statutorily mandated duties is strengthened
by providing judicial recourse when an employer's demands are in direct and
unequivocal conflict with those duties.
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be established without violation of the duty to respect client con-
fidences and secrets.
37 9
Although the Stewart court recognized a limited wrongful
termination cause of action, summary judgment in favor of
Stewart's employer was affirmed. The court noted that Stewart
had not established that he had been constructively dis-
charged, 80 nor had Stewart established that his employer had
asked him to engage in or further any criminal or fraudulent
acts.3
81
379. Id. at 166-67. The court went on to state that:
We stress, however, that a claim for wrongful discharge brought by in-house
counsel will be recognized only in narrow and carefully delineated circum-
stances .... [Tihat claim will only be recognized if it depends on (1) explicit
and unequivocal statutory or ethical norms (2) which embody policies of impor-
tance to the public at large in the circumstances of the particular case, and (3)
the claim can be proved without any violation of the attorney's obligation to re-
spect client confidences and secrets.
Id.
380. Stewart had served as general counsel of GTE's lighting group. In that capac-
ity, Stewart advocated that GTE take aggressive and costly measures to foster consumer
safety in regard to several of its lighting products. Id. at 163-64. Stewart also advised
the company that its services subsidiary should treat florescent and incandescent light
bulbs as hazardous waste. Id. at 164. Stewart claimed that his advice was not well re-
ceived and on some occasions his advice was disregarded. Id. Although in the past,
Stewart had received high performance ratings and bonuses, in 1991, his promotability
rating was lowered and he was counseled to be less confrontational and to cease being
the company's "social conscience." Id. Stewart believed that these actions were precur-
sors to termination and resigned. Id. Thereafter, Stewart's supervisor (GTE's general
counsel) attempted to persuade him to return. The court concluded that this single act of
his employer was not sufficient to support a wrongful termination claim. The court also
found there was insufficient evidence to establish that Stewart's working conditions
"were not so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign as
general counsel." Id. at 169.
381. Id. at 169. Instead, the court characterized Stewart's claims in this regard as
follows:
For the most part, Stewart's claims appear to rest on his advice relating to
the avoidance of possible legal liability, rather than with compelling issues of
product design directly affecting public health and safety. His insistence that
GTE conduct its business 'in compliance with the highest ethical business stan-
dards,' by doing more than was absolutely required by law, met some resis-
tance from others legitimately concerned about profitability. We would be reluc-
tant to conclude that disagreements over the wording of a product warning
label, or the hypothetical risk posed by a product, which are matters commit-
ted to the business judgment of a company and do not rise to the requisite
level of public concern, could be the basis for a wrongful discharge claim.
Id. at 168.
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C. Whistleblower Protection Statutes
In-house lawyers who were terminated after they dissented
from their client's illegal or unethical instructions have found
comfort in state and federal statutes designed to protect
"whistleblowers." In Parker v. M&T Chemicals, 82 for example,
an in-house patent counsel was constructively discharged after
refusing, in writing, to copy the technology of the company's
competitors that had been erroneously released in court proceed-
ings.383 Parker brought suit against M&T Chemicals for retalia-
tory discharge under New Jersey's "Conscientious Employee Pro-
tection Act"
38
M&T Chemicals contended that the protections of the act
should not extend to in-house counsel because under the state's
rules of professional conduct, Parker was required to withdraw
if he believed his client's instructions violated his ethical obliga-
tions.38 The court rejected the company's claim that the statute
impinged on the attorney-client relationship.3 6 The court also
found no threat to client confidences because, under state law,
the attorney-client privilege did not extend to communications
in furtherance of a crime or fraud.3
8 7
Although unsuccessful in establishing the basis for his
claim, an in-house counsel's assertion of a wrongful discharge
claim under the whistleblower protection provision of the False
Claims Act 388 suggests that in-house counsel may avail them-
selves of a federal cause of action in other factual circumstances.
382. 566 A-2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
383. Id. at 217. M&T Chemicals, Parker's employer, had tried unsuccessfully to de-
velop the specialized technology necessary to manufacture methyltin stabilizers. The
company learned that transcripts containing the technology had been inadvertently re-
leased, despite being subject to a sealing order, in litigation to which the company was
not a party. The company arranged to obtain access to the transcripts from a party to
the litigation and directed Parker to supervise the copying of the transcripts. Parker re-
fused and thereafter, was demoted. Id. at 217-18.
384. N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 34:19-1 to 34:19-8 (1988 & Supp. 1996).
385. Parker, 566 A-2d at 219.
386. The company argued that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to law-
yers because it was contrary to the New Jersey Supreme Court's authority to regulate
the conduct of attorneys. The court noted, however, that although the client might be
answerable in damages, the client was nevertheless free to discharge its attorney/em-
ployee and therefore, the attorney-client relationship was unaffected by the statute. Id.
at 219-20.
387. Id. at 221 (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A. 84A-20(2)(a) (West) (1994)).
388. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1994) ("Any employee who is discharged . . .because of
lawful acts done by the employee . .. or others in furtherance of an action under this
section... shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole.").
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In the case of X Corp. v. Doe,38 9 Doe, X Corp.'s former in-house
counsel, had initiated an investigation concerning possible viola-
tion of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by supplying the gov-
ernment with equipment containing used or remanufactured
parts, rather than the equipment called for in X Corp.'s contract,
and by failing to provide the government with notice of the dis-
counts X Corp. provided to commercial customers.390 Doe contin-
ued to monitor the progress of the investigation after he was
transferred from California to Virginia as a result of his failure
to gain admission to the California Bar. Doe advised the general
counsel of his concerns regarding X Corp.'s compliance with the
federal regulations.3 91 Approximately a year and a half later,
Doe's employment was terminated. X Corp. characterized the
termination as a lay-off as part of a company-wide reduction in
personnel. Doe claimed that he had been discharged in retalia-
tion for actions that X Corp. believed he was taking in further-
389. Although originally under seal, the identity of the parties has subsequently
been revealed. "X Corp." is Tandem Computers, Inc., a supplier of computer equipment
to the United States Government. See United States ex rel. Doe v. X Corp., 862 F. Supp.
1502 (1994). "Doe" is Mark R. Levin, Esq., a former Deputy Attorney General of the
United States, who was an in-house counsel at Tandem responsible for compliance. Id.
The litigation arose when Tandem, after having laid Levin off from its legal staff, re-
ceived a letter from Levin asserting a state law wrongful termination claim and enclos-
ing a draft complaint. The complaint contained confidential information. Tandem then
filed suit against Levin, under seal, seeking a preliminary injunction against disclosure
of its confidential information and the return of documents taken by Levin prior to his
termination. The district court enjoined disclosure of the confidential information but de-
clined to order the documents returned. X Corp v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Va. 1992)
[hereinafter "Doe I"]. In further proceedings, the district 'court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Tandem as to Levin's claim of retaliatory discharge, permanently en-
joined Levin from disclosing Tandem's confidences and secrets and ordered Levin to re-
turn Tandem's documents. X Corp v. Doe, 816 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Va. 1993) [hereinafter
"Doe II"]. The award of injunctive relief, including the return of documents, was subse-
quently affirmed by the US. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. X Corp. v. Doe, 17
F.3d 1435 (4th Cir. 1994). In the meantime, Levin filed a qui tam action under the False
Claims Act, 31 US.C. §§ 3729 et seq., which Tandem eventually settled with the govern-
ment. United States ex rel. Doe v. X Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1502, 1504 (E.D. Va. 1994)
[hereinafter "Doe III"]. Tandem then obtained summary judgment in its favor in Levin's
qui tam action on the grounds that because of the injunction against disclosure, Levin
was not qualified to act as a qui tam relator. Id. at 1509-10. For convenience, the parties
will be referred to as 'X Corp." and "Doe" rather than by their true names.
390. Doe II, 816 F. Supp. at 1087-88.
391. Doe also expressed his opinion to other members of Tandems legal department
that Tandem was vulnerable to a qui tam complaint under the False Claims Act and cir-
culated articles concerning qui tam litigation. Id. at 1090. However, as the court ob-
served, "Doe never told any member of the legal department or any X Corp. employee
that he intended, or even contemplated, filing a qui tam action against X Corp." Id.
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ance of a possible qui tam suit. 92 The court held that Doe was
required to establish a causal relationship between his termina-
tion and his purported activities in furtherance of a qui tam
suit,393 and Doe had failed to demonstrate such a causal
relationship.39
4
Other courts have read the whistleblower provisions of the
False Claims Act more expansively, however. For example, in
Neal v. Honeywell, Inc. , 95 False Claims Act whistleblower pro-
tection was extended to an employee who had made an internal
report of fraud but who had not filed a qui tam action (and who
claimed that her employer had improperly failed to apprise her
of her right to file a qui tam action). Neal was employed by
Honeywell at the Joliet army arsenal plant administered by
Honeywell. Neal reported to Honeywell's legal counsel that test
data were being falsified. As a result of Neal's report and the in-
ternal investigation that ensued, Honeywell disclosed the fraud
to the government and ultimately two Honeywell employees
pleaded guilty to criminal fraud charges and Honeywell entered
into a $2.5 million False Claims Act settlement with the United
States. 3
96
392. Id. Under the False Claims Act, individuals or entities are authorized to bring
actions in the name of the United States for damages. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1994) ("A per-
son may bring a civil action for a violation of § 3729 for the person and for the United
States Government."). The Act provides for the recovery of treble damages, and in the
case of a recovery, the qui tam relator is entitled to between 15% and 25% of the pro-
ceeds of the action. 31 US.C. §§ 3729(1), 3730(d) (1994). Lawyers and law firms have
filed actions as qui tam relators. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kriendler & Kriendler v.
United Technologies Corp., 985 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. John Doe
v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318 (2d Ci. 1992); Houck ex reL. United States v. Folding
Carton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1989); United States ex rel. Stinson v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
393. Thus, the court observed that to prevail, "Doe must establish that his acts can
be construed as taken in furtherance of a qui tam action because no retaliatory dis-
charge is established if Doe's discharge simply resulted from an adverse reaction to per-
sistence in urging compliance." Doe II, 816 F. Supp. at 1096.
394. In this regard, the court noted:
[Wihile Doe alleges that he took certain actions that X Corp. could have con-
strued as acts in furtherance of a qui tam suit, it appears that Doe, as corpo-
rate counsel, did not take these in order to facilitate a qui tam suit, but to
prod X Corp. to pursue compliance efforts more vigorously.
Id. at 1095. With respect to Doe's comments concerning possible qui tam liability and
Doe's circulating articles regarding qui tam suits, the court concluded that '[t]hese ac-
tions... represented no more than Doe's efforts to fulfill his responsibility to raise rele-
vant legal issues." Id. at 1095-96. The court further concluded that "[tlhese actions do
not suggest that Doe had brought a qui tam action, nor that he even contemplated
bringing such an action Id. at 1096.
395. 33 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1994).
396. Id. at 861.
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In her suit against Honeywell, Neal contended that as a re-
sult of her report and the events that followed, she had been
harassed and threatened to the point of resignation. 3 7 Honey-
well argued that because Neal had never reported her allega-
tions of fraud to the government or filed a qui tam action her-
self, she was ineligible for whistleblower protection, there being
no "action" pending.398 Honeywell's construction of the False
Claims Act was rejected by both the district court and the court
of appeals.399 Instead, it was held that because the
whistleblower provisions apply to investigatory activities preced-
ing litigation, Neal's internal report of the fraud was protected
by the False Claims Act. 00 The broad construction of the False
Claims Act whistleblower provisions in Neal was relied on in
two retaliation cases arising in the federal courts of California.
In the first, United States v. Aiello,401 the manager of a federally
subsidized senior citizen residential complex alleged that the
owners of the complex had falsified records in order to make
false claims to the Farmer's Home Administration. The manager
sued, claiming that she had been fired because she had dis-
closed the fraud and had testified before the grand jury.402 The
defendants sought dismissal of the claim because the plaintiff
had failed to allege that her termination was in connection with
an action "filed or to be filed. 40 3 Citing Neal, the district court
held that False Claims Act whistleblower protection extends not
only to actual qui tam plaintiffs but also to those who investi-
gate, testify or who are "otherwise involved" in the filing of an
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. In this regard, the district court specifically declined to follow Doe v. X Corp.
Instead, the district court extended whistleblower protection to Neal on public policy
grounds:
The False Claims Act is intended to put an end to fraud against the gov-
ernment by encouraging those with knowledge of such fraud to come forward.
In order to further that purpose, public policy demands that internal
whistleblowers like the Plaintiff in the present case can be protected from re-
taliation .... Thus, we hold that the whistleblower protection provision of the
False Claims Act forbids discrimination against an employee who has made an
intracorporate complaint about fraud against the government.
826 F. Supp. 266, 272-73 (N.D. M. 1993).
400. 33 F.3d at 865 ("Neal conducted her own investigation and reported her find-
ings through corporate channels, leading to two additional investigations: one by Honey-
well and a second by the Army. The conduct limned in her complaint may reasonably be
described as both investigation for and assistance in an action 'to be filed.' ").
401. 836 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
402. Id. at 722.
403. Id. at 723.
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action. 4
In the second, subsequent case, Clemes v. Del Norte County
Unified School District,4 5 a school teacher who had reported
false record keeping in a federally funded program to the school
administration and to the government (the district attorney and
the U.S. Department of Justice) was entitled to whistleblower
protection despite his not having followed the procedural re-
quirements for filing a qui tam action.4 6 Again following the
Neal decision, the district court held that the whistleblower pro-
visions were to be construed broadly,4°7 and found that Clemes'




In contrast to Neal, Kent and Clemes, whistleblower protec-
tion was denied to a terminated employee in Robertson v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc.,409 where there was no evidence that the
employee's supervisors knew that the employee was conducting
an investigation outside the scope of his normal duties. There,
Robertson, a senior contracts administrator, attempted to sub-
stantiate a request to the government for additional funds by re-
questing documents and information from managers in different
departments of the company. Robertson also raised cost charging
issues with his supervisors on a regular basis. After he was laid
off, Robertson claimed that he had been retaliated against be-
cause of his "investigation" and reports to management and be-
cause he had refused to perform an illegal act requested by the
company.410 Both the district court (which granted defendants'
404. Id. at 723-24.
405. 843 F. Supp. 583 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
406. Id. at 595.
407. Id. at 595-96. The court in Clemes noted that:
Whistleblower statutes have traditionally been broadly construed, see Neal v.
Honeywell, Inc.,. . . and this court sees no reason to break from tradition in
this instance in order to read the statute in a manner which its plain language
does not support. Other courts to consider the issue have reached the same
conclusion that the retaliation provisions of the False Claims Act are available
to whistleblowers whether or not they have pursued a qui tam action or taken
the steps outlined in 31 US.C. § 3730(b).
Id- (citation omitted).
408. Id. at 596. The court noted that:
Mr. Clemes alleges that he brought evidence of fraud against the government
to the attention of his immediate supervisors, as well as to state officials and
the Department of Justice. On the basis of these facts, this court is unable to
say that Mr. Clemes can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief
under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
409. 32 F.3d 948 (5th Cir. 1994).
410. Id. at 949-50. Robertson had expressed concerns about requests for funds with-
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motion for judgment NOV)" and the court of appeals (which af-
firmed the district court) disagreed that Robertson's activities
were protected under the False Claims Act. Unlike Neal, Kent
and Clemes, where plaintiffs had expressed their concerns about
possible fraud to management, Robertson had offered no evi-
dence that either his supervisors or the company was aware of
any activity on Robertson's part in furtherance of a qui tam ac-
tion.411 Accordingly, Robertson's actions were "qualitatively dif-
ferent" from those in Neal, Kent and Clemes, and his reporting
did not rise to protected activity under the False Claims Act.
412
Thus, although whistleblower protection may not be strictly
predicated on the actual filing of a qui tam action under the
False Claims Act (as suggested in Doe), there must be a causal
relationship between plaintiff's False Claims Act-related activi-
ties and the alleged retaliation by the defendant employer. In
this regard, as in Robertson, when the plaintiff's activities do
not put the employer on notice that the plaintiff is engaging in
protected activity (i.e., because the plaintiff's actions were all in
the ordinary course of the plaintiff's duties or because the plain-
tiff did not specifically report fraud or illegality to management)
there will be insufficient evidence of retaliatory intent and thus,
the required causal connection will be missing.
Nevertheless, because in-house counsel plainly can engage
in protected False Claims Act activity, including the filing of a
qui tam complaint, where in-house counsel can establish the re-
quired retaliatory intent by demonstrating a causal connection
between counsel's termination and protected activity, in-house
counsel should be able to avail themselves of the whistleblower
protections of the False Claims Act to be made whole for dam-
ages resulting from retaliatory termination.
out verification. When he was asked to write a letter requesting an additional $2 million
for unanticipated maintenance and repair in connection with two contracts, Robertson
refused. Robertson's performance rating was subsequently lowered (due to tardiness and
difficulty in communicating effectively) and he was later laid off as part of a general re-
duction in the work force. Id. at 950.
411. Id. at 951.
412. Id The Robertson court stated that:
In the cases cited [Neal, Kent and Clermes], the employees did not file qui tam
actions, but they did express concerns about possible fraud to their employers.
By contrast, in this case, Robertson admitted that he never used the terms "il-
legal," "unlawful," or "qui tam action" in characterizing his concerns about
Bell's charges. Thus, Robertson's reporting was qualitatively different than the
reporting that occurred in the cases he cites. As a result, we conclude that
Robertson's reporting did not constitute protected activity under the False
Claims Act.
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D. Protecting Confidential Information in the Face of a
Wrongful Termination/Retaliatory Discharge Claim
The disclosure of confidential information in the course of
attorney-client litigation has been a matter of significant con-
cern to courts. Some courts have viewed the risk to the attor-
ney-client relationship, resulting from possible disclosure of cli-
ent confidences, too great and for that reason have denied in-
house counsel recourse in the courts for wrongful termination or
retaliatory discharge. 413 Other courts, however, have found the
possible disclosure of client confidences not to be a bar to an at-
torney's ability to vindicate rights through litigation.414 To a
great extent, however, whether disclosure of client confidences
will be permitted turns on whether the confidential information
is used offensively or defensively by the attorney.
When a former in-house attorney endeavors to support a
claim against a former employer, the employer has several rem-
edies available to limit or prevent disclosure of its confidences.
Thus, in the X Corp. v. Doe litigation discussed above, X Corp.
sought and obtained injunctive relief against Doe after X Corp.
learned that Doe had provided the government with confidential
information in connection with a qui tam action Doe was filing
against his former employer.415 The court found that X Corp. had
met its burden to show irreparable injury since, "[o]nce confi-
dential attorney-client communications are disclosed, their confi-
dential nature is permanently and irrevocably impaired."416 The
court also concluded that X Corp. would not be required to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because X
413. See, e.g., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (l. 1991).
414. See, eg., Doe v. A Corp., 709 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir. 1983). The court in Doe
v. A Corp. held that:
The district judge granted summary judgment on the basis that Doe's prior
representation of A Corporation was a per se bar. A lawyer, however, does not
forfeit his rights simply because to prove them he must utilize confidential in-
formation. Nor does the client gain the right to cheat the lawyer by imparting
confidences to him.
Id-
415. At the time he left X Corp., Doe took with him approximately 4,300 pages of
documents from X Corp.'s files which he claimed supported his contention that X Corp.
had engaged in fraud in connection with its government contracts. Doe based his report
to the government in support of his qui tam complaint on these documents. Doe also
provided the government with a copy of his state law wrongful termination complaint
which contained confidential information. X Corp. learned of Doe's intent to disclose its
confidences when Doe's counsel sent a letter to X Corp. asserting Doe's state law wrong-
ful termination claim and enclosing a draft of Doe's complaint. Doe I, 805 F. Supp. at
1301-02.
416. Id. at 1304.
882 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
Corp.;s complaint raised "grave or serious questions" concerning
"difficult and troubling ethical issues . . . ." Accordingly, the
court granted an injunction against disclosure of the confidential
information.41
7
Although X Corp. was unsuccessful initially in obtaining the
return of the documents purloined by Doe,418 in subsequent pro-
ceedings Doe was compelled to return the documents to X
Corp.419 In reaching this conclusion the court analyzed what Doe
knew (or should have known) at the time of the intended disclo-
sure of the confidential information and whether a reasonable
attorney would have found that the information "clearly estab-
lished" an ongoing or planned fraud.4 20 Based on that analysis,
the court concluded that Doe had failed to show that disclosure
was justified in view of the public interest in maintaining client
confidentiality.421
417. Id. Indeed, the court observed, "[flew questions are graver or more serious in
the practice of law than determining what evidence of crime or fraud justifies a lawyer's
disclosure of his client's confidential information." Id
418. Id. at 1311-12. The court concluded that because Doe was enjoined from dis-
closing X Corp.'s confidences, X Corp. was unlikely to suffer irreparable injury if Doe
were allowed to retain his copies of the documents. Additionally, the court expressed
some question whether X Corp. would prevail on its breach of confidentiality agreement
claim upon which X. Corp. sought return of the documents. Id. Finally, the court also
found no "discernable public interest" supporting return of the documents at that stage
of the litigation. In the court's view, requiring return of the documents "would merely
confer on X Corp. the fruits of victory before they are earned.! Id. at 1312.
419. Doe II, 816 F. Supp. at 1095.
420. See id. at 1091-95. As the court had explained in Doe I, 'X Corp. must show..
* that the communications sought to be protected are 'confidences' or 'secrets' within the
meaning of [the] Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility .. . " and once X Corp.
met that initial burden of establishing a duty of confidentiality, "the burden then shifts
to Doe to show that the material and information he voluntarily disclosed or seeks to
disclose 'clearly establish' that during the course of Doe's representation, X Corp. perpe-
trated a fraud related to the subject matter of the representation upon a third party,
namely the federal government." Doe I, 805 F. Supp. at 1310. The court emphasized that
Doe was required to show "more than mere suspicion of fraud" but rather, Doe had to
show that "a reasonable attorney in his position would find the communications at issue
to be convincing evidence of the perpetration of a fraud . . . ." Id. The court in Doe II
found that X Corp. had met its burden of showing that the communications constituted
"confidences" and "secrets" such that the burden shifted to Doe to justify their disclosure.
Doe II, 816 F. Supp. at 1095. In this respect, the court in Doe II stated that:
Initially, the parties disputed whether the documents met the threshold re-
quirement that they represent client "confidences" or "secrets." There is no
doubt they do. Many documents reflect information obtained in the context of
the attorney-client relationship. Other documents fall within the attorney-
client privilege as they relate to advice from attorneys. As a whole, the body of
documents clearly constitute and reflect X Corp.'s secrets and confidences.
Id-
421. Doe 11, 816 F. Supp. at 1095 ("Doe has failed to show that his proposed volun-
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An additional consequence of the injunctive relief granted to
X Corp., forbidding Doe from disclosing X Corp.'s confidences
and compelling Doe to return X Corp.'s documents, was that Doe
was foreclosed from being a relator in a qui tam action against
X Corp.4 2 The court reasoned in this regard that although Doe's
status as an attorney did not prevent him from serving as a re-
lator, he was nevertheless ineligible to do so because he did not
possess sufficient information which he could disclose, consistent
with his professional duties, to form a sustainable qui tam com-
plaint against X Corp.423.
Thus, an employer faced with disclosure of its confidences
and secrets by its counsel offensively, whether in support of a
wrongful termination/retaliatory discharge suit or a qui tam ac-
tion under the False Claims Act, may seek injunctive relief
preventing disclosure and requiring the return of its documents.
However, when counsel proposes to disclose confidential infor-
mation defensively, for example, to defend against allegations of
misconduct or lack of competence, the analysis is quite different.
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules allow an attor-
ney to disclose client confidences defensively. Under the Model
Code, a lawyer may reveal the secrets and confidences of a cli-
ent where necessary "to defend himself or his employees or asso-
ciates against an accusation of wrongful conduct."4 4 Similarly,
the Model Rules allow the disclosure of confidential information
"to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a contro-
versy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense
to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based
upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's represen-
tation of the client."425 Courts, as well, have upheld disclosures
tary disclosure is justified given the compelling public interest in preserving the integ-
rity of the attorney-client relationship. Given this, the disputed documents must be re-
turned and Doe permanently enjoined from voluntarily disclosing X Corp.'s confidences
and secrets).
422. Doe III, 862 F. Supp. at 1510.
423. Id The court in Doe III held that:
In sum, neither Doe's status as an attorney, nor his use of a letter refer-
encing the material contained in the complaint as his "written disclosure," bars
Doe from serving as a relator in this action. Doe cannot be a relator in this ac-
tion for the sole reason that he does not possess enough information that he
may legally disclose to form the basis of a valid complaint against X Corp.
Id.
424. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1980).
425. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1995). The Comment to
Model Rule 1.6 notes that:
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when necessary to defend against suits by former clients. 426
Thus, the employer wishing to discharge in-house counsel must
exercise care in the manner in which that discharge is justified
in order to safeguard against defensive disclosure of its confi-
dences and secrets by its former counsel.
CONCLUSION
The foundation of the attorney-client relationship is the
lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. From that primary duty
flow other ethical duties a lawyer owes the client such as avoid-
ing self-dealing and preserving client confidences and secrets.
This fundamental ethical obligation (and its progeily) runs to all
lawyers whether the lawyer represents multiple clients, each of
whom have individual claims to the lawyer's undivided loyalty,
or whether the lawyer represents one institutional client, the
lawyer's employer.
When, however, the lawyer becomes aware of client miscon-
duct in the course of the lawyer's representation, what once
seemed to be a bright line principle of client loyalty and confi-
dentiality becomes much more vague. The lawyer may also be
confronted with possible conflicting ethical and legal obligations
regarding disclosure of the wrongdoing. The ethical and legal
ambiguity is only heightened for the in-house lawyer who may
serve as both counsel and manager of the entity.
As a result of that dual role of lawyer and manager, in-
house counsel must always be mindful of who the client is. Both
the Model Code and the Model Rules are clear and categorical
that for in-house counsel, the client is the corporate entity and
not the individuals through which the corporation thinks and
acts. In practice, however, the distinction between the corpora-
tion and its senior management is more theoretical than real,
particularly in the eyes of management who do not iabor under
such a distinction between themselves and the corporate entity
Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer
in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation
of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a
claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1995).
426. See, eg., Heartbreak Cabaret Corp. v. Cruz & Toledo Restaurant, 699 F. Supp.
1066, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("As a matter of common sense, when a former client sues his
former attorney, the client places the attorney in a position where previously confiden-
tial communications must be revealed to trial counsel defending the attorney in the
suit.").
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and who quite naturally view corporate counsel as one of them.
For that reason, in-house counsel must take pains to make it
clear in the first instance and to remind their management col-
leagues thereafter that when functioning as a lawyer, in-house
counsel's ethical loyalties and fiduciary obligations run to the
corporation and not to them.
The divergence of collegiality and loyalty is most poignant
when in-house counsel wrestles with disclosure of misconduct by
those acting on behalf of the corporation. Here again, the Model
Code and Model Rules propose a course of conduct the practical
consequences of which, for in-house counsel, were either not con-
templated or were ignored by their authors.
The ethical obligation of in-house counsel who has reason to
believe that the corporation is acting illegally is to rectify the
situation. Counsel is admonished by the Model Rules to seek re-
consideration of the decision resulting in the illegality. Failing in
that, counsel is then to evaluate the matter to higher authority
in the organization up to the highest authority in the organiza-
tion, ordinarily the board of directors. In order to do so, how-
ever, counsel will disclose information to higher management or
to the board that may have been imparted to the lawyer in the
belief that the information would be treated confidentially. To
avoid such a misperception (and to avoid an inadvertent crea-
tion of an attorney-client relationship between in-house counsel
and an individual), in-house counsel must make it clear that the
counsel represents the corporation and not any individual and
for that reason, the information provided to in-house counsel
will be disclosed to others in the management of the
corporation.
If the Chief executive officer or the board of directors rejects
counsel's advice and declines to cease the unlawful practice,
counsel must confront several courses of action, none of which
are pleasant.
Counsel must resolve whether to disclose the client's illegal-
ity to the government (if the corporation engaged in regulated
activities) or to private third parties. Although again, the Model
Code and the Model Rules address such disclosure under limited
circumstances and provide that disclosure of client confidences
is permissible, if at all, generally only to prevent death or seri-
ous bodily injury. Government agencies and private litigants
have viewed counsel's disclosure obligations much less restric-
tively, however.
Government regulatory agencies, such as the SEC and the
OTS, have aggressively sought to impose on corporate counsel
an obligation to disclose (or at least not to withhold) information
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concerning their clients' violations of the law or the regulations
that the agencies enforce. Counsel who remain silent concerning
their clients' violations (past, current or future) risk having that
silence viewed by these agencies, and private litigants, as being
in furtherance of their clients' continuing and future illegality,
thereby giving rise to counsel sharing in liability for their cli-
ents' misconduct. Additionally, counsel whose involvement in a
transaction is considered essential to the transaction's consum-
mation (i.e., the "passkey") also risk being viewed as a direct
participant in the transaction and therefore individually liable
for improprieties in the transaction. The risk to in-house counsel
is even greater in this regard due to in-house counsel's direct in-
volvement in management of the corporation in addition to their
role as attorneys. Thus, the in-house counsel faced with client
intransigence may have no real alternative but to disclose the
client's confidential information in order to avoid personal liabil-
ity for the client's misconduct, notwithstanding counsers ethical
obligations to the contrary.
Further, when the corporation's executive management de-
clines to abandon the illegal conduct, both the Model Code and
the Model Rules direct counsel to withdraw from the representa-
tion of the corporation. Compliance with ethical standards of
conduct is cold comfort to in-house counsel whose only client is
the corporation and who thus faces the prospect of immediate
unemployment, and possibly the end of a career, if counsel is
ethically obliged to withdraw.
In those circumstances, in-house counsel who must "with-
draw" in order to comply with counsel's ethical obligations, as
well as to avoid personal culpability, would be justified in the
view that rather than being a voluntary act, counsel's resigna-
tion was compelled by the corporate employer, in effect, a con-
structive discharge.
Should in-house counsel have recourse, therefore, against
the "scoundrel" client? The prevailing view appears to be that
because a lawyer's employment is at the will of the client, in-
house counsel can be discharged (actually or constructively) at
any time. Courts that have considered wrongful termination and
constructive discharge claims by former in-house lawyers have
hewed to this traditional view and have denied relief An emerg-
ing line of cases, however, have held that while clients are al-
ways free to discharge their in-house counsel, they may never-
theless be held accountable for the consequences of their actions
and when the loss of employment is the result of in-house coun-
sel's ethical obligations, counsel have been allowed to recover
damages. It remains to be seen whether this view will prevail.
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